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Part 1 
Analysis 
and 
Recoininendations 
Introduction 
Over the past eighteen months, the Commission on Government Integrity has devoted 
considerable time and resources to investigating the fund-raising practices of candidates for 
public office in New York. It has held a series of public hearings, computerized campaign dis-
closure statements for the first time, and issued a series of reports on the subject.1 The 
Commission's probing of the present campaign finance system, and its examination of the 
concerns and practices of candidates, contributors, and the Board of Elections, has illuminated 
serious interlocking problems in current practices: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Candidates for public office need enormous sums of money. Modern campaigns 
for major office depend heavily on media, especially costly television advertising, 
and expensive consultants. These financial pressures cause officeholders to 
solicit money through the entire terms of their office, in order to raise the 
needed totals. 
Less than three tenths of one percent of the voters in New York make political 
contributions. The vast majority of contributions comes from a small core group of 
contributors, many with special interests to promote. These contributors give most 
freely to those already in office, those in powerful positions, and those seen as likely 
winners, in order to ensure access and influence and to protect against the spectre of 
adverse action. 
The constant need to raise funds makes it difficult for incumbents to separate their 
fund-raising activities from their official activities. Their official staffs, many of whom 
also often work on their campaigns, blur those distinctions even further. 
Existing statutory limits on campaign contributions are absurdly high. Wealthy 
contributors easily dominate the fund-raising scene. 
Disclosure mechanisms are so ineffective that the contribution process is hidden from 
the public and press. The Board of Elections, the nominal enforcement agency, is 
actually subservient to the very groups it is meant to police. Even when the Board 
takes steps to improve its enforcement procedures, it is hampered by a lack of needed 
funds. 
1 See Appendix One for a listing of all of these materials, which are available upon request from the 
Commission on Government Integrity. 
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Each of these problems contributes to the popular view that big gifts buy influence. 
Although not the norm, some of the solicitation efforts we have investigated seem to invite 
prospective contributors to believe that their contributions may help them or that their refusal 
to give may hurt them. Even when officeholders attempt to prevent such impressions, they may 
not be able to dispel the unexpressed uneasiness in the minds of prospective contributors that a 
refusal to contribute may subtly influence decisions affecting their business interests. Candidates 
cannot reduce their need for money, and they have great difficulty obtaining adequate funding 
from those who are financially disinterested. They must inevitably solicit the bulk of their 
campaign funds from those who have a financial stake in the business of government. 
Earlier Commission reports have addressed each of these problems and laid out a 
program of reform recommendations. But nowhere are these forces more powerful, or more 
obvious, than in the case of our statewide elected officers. This report, while drawing on the 
Commission's previous work and what has been learned about how candidates for other offices 
raise money, focuses on the fund-raising practices of the Governor, Attorney General and 
Comptroller of New York State during the periods of their incumbency.2 Their fund-raising 
practices provide a compelling argument for the reforms needed to break the current cycles of 
behavior that make political fund-raising so troublesome. 
In public testimony before the Commission,3 our statewide political leaders all made 
encouraging statements of support for various reform measures. Governor Cuomo promised to 
sign any reform bill placed before him. Attorney General Abrams and Comptroller Regan 
reiterated their longstanding endorsements of reform. All three pledged a number of voluntary 
restraints in the interim until a reform statute is enacted. Both Assembly Speaker Miller and 
Senate Majority Leader Marino, in public testimony before the Commission on March 17, 1989, 
spoke of the need to strengthen the Board of Elections and adopt far more stringent 
contribution limits. In addition, and most important, they indicated a willingness to explore the 
possibilities for public funding of at least some elections in New York. 
These statements bespeak recognition that it is not enough to rely on the good faith and 
ad hoc controls of individual officeholders. These controls tend to break down in the face of 
the overwhelming pressures both upon candidates seeking to gain or keep office, and upon 
businessmen competing for lucrative business opportunities. One candidate cannot be expected 
2 The fundraising practices of each of these three statewide elected officials are described separately in Part 
2 of this report. 
3 Comptroller Edward V. Regan testified on September 23, 1988. Governor Mario M. Cuomo and Attorney 
General Robert Abrams testified on March 10, 1989. 
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to hold back when an opponent is taking every advantage the law allows, and one business firm 
cannot be expected to hold back when a competitor may be gaining advantage through 
campaign contributions. The competitive nature of both politics and business tends to push 
even the most conscientious participants to the limits of the law. Institutional safeguards must 
be adopted and they must go far beyond any now in place in order to restore citizens' 
confidence in the integrity of officeholders and institutions. 
I. The Need for Money 
Breeds a Constant Preoccupation with Fund-Raising 
Every statewide officeholder testified that he abhorred fund-raising. This echoes the 
sentiments of every other candidate whose testimony has been heard--all describe fund-raising as 
the most distasteful of their activities. Yet they cannot escape it, even when the next election is 
two or three years off. 
Modern political campaigns are extremely expensive. To compete effectively, especially 
for statewide office in New York, candidates must raise and spend millions of dollars. And as 
the price of advertising--particularly television time--goes up, so does the cost of getting elected. 
Air time alone for a single 30-second prime time television commercial can cost as much as 
$30,000 today. In addition, candidates must hire an array of expensive pollsters, media 
consultants, public relations advisors and the like. 
The need for huge sums does not disappear when the election is over. In many cases, 
the winner is left with a sizable campaign debt, and every officeholder must plan early in his or 
her tenure to raise money for the next campaign, be it one for re-election or for some other 
office.4 This creates an unhealthy preoccupation with fund-raising throughout the election cycle. 
Candidates continuously raise money, even when their war chests are full, and even in non-
election years. In 1988--two years before the next statewide elections in 1990--each of the 
statewide officeholders held major fund-raising events: 
4 The Attorney General entered the 1986 race seeking a two-tiered pledge from his major contributors: 
$15,000 from each should he run for Attorney General; $50,000 from each should he run for Governor. Fund-
raisers for both Abrams and Regan spoke of raising extra money to protect against the possibility of some 
wealthy candidate entering the race. 
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Date of Cash on Amount 
Candidate Fund-raiser Hand Before Raised 
Cuomo November 30, 1988 $3,591,000 $1,158,040 
Abrams January 12, 1988 $1,0005 $326,8506 
Regan May 2, 1988 $144,000 $866,080 
Off-year fund-raising is a particularly effective way to discourage potential challengers, 
the political version of a "preemptive strike." Few challengers have the kind of name 
recognition necessary to raise large amounts years before an election. As a result, incumbents 
enjoy a tremendous advantage, and the voters may be denied an important choice. This attempt 
to discourage future challengers is not limited to off-year fund-raising. Incumbents sometimes 
campaign and spend heavily even when they are not opposed or when the opposition is feeble. 
Campaigns are so expensive that despite constant fund-raising, even incumbents run out 
of money.7 The more one candidate spends, the more his or her opponent feels compelled to 
spend, and the costs escalate out of control. Frequently a candidate will hoard or borrow funds 
for a surprise last-minute media blitz. In such a case, the opponent, too, often borrows money 
from family, friends or from banks (with the loan personally guaranteed by key contributors). 
The task of raising money to repay these debts is deferred until after the election in the 
generally correct belief that victory will make the necessary fund-raising easier. 
Modern political fund-raising generally requires repeated personal appeals by the 
candidate to potential contributors. Only the Governor and the Mayor of New York City, by 
virtue of the powers inherent in their offices, are in a position to delegate solicitation to others. 
Their volunteer or professional fund-raisers function as their surrogates, using the Governor's or 
the Mayor's name and position to attract crowds to huge events and to solicit money directly 
from wealthy individuals. Candidates for less prominent office cannot afford the luxury of 
5 This figure reflects cash on hand as of September 1, 1987, the point at which the campaign committee 
began to organize the solicitation effort for the Janauary 12, 1988 tundraising event. 
6 Abrams raised $282,000 from 7/14/87 to 1/11/88; he raised $44,850 from 1/12/88 to 7/13/88. 
7 The proceeds of the Abrams' fund-raiser held in January, 1988, were used in part to pay off the campaign 
committee's $58,000 outstanding debt from the 1986 campaign. 
Regan likewise borrowed $290,000 in October, 1986 to meet unexpected, last-minute campaign expenses. 
He held his annual Spring fund-raiser at Lincoln Center in New York City on June 8, 1987, and used the 
proceeds in part to defray those costs. 
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distancing themselves from personal involvement in fund-raising. For them, fund-raising is an 
unending process requiring their personal attention. 
Candidates make constant efforts to expand their network of potential contributors and 
to cultivate the friendship of the wealthy and powerful. They and their representatives glean 
names of potential contributors from various sources, including lists generated in the course of 
their official duties.8 Whether they meet such potential contributors in an official context or in 
a social setting, many note and record names and pertinent details, and make sure their 
campaign committees receive that information.9 And whether the work is done by the 
campaign committee or the candidate or both, the actual fund-raising involves hard work.1 O 
8 People who attended the Governor's Business Barbecue in 1984 (paid for by State funds) found 
themselves invited to serve on his Dinner Committee, his core group of fund-raisers. In a memorandum to 
Cuomo, Lucille Falcone (Counsel to Cuomo's Campaign Committee and the main organizer of the Committee's 
fund-raising) asked him to provide the names to her, so that they could be recruited for the fund-raising team. 
The Attorney General's official Department of Law Major Mailing List grew by some 433 names between 
1986 and 1988. Although the stated purpose for the list was to communicate the views of the Attorney General 
on issues of public importance to those in leadership positions in New York, 94% of the added names were 
those of contributors. 
9 Identifying such individuals was one of the assigned tasks of Joseph Palumbo, Comptroller Regan's 
assistant. 
10 Both the Ned Regan Support Committee and Friends of Mario Cuomo use the same techniques as the 
most effective private philanthropies. In the Comptroller's case, Dinner Committee Chairs or Co-Chairs for the 
annual spring dinner are selected on the basis of their "outreach" -- the ability to buttonhole large numbers of 
friends and other contacts and to solicit pledges or purchases of tickets and tables. Thereafter follow-up calls are 
assiduously made by campaign committee staff and volunteers. The Comptroller's administrative aide takes a 
leave of absence from his official job to make these follow-up calls. In campaign years, or years when there is a 
post-election debt, a second dinner may be held. Although the fund-raising goal is typically lower, the second 
dinner is preceded by the same organizational efforts supporting the Spring dinner. The Comptroller is intimately 
involved in the planning process. 
The Governor's campaign committee follows the same model of fund-raising although the Governor is 
less personally involved. The selection of Dinner Committee members is made with great care on the basis of 
their ability to reach out to potential contributors, and each member is given goals to meet. Because of the 
Governor's high visibility, he is able to raise substantially more money through fewer fund-raising events. 
Attorney General Abrams, though perhaps more visible to the general public than the Comptroller, has a 
more directly personal approach. Eschewing the formula of an annual fundraising event, he adopts a "one-on-
one" approach. Beginning almost two years in advance of the next election, he embarks on an organized 
program of individual breakfast or luncheon meetings with prospective contributors of substantial sums. While 
these may not be his only meetings with these individuals (many of whom he describes as friends) , they are the 
occasions for a specific, and highly choreographed, request for substantial financial support. One of the 
members of his Finance Committee is always present, charged with the responsibility of eliciting a pledge of 
$15,000 (or $50,000 if the Attorney General were to run for Governor). In addition to this "one-on-one" program, 
the Attorney General raised approximately $700,000 through a large fund-raising event on October 23, 1986 and a 
series of smaller events whose hosts were, in many instances, first approached by the Attorney General himself. 
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To make clear that they are not interested in these individuals solely for their money 
and connections, the candidates, for example, host "non-political" dinners to show their 
appreciation to key contributors and meet with the contributors throughout the year to discuss 
issues and maintain relationships. The contributors, in turn, value the feeling of a special 
relationship with a powerful official, a relationship that includes direct access to the officeholder 
that is not available to the general, non-contributing public. 
The preoccupation with fund-raising undermines the political process. There is no doubt 
that to obtain or retain office, candidates must have access to vast sums of money. But those 
funds should come from a broad base of support, not from the wealthy few, and all candidates 
should be bound to reasonable spending limits. Officeholders could then devote more time to 
their duties without the distraction of constant fund-raising. More important, the citizens of this 
State could be assured that candidates' campaigns were not funded primarily by those with a 
financial stake in governmental action. This is only possible with a system that provides for 
public funding of campaigns.11 
II. Special Interest Money Flows to 
Powerful Incumbents and Likely Winners 
As Governor Cuomo observed during his testimony before this Commission on March 
10, 1989: "And let's be candid .... Practically, you know, [fund-raising] is easier for me now than 
it has been for a long time."12 He echoed the testimony of his former fund-raiser, William 
Stern, who described the magic moment, after Cuomo had won the Democratic primary for 
Governor in 1982, when prospective contributors' attitudes suddenly changed and people lined 
up to thrust cash and checks into Stern's pockets, even as Cuomo walked to the podium to 
claim his victory. Stern testified that these contributors, in his view, were attempting to in-
gratiate themselves with somebody who was to be Governor. 13 
11 Lower contribution limits would go part way toward the goal of broad-based financial support of 
campaigns, for candidates would, of necessity, appeal to a wider constituency for the funds they require. 
12 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 18. Unless otherwise indicated, citations to ''Tr." refer to transcripts of the 
Commissions' public hearings. Citations to "Hrg. Exh." refers to exhibits introduced at those public hearings; 
"Dep. Tr." refer to Commission depositions. 
13 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 132. 
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Every fund-raiser and every candidate with whom the Commission spoke described the 
vast advantages which incumbency, in and of itself, confers on campaign fund-raisers. The most 
commonly expressed theme was the euphemism that "everybody loves a winner." Incumbents 
are, by definition, winners. As Senator Marino stated in his testimony, 14 contributors give to 
incumbents 
"because the incumbents generally win 99% of the time, and why 
give to a loser .... [You give to a winner} because you are going to 
be seeing that winner .... talking to that winner. You are not going to 
be talking to the loser at all." 
The more powerful and visible the office, the more easily the money flows to its 
occupant's campaign committee. Governor Cuomo, and to a somewhat lesser degree, Mayor 
Koch, are able to attract large sums despite self-imposed restrictions, whenever they decide to 
hold a fund-raiser. The Governor's annual fund-raisers were suspended in 1986 and 1987; when 
he resumed fund-raising in December, 1988, he was able to raise $1.15 million despite voluntary 
limits on the size of contributions from individuals and corporations.15 Speaker Miller 
testified 16 that: 
"There is no question that as a party leader I could have raised 
double that amount [about $80,000] if I wanted to. Any party 
leader--the Governor can raise twenty times that amount. That is 
the way the world is. 
Mr. Schwarz: As the Governor said, "The money flows over 
the transom. " 
Speaker Miller: The money comes off the back of the 
truck, right. " 
By contrast, Lawrence Huntington, chairman of the Ned Regan Support Committee 
described the fact that "nobody knows who the Comptroller is and what his job is" as the 
14 Tr. Mar. 17, 1989, at 122. 
15 Governor Cuomo agreed to abide by the fund-raising constraints of the campaign finance bill that he 
proposed and the Assembly passed in 1988. In somewhat the same vein, Mayor Koch restricted the size of 
contributions he would accept in connection with his 1988 fund-raising "birthday" dinner; nonetheless he raised 
about $700,000 through that one event. 
16 Tr. Mar. 17, 1989, at 61. 
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greatest handicap Comptroller Regan faces in his fund-raising. Groups that do business with 
the Comptroller's office are targeted for fund-raising precisely because they are among the few 
who know the Comptroller and the work of his office. 
As important as the fact that they are likely winners, incumbents are in the position to 
make or influence the decisions of government. As a result, contribution money flows in 
especially large amounts from those groups over which the officeholder has authority, and 
substantial proportions of the money which flows to the statewide officeholders come from 
identifiable interest groups and from businesses. Analysis of campaign contribution patterns 
confirms the dominant role of special interests over which the statewide officeholders exercise 
discretion.17 Across the board, and particularly in the statewide races, incumbents raised vastly 
more money than their challengers, with heavy funding from special interests.18 
In certain industries, there appears to be an especially high correlation between those 
who receive state business and those who give. For example, an overwhelming proportion of 
Comptroller Regan's campaign funds are contributed by those who receive business from the 
Comptroller's Office in connection with the annual Spring Borrowing 19 and investments of the 
Common Retirement Fund. 
Similarly, over 90% of engineers who receive contracts from the Department of 
Transportation and from the Thruway Authority make contributions to Governor Cuomo's 
campaign committee or to the State Democratic Party campaign committee. Notably, 
engineers--even those contracting primarily with other state agencies and authorities--do not 
typically contribute in significant amounts to other campaign committees. When asked to 
explain the reasons for making these contributions, the engineers uniformly said that, while they 
did not believe they received any particular benefits as a result of their contributions, they 
wanted to protect against the possibility of some adverse decision, and were "not going to take 
a chance and not contribute."20 Other contributors from various industries interviewed by 
Commission staff also said that their gifts were not an expression of ideological support, but 
17 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 1. 
18 This pattern is repeated in the Legislature. There, it is the dominant party in each house that attracts the 
most money; special interest money flows to the majorities in far larger amounts and proportions than to the 
minorities. See, The Albany Money Machine, Charts F and G. In addition, as Exhibits 11 and 12 introduced at 
the Commission hearing on March 17, 1989 show, when individual legislators achieve leadership positions, the 
amounts contributed to them increase dramatically. Contributions to both Speaker Miller and Senator Marino, for 
example, nearly tripled after their predecessors announced their retirements. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 3. 
19 Spring Borrowing is the State's annual short-term borrowing against anticipated revenues. 
20 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 24. 
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rather, reflected a pragmatic understanding that the office-holder is in a position to affect them 
by some official action, and their concern to protect against some possible but unspecified 
adverse decision. Lobbyists said they give (usually through PACs) in order to obtain "access 
and influence" rather than to support one ideology or political party. This is underscored by 
the fact that they often give large amounts to members of both parties.21 
Every fund-raiser and officeholder who testified or who was interviewed categorically 
insisted that fund-raising and government decision-making were never linked, even indirectly. 
Candidates differed, however, in the steps they took to ensure separation (such as adoption of a 
policy against accepting contributions from those doing business with their offices or agencies), 
and in the degree to which they actively targeted groups or individuals who might have business 
with their offices. 
Only the Attorney General has adopted any policy of restraint in accepting contributions 
from some category of contributor who has business with his office, but that policy is so narrow 
as to raise as many questions as it answers.22 Condominium and cooperative apartment plan 
sponsors whose plans are in the narrowly delineated "red herring" (or initial application) phase 
of the application process, and who have made a contribution during that phase, may inform the 
Attorney General of the existence of the plan and ask for a refund of their contributions. All 
contributors are informed of this policy through a notice stapled to the Attorney General's 
personally signed thank-you note. This limitation is also discussed during the "one-on-one" 
meetings between the Attorney General and prospective contributors. 
This policy is flawed in several crucial respects.23 First, the campaign committee relies 
on the contributor to come forward and demand the return of his or her contribution. The 
very person who may be seeking to ingratiate himself with the officeholder is the one to whom 
the campaign committee looks to police its ban. Second, the time period when contributions 
from sponsors are subject to refunding is too narrow. It leaves out the critical period of time 
21 Tr. Mar. 17, 1989, at 27-28. 
22 At the hearing on March 10, 1989, Abrams announced additional voluntary restrictions he would place on 
his own fund-raising . He agreed to restrict corporate contributions from related corporations to the same levels 
as the maximum that state law allows for individual contributions, although he conceded that this limit would still 
far exceed the amount any one corporation could give. He also promised to refrain altogether from accepting 
contributions from those with whom his office has contractual relationships, and to submit contributions from 
attorneys representing clients with cases pending in his office to an independent body for a conflict of interest 
review. 
23 A detailed discussion of the problems with this voluntary ban is presented in Part 2, pages 45-48 below. 
A statutory ban of a similar nature would, of course, suffer from the same flaws. See discussion of the New York 
City experience with Election Law 14-114(9)(a), the so-called "Goodman Amendment," in the Commission report 
Unfinished Business, at 23 et seq. 
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following the "red herring" period during which the decisions of the Attorney General's office 
continue to have an immediate economic impact on the sponsors, as well as the period 
immediately prior to the submission of the "red herring," when the sponsor has taken steps to 
file a plan, but has not yet done so. The Attorney General makes no provision for the return 
of a contribution when it is followed in short order by the filing of a plan. 
Finally and most important, the policy does not prohibit Abrams or his aides from 
meeting with and personally soliciting--although not collecting--contributions from sponsors of 
plans with pending red herrings. The campaign committee does not screen from its one-on-one 
solicitation program potential contributors with pending plans. Although it may not be the 
intent, a solicitation while a plan is pending, coupled with advice that the payment cannot be 
made until the plan has been accepted, probably amounts to more inescapable and inherent 
pressure than simple acceptance of a contribution during that period. 
Although the Attorney General's step in the direction of self-restraint has its drawbacks, 
it is, at least, a step in the right direction. The other statewide officeholders and their fund-
raisers aggressively solicit money from all categories of people who do business with their 
offices.24 
While the Governor testified that he remains above the direct fund-raising fray, the chief 
organizer of his fund-raising efforts estimated that one prominent lobbyist, Howard Rubenstein, 
had alone been responsible for raising more than $200,000 on the Governor's behalf in 
connection with each of the fund-raising events.25 The solicitation lists developed and used by 
the Governor's campaign committee include lists of registered lobbyists, lists of attendees to the 
Governor's Business Barbecue, and lists broken down by category: Banking, Insurance, Finance, 
Attorneys, Engineers, Brokerage Houses and so on. 
In the case of the Comptroller's fund-raising, the evidence suggests a deliberate targeting 
of firms that his Office uses for Spring Borrowing26 or for pension fund investment. This 
targeting focuses on industry groups and on names of particular firms with particular contracts. 
24 Even the Attorney General has solicited contributions from a law firm representing a client with a pending 
matter; his voluntary ban has, in the past, not barred soliciting contributions from attorneys in such cases. See 
Part 2, pages 48-50 below. 
25 At a Commission hearing on June 20, 1988, Rubenstein testified that he had decided, on his own 
initiative, to refrain from political fund-raising in the future, because of the possible appearance of impropriety 
involved in professional lobbyists engaging in such fund-raising efforts. (Tr. June 20, 1988, at 279 et seq.) 
26 See fn.19 above. 
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In light of the vast amount of money which flows from those who do business with 
government, it is not surprising that no statewide elected official has endorsed an outright ban 
on accepting contributions from those who do business with his office. Such a ban is typically 
characterized by New York officials as unworkable, notwithstanding the adoption of such a ban 
by the federal government and the state of California.27 Whether or not officials admit it, such 
industry groups--so responsive to solicitations--have become a pillar of their campaign fund-
raising efforts. 
III. Officeholders' and Candidates' 
Roles Are Blurred 
There is powerful pressure for even official transactions to become imbued with 
something of the fund-raising agenda, despite efforts of officeholders to resist this. All three 
statewide officeholders demonstrate keen awareness of the all-consuming nature of their official 
roles. They all emphasize that they continue to be Governor, Attorney General, or Comptroller 
twenty-four hours a day. If they seek re-election, they must then add candidate and fund-raiser 
roles to their official roles. 
To be effective, officeholders who are candidates must obviously delegate responsibilities 
to key staff aides on whom they can rely to implement their policy directives. Moreover, 
officeholders tend to use the same trusted aides for both official and political purposes. This 
practice contributes to the perception that government decision-making is intertwined with 
campaign matters, including the fund-raising process, and that contributions yield access and 
influence. 
Each of the elected officials separates, at least in his own mind, his official and political 
roles. To some extent there is a degree of procedural separation as well; the officeholder may, 
for example, leave his office to make campaign-related calls. But the wall of separation is not 
solid, and it begins to break down when staff members play multiple roles, or when campaign 
committee members hold important policy positions in government. Those close to the 
officeholders have acknowledged that they cannot simply purge their minds of the knowledge 
27 See Unfinished Business, at 28. Section 14-114(9)(a) of New York Election Law limits contributions from 
those with business before New York City's Board of Estimate; a similar provision is in effect in the City of 
Chicago. In Kentucky, no elected statewide official may solicit contributions to retire a campaign debt from any 
person paid for services rendered under a state contract. See R.D. Michaelson, Campaign Finance Update: 
Legislation and Utigation (Illinois State Bd. of Elections, Dec. 1988) at 19, 26-27. 
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that a person with whom they are dealing concerning official matters is also a fund-raiser or 
major contributor. When asked about this problem, Regan's campaign committee chairman 
responded: 
"I think you've hit the heart of what's wrong with our system, and it 
cries out for reform. "28 
In varying degrees, the fund-raising practices of all three statewide officeholders illustrate this 
blurring of the officeholders' official and political roles. 
More than any other candidate, Governor Cuomo distances himself personally from 
direct fund-raising efforts. His volunteer and professional campaign staff puts together a Dinner 
Committee which is charged with soliciting ticket purchasers. The Governor does not even stay 
for the entire organizational meeting at which those groups are briefed, but leaves after a brief 
"pep talk." He testified that he neither knows nor wants to know who contributes, or in what 
amounts; at most, he testified, he is incidentally aware of who actually attends the dinners. 
Thank-you letters to contributors are signed by staff. 
Yet documents from the campaign committee, particularly memoranda to the Governor 
from Lucille Falcone, suggest that she has worked closely with the Governor in selecting this 
core group of fund-raisers, a group composed of leading representatives of many industries 
which have a great deal of business with the State. Falcone stated plainly to Commission staff 
who interviewed her that she deliberately cultivates the impression among the Dinner 
Committee members that their efforts on the Governor's behalf are known, recognized and 
appreciated by him. "Otheiwise," she said, "you would never get any money." 
In addition, a number of the Governor's advisors participate in the fund-raising effort, 
either as volunteers on their own time or as paid campaign staff while on leave from their state 
jobs.29 And, as discussed in more detail in Part 2, an employee of the Niagara Frontier Transit 
Authority testified at a hearing before the Federal Merit Systems Protection Board that he 
28 Huntington Dep. Tr. Sept. 19, 1988; Hrg. Exh. 1, Sept. 24, 1988. 
29 William Hennessey represents a slightly different example of the blurring of roles of state officials. 
Hennessey went from a position as Commissioner of the State Department of Transportation, to one as Chairman 
of the State Democratic Committee, and then back into government as Chairman of the Thruway Authority. The 
Commission's investigation discloses that engineering firms doing business with DOT and the Thruway Authority 
appear as contributors to the State Democratic Party and to Friends of Mario Cuomo in larger percentages than 
do similar firms who do business with other state agencies. 
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believed that his job would be at stake if he did not buy a ticket to a fund-raising event for the 
Governor's campaign. 
Attorney General Abrams is deeply involved in his own fund-raising, relying as he does 
to a large extent on the "one-on-one" program which involves his meeting at length with 
individuals and asking for large sums from each of them. He does seek to separate these 
meetings from the business of his office, carving them out of his official day, scheduling them at 
places outside his office, and involving in each of them a senior member of his Finance 
Committee. But virtually all of his key contributors are included--with pertinent information 
about spouses, nicknames and employment--in the Attorney General's "Major Mailing List," a 
list that was created and maintained at Department of Law expense, and which has been 
increasingly composed of the names of Abrams' contributors. Those on the list received 
personalized letters and "informational" packages of press clippings sent out by Abrams at 
Department of Law expense, with statements of his stands on such issues as crime and the fight 
against political corruption. The Major Mailing List itself found its way to campaign 
headquarters for use by campaign staff. 
Several Law Department employees played important roles in the Attorney General's 
1986 campaign, though they did not, apparently, have a direct role in soliciting campaign 
contributions. Both the campaign coordinator and the campaign office manager were employees 
of the Law Department who took leaves of absence to work full -time on the 1986 campaign. 
Both returned to the Law Department when the campaign was over. The Attorney General's 
executive assistant took a six-month leave to serve as manager of the Attorney General's 1982 
campaign, then returned to his official position at the Law Department. Although he did not 
take a leave of absence in 1986, he participated in campaign strategy sessions, attended finance 
committee meetings, and served as a liaison between campaign staff and the Attorney General. 
Comptroller Regan has adopted no formal division between his role as a fund-raiser and 
his role as Comptroller. Although he has declared that there is a "Chinese Wall" between the 
personnel involved in these two functions, the Commission's investigation reveals no written or 
otherwise memorialized policy to that effect,30 as well as a number of fissures in the wall. 
His campaign committee actively targets categories of contributors who have substantial 
business with his office. Although the requests for pledges and contributions are organized 
30 The only policy directive we have discovered states merely that: 
No employee is to conduct political activities on paid State time.... In addition, 
State equipment, vehicles and office space are to be used only for official 
business. Office of the State Comptroller Employee Handbook, p.34. 
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around the annual or twice-yearly dinners, Regan meets regularly with contributors throughout 
the year. A number of members of the campaign committee hold unpaid positions on the 
Mortgage Advisory Committee and Investment Advisory Committee, two bodies which guide the 
Comptroller in connection with investment decisions for the Common Retirement Fund. 
Regan's assistant, Joseph Palumbo, spent a substantial portion of the 1986 election cycle 
as a state employee engaged in what were essentially fund-raising activities.31 He targeted 
potential contributors among those doing business with the Comptroller's Office; he arranged 
meetings between Regan and potential fund-raisers; he met with key members and employees of 
the campaign committee to plan fund-raising strategies, memorializing the meetings in 
memoranda to Regan on official State Comptroller stationery. One witness from the investment 
banking community even testified that Palumbo, virtually simultaneously, both solicited campaign 
contributions from his firm and, on behalf of the Comptroller, invited a bid from his firm for a 
contract managing Common Retirement Fund investments. Only in the closing days of the 
campaign, and just before the major fund-raising events, did Palumbo take leaves of absence to 
add his efforts to those of others making repeated follow-up calls to contributors who had not 
yet made good on pledges. 
These scenarios, when viewed together, reveal a troublesome picture. True, the elected 
official has round-the-clock duties and requires the assistance of trusted staff in order to attend 
to them effectively. True also, the same elected official must periodically campaign--at great 
expense--for re-election, and needs trusted staff in that area as well. Raising the funds required 
for an effective campaign is a monumental undertaking; again, trusted staff is needed. But it is 
neither necessary nor advisable, particularly in the case of the very well-funded and 
professionally run campaigns which characterize the statewide races, to employ the same cadre 
of people as both fund-raisers and public employees. Without the strictest separation between 
these functions, contributors may fear or hope that there may be a link between the decision to 
give or not to give and the official treatment they will get. 
It is not possible to prevent a certain blurring of roles in the case of officeholders 
themselves. There, both the officeholder's good faith and the oversight of the voters must be 
relied upon. But official staff should not be involved in any way in soliciting contributions from 
those who have business with the officeholder for whom they work. Either there should be an 
outright ban on contributions from those who have business with the State, or, alternatively, the 
staff should be completely divorced from the fund-raising process, with fund-raising run by 
employees who are totally separate from the official duties of the officeholder. These steps, 
31 This conduct does appear to contravene the Comptroller's policy memorandum prohibiting political 
activity on paid State time. See fn. 30. 
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together with sharply reduced contribution limits and increased disclosure, would go a long way 
toward restoring confidence in the integrity of the fund-raising process. 
IV. Present Limits Amount to No Limits 
Against this backdrop of the candidates' overwhelming need for money, the strong sense 
that many contributors have that their campaign contributions to officeholders are good for 
business, and the almost inevitable blurring of roles between officeholder, candidate and fund-
raiser, it is small wonder that current practices make contribution limits, as presently drafted, 
illusory. Wealthy individuals with vested interests regularly contribute the maximum allowed by 
law: $65,000 per statewide candidate,32 and a total of $150,000 annually to all candidates. Many 
contributors, especially in the real estate business, also control a large number of separate 
corporations, for each of which the $5,000 maximum allowable yearly corporate contribution is a 
paltry sum. To many contributors, determining how much to contribute is mainly a business 
decision, balancing how much the competitors are giving (the "going rate") against the potential 
risk of refusing to contribute at all or at the going rate. 
The challenge for some contributors, having once decided the optimum contribution 
level in light of such factors, is to find ways to give--through family, employees, clients or 
customers, P ACs, and so forth--more than even current limits permit for one individual. 
Candidates are not shy about explaining how to accomplish this.33 
32 A contributor may give to a statewide candidate both $15,000 for the primary and $50,000 for the general 
election. 
33 The current state of the law in New York on corporate contributions was succintly summarized in a 
memorandum from Abrams' campaign director Ethan Geto to Howard Milstein, a developer who, from time to 
time, has submitted condominium and coop plans to the Law Department: 
" [A]ny corporate entity, no matter how closely related to any other corporate entity, may 
contribute up to $5,000 to political candidates in a calendar year. For example, if Milstein 
Properties consists of ten buildings, and each building is separately incorporated, each building 
may contribute up to $5,000, even though all of these corporations may have the same Board 
of Directors, officers, etc. 
In sum, any corporate entity that you or your family control may give up to $5,000 per calendar 
year to political candidates for non-federal office. " 
Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 90-91; Hrg. Exh. 22, Mar. 10, 1989. 
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As a result, multiple contributions from related corporations are common: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
On a single day, Drexel Burnham Lambert contributed $20,000 to 
Cuomo in four $5,000 checks from affiliated corporations. 
In one month, Merrill Lynch affiliated companies contributed a 
total of $26,500 to Cuomo in six separate checks. 
Ronald Perelman, chairman of McAndrews & Forbes, contributed 
$50,000 to Abrams' 1986 campaign. Ten contributions of $5,000 
each were made by McAndrews & Forbes and nine of its affiliated 
corporate entities. 
Benjamin Lambert gave $12,000 to Regan through three separate 
corporations he controlled, on April 22, 1985. On March 5, 1987, 
he contributed $15,000 through three related corporations, two of 
which had not been involved in the 1985 contributions. 
Three firms affiliated with Ehrlich-Bober & Co., Inc. gave a total 
of $15,000 to Regan on January 16, 1986, and another $15,000 on 
January 26, 1987. 
In many cases, only the recipient knows who is behind multiple or corporate 
contributions. Under current law, the barest minimum of information is required on the official 
disclosure form: the date, the name, some address (home or business), an indication whether it 
is a corporate contribution, and some indication about prior contributions.34 Investigators 
seeking to track down the sources of contributions can, as Commission staff did, telephone out-
of-state contributors at home to learn that they are all employees of the same nationwide 
financial institution, or travel to the single address listed for twenty corporate contributions in 
different corporate names to find who has his office there. The ordinary citizen, however, is 
left in the dark. 
At the end of the campaign, everyone but the voters has been well-served: the 
incumbent has retained his office he wants and the contributor has invested the money he 
34 In some instances, the latter two items seem to be more frequently omitted than included by those filing 
disclosure statements. 
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deems effective for his purposes; whatever technicalities are necessary for compliance with the 
law, and whatever rituals are deemed appropriate for improvement of the appearances of the 
transaction, have been satisfied. No one has literally exchanged anything for anything, yet, to 
the public, the whole process presents the appearance that money may influence government. 
V. Everything Happens in the Dark: 
The Board of Elections Cannot Effectively Police the Process 
The Board of Elections, which is charged with enforcement of the current inadequate 
disclosure laws and contribution limits, has failed to discharge its responsibilities in this area 
effectively. The Commissions's investigations and hearings have revealed the agency's indif-
ference to the need for vigorous enforcement and effective disclosure; on occasion, the evidence 
has pointed to deliberate diversion of resources away from such efforts. 
Enforcing contribution limits requires monitoring multiple contributions by a single 
contributor. But the Board cannot do so. It has no way of tracing how much one contributor 
has given, in the aggregate, to different candidates, PACs, and party committees. Each 
candidate (sometimes with more than one committee), each party committee (state, legislative, 
and local), and each of more than 400 PAC's, files separate statements anywhere from two to 
seven times a year. The statements may be handwritten; in the case of major fund-raisers such 
as Governor Cuomo's, they may be tens, even hundreds of pages long.35 It is physically 
impossible, without the aid of a computer, to cross-reference the contributions even within one 
such candidate's records, much less to derive aggregate figures for particular contributors. The 
Board of Elections has not only failed until now to attempt such computerization, but Board 
officials also informed one employee who, on his own initiative, set up a modest computer 
information system, that they "did not want that type of data leaving the agency."36 
The difficulty of tracing contributions is compounded by the fragmentation of the 
enforcement responsibility among the state and local boards of elections. The State Board is 
35 The Director of Governor Cuomo's campaign committee told Commission staff how, although the 
committee itself kept track of contributions by computer, he copied the hundreds of pages himself by hand "in 
order to be more accurate and pick up excessive contributions." Despite his vigilance, a $10,000 corporate 
contribution (twice the legal maximum) was deposited and not refunded. 
36 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 43. 
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responsible for receiving disclosure statements of statewide officeholders, PACs, state legislators, 
and state and legislative party committees. Fifty-seven county boards, plus one for New York 
City's five counties, collect and record all filings which pertain to local elections, including filings 
of local party committees. Yet party committees can make unlimited transfers to candidates or 
to other party committees; the network of relationships is impossible to discern. Conversely, 
contributions from individuals or companies with special interests can, for example, be routed to 
local elections by way of party committees whose filings are deposited only at the State Board 
of Elections; once again, those who have a vital interest in the process find it impossible to 
track.37 
Despite obvious weaknesses in the requirements for disclosure information concerning 
contributors, the Board has failed to promulgate the simplest of regulations to facilitate review 
and interpretation of disclosure statements. Statements do not have to be typed or, as a 
practical matter, even legible. Furthermore, the Board believes it lacks power to require 
disclosure of business affiliations and business addresses for individual contributors. The Board's 
enforcement efforts are lacking in other areas as well. Even when contribution and disclosure 
violations are called to its attention, the Board has not challenged the conduct of key party 
officials in both parties.38 
When asked to explain the lack of vigor in the Board's enforcement efforts, the Board's 
Executive Director identified the central reason as budgetary. He went on to say: 
"I think another thing that we have to recognize, too, is that in 
effect, the Legislature is our clientele. We are asking them for more 
auditors, more investigators, so that we can do a better job reviewing 
the reports of legislators, and so forth. I think there is a reluctance 
there. ,,3g 
37 A Commission investigation revealed that this did occur with respect to 1985 Town Council races in 
Poughkeepsie. Over $300,000 in contributions from individuals affiliated with the Pyramid Companies, which were 
seeking to build a mall but required a controversial zoning variance to do so, was contributed to the State 
Republican Party Committee, the New York Republican Federal Campaign Committee, and an "independent" 
committee called "Building A Better New York," and then funneled into the local elections without the knowledge 
of the local electorate. Additional expenditures were made directly by the Pyramid Companies, at least partially to 
further their efforts to influence the election. See, Appendix Three, Exhibit 2. 
38 In the Poughkeepsie case referred to at note 37, although the State Board of Elections was alerted to the 
possibility of Election Law violations, it conducted less than a complete investigation, which failed to uncover the 
full extent of the moneys poured into the local races. 
39 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 77-78. 
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Expert testimony the Commission received at the outset of its inquiry into campaign 
finance practices provided additional explanations for the ineffectiveness of the Board of 
Elections. These experts were unanimous in their view that campaign finance enforcement 
should not be the responsibility of the same agency that administers voter registration and the 
ballot process. If these responsibilities are concentrated in a single agency, the agency will 
inevitably devote more of its resources to resolution of immediate problems--such as which 
candidates are to appear on the ballot--than to issues such as post-election review of the 
adequacy of a candidate's financial disclosure statements. This is especially so where there has 
been a failure to provide detailed statutory guidelines with respect to analyzing, auditing, and 
disseminating publicly the campaign finance disclosure information. 
Whatever the cause, the Board's failures subvert the underlying purposes of disclosure. 
Even law enforcement officials with responsibility to oversee the integrity of governmental 
processes do not have effective access to essential information about transactions at the very 
heart of the electoral process. An attorney with the State Investigation Commission described 
in detail how the fragmented record-keeping of the State and local boards of elections 
hampered that agency's investigations, making virtually impossible enforcement of existing 
contribution limits, investigation of allegations of coercive solicitation of campaign contributions, 
and evaluation of the relative influence of various individual contributors.40 There simply can 
be no effective enforcement of the contribution limits unless meaningful disclosure is required 
and computerized records developed. 
VI. Fundamental Reforms Are Essential 
Only sweeping, institutional reforms can break the cycle of increasing costs and constant 
high-pressure fund-raising, and its corrosive effect on the electoral process and on citizens' 
confidence in the integrity of their government. These reforms must address all elements of the 
problem. Some of the essential reforms have been spelled out in detail in earlier Commission 
reports; others are addressed for the first time in this report. In recent months all three 
statewide officeholders, as well as Assembly Speaker Miller and Senate Majority Leader Marino, 
have expressed support for some reform measures. The Assembly has already passed a bill with 
many of the features that this Commission recommends. Adoption during this Legislative 
session of the broad package of reform measures should be an absolute priority. 
40 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 3-19. 
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A. Limits on Contributions and Transfers. Among the reforms this Commission has 
repeatedly called for are drastically reduced limits on the amounts that individual contributors 
may give to candidates, to party committees, to PACs, and in the aggregate to all candidates. 
For convenient reference, a summary of those recommendations is reproduced as Appendix 
Two. 
All statewide elected officials who have testified before us, as well as the majority 
leaders of both legislative houses, have endorsed substantially lower limits on contributions. The 
limits set forth in the recently passed Assembly bill are similar to the limits recommended by the 
Commission. Senate Republicans have expressed concern that too drastic limits on party 
committee support for legislative races will impair the important role those committees have in 
maintaining a two-party or multi-party electoral system. No one questions the appropriateness 
of this party role. But unlimited contributions to the party committees and unlimited transfers 
of funds from party committees to candidates' committees, which the present arrangement 
allows, are not essential to a strong party role. Nor is unlimited spending by party committees 
on behalf of particular candidates. In effect, this lack of limits on party funding of individual 
races permits circumvention of whatever contribution limits or expenditure limits might 
otherwise apply. Adoption of the limits proposed, which will permit parties to perform their 
vital role both unhindered and untainted, is an absolute must. 
In addition, there should be a total ban on contributions from corporations, from unions, 
and from individuals and firms doing business with the State. Everything learned through study 
of the present campaign finance system supports these recommendations. This type of 
contribution represents the prime situation in which there exists motivation, risk and the 
appearance of a quid pro quo. This has been particularly evident in the examination of certain 
fund-raising practices of the statewide officeholders, but has also been found to be true in our 
review of fund -raising at every level of government in New York State. 
Contributions from corporations are problematic on several levels. First, while 
corporations are at the heart of economic activity in the State, they have no inherent right to 
make political contributions. The citizens of this State are the constituents of the political 
process, and it is important to encourage broad individual participation in providing funds for 
campaign activity. Second, while it is perhaps not fully articulated by the contributor, a 
contribution made through a corporate vehicle is in effect a business expense, made as a 
business decision.41 The concept of political contributions as a business expense is consistent 
41 This is in some ways more true in situations when individuals with small businesses do business through 
(continued .. . ) 
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with, and supportive of, the possibility of a quid pro quo. Third, corporate contributions lend 
themselves to evasion of disclosure requirements and contribution limits, at least for those 
contributors who control a number of different corporate entities. 
It is quite common for one individual, especially in the real estate business, to do 
business through a large number of separately incorporated entities. Sometimes each property 
owned by a real estate developer has its own corporate identity. In other businesses, such as 
investment banking and brokerage, use of multiple corporations with common ownership and 
control is also common. Under current law, while each of those corporations is restricted to 
one $5,000 contribution annually, they can all make contributions to the same candidate, adding 
up to more than the controlling individual could give as a individual. And under current 
disclosure law, no one except the contributor and the candidate need know who is the individual 
behind the contribution; the often unrevealing corporate name and address alone is all that is 
required. 
The Assembly has recently passed the Governor's reform bill, which would restrict the 
aggregate contribution from an entire corporate family to the amount that could be given by a 
single corporation.42 Enforcement of this provision would require complete disclosure of the 
extremely complex information necessary to determine whether there is common ownership or 
some other relationship among corporate entities. Substantial enforcement difficulties will 
accompany implementation of such an aggregation provision, and, as discussed above, there is 
no compelling reason to continue to permit contributions from corporations at all. Not only the 
federal government, but at least a dozen states, ban corporate contributions altogether. It is 
preferable to ban corporate contributions outright and to direct scarce enforcement resources 
toward implementation of the other essential reforms. 
Contributions from individuals and organizations which have business dealings with the 
State must also be prohibited. Although the Governor has pledged to sign any campaign 
finance reform bill put before him, in his public testimony he also expressed reservations about 
this recommendation, and none of the other statewide officeholders or legislative leaders has 
endorsed it. All of them contend that reasonable and effectively enforced contribution limits 
will suffice to address the problems discussed in this report. 
41 ( ... continued) 
a corporation. While these businesses do not represent the aggregation and concentration of wealth that was 
one factor in support of the ban on corporate contributions to candidates for federal office at the turn of the 
century, see Federal Election Commission vs. National Right to Worlr Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 
(1982) , they instead represent individuals doing business in a corporate form. There is no justification for 
permitting these individuals to make contributions through their corporations instead of individually. 
42 A.189--B, §14 (March 13, 1989), amending N.Y. Election Law §14-116(2) (McKinney's 1989) . 
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Such limits will indeed be a great improvement. But for government officials to solicit 
contributions from those who come before them for decisions, even if the sums solicited are far 
smaller than those now permitted, offends proper ethical standards. This issue was discussed at 
length in an earlier report on campaign finance practices in New York City,43 and an opinion of 
the New York City Board of Ethics which was quoted there remains equally pertinent today: 
"The solicitation of funds for political purposes by a public official 
from those whose matters come before him or his agency for official 
action is offensive to proper ethical standards ... 
[T]he solicitation and acceptance of political contributions by public 
officers from persons, jinns or corporations doing business with 
government with which these public officers and employees are 
connected is against the public interest and should be prohibited ... 
It is our recommendation that appropriate legislation be enacted on 
all levels of government to deal effectively with conduct that now is 
contrary to proper standards but is not prohibited by law. •'44 
A prohibition -- or restriction -- on contributions from those who have business dealings 
with government is in effect in the federal government, the City of Chicago, New York City, 
Kentucky and California.45 This Commission strongly recommends a two-pronged prohibition, 
banning both the solicitation by candidates or their agents of contributions from those with 
business with the government and the making of such contributions by individuals or 
organizations having business with the government.46 The implementation of such a ban was 
discussed at length in the Unfinished Business report. 
43 See, Unfinished Business, at 27-32. 
44 Opinion No. 35, New York City Board of Ethics, pp. 24-25 (Oct. 5, 1961). 
45 See, Unfinished Business, at 28 and fn. 27 above. 
46 This ban on contributions from those doing business with the State would not encompass those whose 
dealings are merely of a ministerial character. The prohibition should apply only to businesses and business 
persons who are engaged in earning money through dealings with government entities, or are seeking the 
necessary approvals to enable them to pursue income-producing ventures. 
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Individuals associated with unions and corporations can and should still be permitted to 
give through PACs, although there should be a limit of one PAC, using a single name, for each 
union or "family group" of corporations, in order to prevent circumvention of the contribution 
limits. 
B. Public Funding and Expenditure Limits. To compensate for these drastic 
reductions in private contributions, and to enable candidates to participate on an even footing in 
the most expensive statewide races, a public funding system for statewide races should be 
adopted.47 Such a program would be financed by a modest check-off on individual tax returns, 
and would substitute small contributions from a large number of citizens for the current system 
of large contributions from the interested few.48 
Public funding is essential for another critically important reform, reduction of overall 
spending on campaigns. Under a public funding system, spending limits, which cannot 
constitutionally be imposed on candidates as a simple police power measure, can be imposed as 
a condition of receiving public funds; candidates faced with opponents who refuse the public 
funds and spending limits can be given generous bonuses in public funds to ensure that the 
candidate accepting public funds would not be penalized.49 It is vital that spending limits be 
high enough to be realistic and to allow meaningful challenges to incumbent officeholders. 
C. A Separate Campaign Finance Disclosure Agency. From the outset of its work in 
this area, based on testimony received from a number of experts, this Commission has strongly 
urged that the agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the campaign finance laws be 
organizationally separate from the existing Board of Elections. Experience in other jurisdictions 
strongly suggests that where a single agency is assigned the tasks of ballot administration 
(including voter registration, candidate registration, petition challenges, administration of 
elections, and the like) and also all the tasks of administering candidate financial disclosure, 
enforcing contribution limits, and disseminating disclosure information publicly, there is an 
inevitable diminution of resources allocated to the campaign finance functions. 
47 For reasons discussed at length at pages 45-53 of the Commission report, The Albany Money Machine, 
this Commission does not recommend public funding for legislative races at this time. Localities should be free 
to adopt such programs if they desire, and this Commission strongly supports the new New York City program, 
although the changes discussed in Unfinished Business remain imperative. 
48 All the statewide officials have endorsed such public funding proposals, and the Assembly has passed a 
bill providing such a system. Senator Marino has indicated that the Senate is willing to engage in discussions of 
public funding for certain offices. 
49 Details of Commission recommendations concerning spending limits are contained in the December 21 , 
1987 Preliminary Report at 43-48. 
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Commission hearings, particularly the recent testimony of the Governor and Legislative 
leaders, have revealed serious objections to the creation of a new government body in an era of 
imperative fiscal restraint. If complete separation of functions is not feasible, certain other steps 
can be taken which will do much to ensure effective enforcement of the campaign finance laws. 
At a minimum, and only if an independent agency is entirely impossible, the Board of Elections 
should be reorganized.50 
The Board itself should be made less subject to partisan influences, which, under the 
current system, neutralize its ability to act effectively.51 This can be accomplished by providing 
for a nominating commission patterned after the State Commission which nominates candidates 
for the New York State Court of Appeals.52 The nominating commission should be comprised 
of four appointees of the Governor, not more than two from any political party, and one 
appointee each of the speaker of the Assembly, the temporary president of the Senate, and the 
minority leaders of each house of the legislature. The nominating commission should include 
representatives of leading civic groups and business and religious leaders. It should be charged 
with nominating three candidates for each of the open commissioner positions on the Board. 
The nominating commission should make nominations to the Board which will make the 
agency independent of the statewide officials and the legislature. Ultimately, the Board should 
be comprised of citizens who have demonstrated integrity and commitment to civic affairs, 
representing a broad cross-section of the electorate. The chairman should be full-time and the 
other commissioners part-time, and reimbursed for actual expenses. 
The Board should be composed of five members, no more than three from either major 
party. Appointments to the Board should be made by the Governor, from among those 
nominated by the commission, and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. All 
members should have fixed, overlapping terms. As the terms of present Board members expire, 
and for all succeeding appointments, new members should be appointed through the 
independent commission process. 
50 If a public funding program of any scope is adopted, even closer consideration should be given to a 
separate Campaign Finance Disclosure Agency structured in such a way as to be politically independent of those 
whose conduct it must police, with resources clearly dedicated to the sole function of implementing and enforcing 
the contribution and spending limits and disclosure requirements, and an undiluted mission to fulfill that function. 
51 With two members of the four-member Board answering primarily to each major party, as is the case 
currently, either deadlock or bartering of decisions is inevitable. 
52 See New York Const., Art. VI , Section 2(c)-(f) . 
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The agency itself should have three separate Offices, each with a Director reporting to 
the Board of Elections and Campaign Finance.53 One should be the Office of General 
Counsel, which would interact with and support each of the other two. The other two should 
be an Office of Election Administration, charged with all aspects of administration of elections, 
and an Office of Campaign Finance, charged with all aspects of administration and enforcement 
of the campaign finance and disclosure laws. All three Offices should be allocated, with 
separate budget amounts for each, the full resources necessary to accomplish their missions. 
The Office of General Counsel should work with the other two to formulate regulations and 
advisory opinions, and should make determinations as to conflicts of interest, and the like. 
The Office of Campaign Finance should be required by law to issue detailed but 
workable disclosure forms, to computerize all information on the disclosure statements, to 
monitor and enforce the contribution limits, to make periodic detailed public reports to the 
Governor and Legislature, and to administer whatever public funding program is authorized by 
law. It should have audit capability and, as authorized and directed by the Board, subpoena 
power and the power to investigate and conduct enforcement proceedings. It should assist the 
Board on rendering advisory opinions. In short, it should have all the duties and responsibilities 
of the independent campaign finance enforcement agency described in the Commission's 
Preliminary Report at pages 10-12. 
These changes in the Board's structure and statutorily mandated responsibilities are 
essential. Without them, the public is fated to suffer the same lack of enforcement that has 
characterized the past decade. 
D. Disclosure and Enforcement Mechanisms. Whether or not a public funding system 
is adopted, effective reform of present campaign finance disclosure requirements is imperative, 
including a far more effective system to record, publicize and disseminate the campaign finance 
information.54 Specific statutory direction should be given to the Board of Elections, requiring 
periodic public reports to the Legislature and the Governor, which would detail the information 
53 Establishing a separate office whose director reports directly to the Board itself will help ensure the 
autonomy and stature of the Office of Campaign Finance. 
54 In response to Commission recommendations in this area, the Board of Elections has begun in recent 
months to develop a computer system capable at least of recording and analyzing the data filed by campaign 
committees. But the effort is being hampered by budget cuts. It cannot be emphasized enough that effective 
computerization of these records is the barest of necessities, followed closely by sufficient audit and enforcement 
staff to make contribution limits meaningful. 
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on the disclosure forms, and also present tables and summaries interpreting that data.55 It is 
essential that the Governor and Legislature appropriate the funds necessary to accomplish this 
task. 
In addition, local boards of elections require the resources and technical support to 
computerize the disclosure statements that are filed locally. A portion of the initial 
computerization effort of the State Board could effectively be dedicated to this purpose, at no 
sacrifice to its mission. Uniformity of disclosure requirements and compatibility of computer 
systems between the local and State Boards is essential. All statements filed at the State Board 
which disclose contributions made to assist any candidate in a local election should be filed 
locally as well. Contributors who give more than $1,000 in the aggregate should be required to 
use the same name with each contribution, spelled the same way, for all contributions or unique 
identifying numbers should be assigned. 
The experience of this Commission in computerizing disclosure statements demonstrates 
that it is neither technologically difficult nor prohibitively expensive to computerize the volume 
of reports that local boards of elections receive. Commercial software and personal computers 
lend themselves readily to the task. If technical support were provided by the State Board, a 
smoothly functioning coordinated network of information throughout the State could easily be 
accomplished within two years. 
All the statewide elected officials and the legislative leaders spoke positively in their 
testimony about mandatory computerization of records and public reports. The problem now is 
to fund these improvements. The Board of Elections has already hired one highly qualified 
person to design a computer system, and has invested in costly and sophisticated equipment. 
Appropriations for the current fiscal year have not allocated nearly sufficient resources for the 
Board to hire the minimum staff necessary to achieve these goals. But without such funds, 
expressions of support, and statutory instructions to computerize disclosure information, are 
completely meaningless. 
55 The reports should be made annually, but a special three-month post-election report should be required 
following each election. The reports should contain, for each candidate, a listing of each contribution, sorted 
alphabetically by name of contributor; they should also present figures for total contributions received and 
expenditures made, as well as analyses of the patterns of contributions, in terms of size of contributions from 
various contributors, industry breakdowns and the like. Reports should cover incumbents and challengers, and 
permit comparison of the information. 
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E. Restrictions on the Use of Official Staff for Fund-raising. Commission 
investigations indicate an urgent need to limit the use of official staff for political fund-raising, 
even during leaves of absence, vacation days, or their off-duty hours. 
The Commission strongly recommends a provision, comparable to one included in its 
Proposed Draft Municipal Ethics Act,56 that would prohibit a public officer or employee, or his 
or her campaign committee, from soliciting contributions or participation in election campaigns57 
from non-elected public officers and employees or persons doing business with the state 
government. If this recommendation is not adopted, state employees should simply not 
participate at all in soliciting campaign contributions. 
When government decision-makers act as fund-raisers, citizens--especially contributors--
inevitably link big gifts to favorable official action. Moreover, it is virtually impossible under 
such circumstances to eliminate a fear on the part of those solicited that a refusal might some 
day work against their business interests. This subtle coercion is inescapable under the present 
rules. People come to believe that government is for sale. The present occupants of elected 
office may possess the ability to eliminate gratitude and any sense of obligation from their 
decision-making when presented with matters involving contributors. But the inherent forces 
which drive the world of fund-raising make at least occasional lapses virtually inevitable. 
Contributors cannot be expected to sort out the various roles adopted by state 
employees who revolve in and out of fund -raising and government positions. The history of 
questionable fund-raising practices is too long, and has engendered too much cynicism, for 
contributors or the general public to accept at face value the spoken disclaimers that 
contributions and government decisions are never linked at all. If present practices persist--
allowing and even encouraging public employees to shift between official and fund-raising roles 
several times during the tenure of an incumbent--the public will remain disillusioned about the 
electoral system. 
The best way to address this problem is to ban contributions from those who do business 
with the government and to implement this ban by prohibiting solicitations of them by can-
didates or their committees or representatives, including public employees. If such a ban is not 
adopted, at a bare minimum, public employees should be excluded completely from the fund-
56 See, Municipal Ethical Standards: The Need For A New Approach, Commission on Government 
Integrity, December 26, 1988. 
57 A limited exception should allow elected officers to solicit participation in election campaigns from their 
appointees who are exempt or unclassified under the Civil Service Law and are directly subordinate to them. 
There should also be language designed to assure that these prohibitions will not apply to general solicitations 
which do not target public officers and employees, or people doing business with the government. 
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raising process. Intimate knowledge of the workings of government, or of the candidate's office, 
cannot be necessary for effective fund-raising, at least as long as there is no connection between 
the business of the office and the contributions being solicited. To the extent that familiarity 
with the candidate's positions and decisions is necessary for fund-raising, the campaign 
committee may educate itself without being injected into the government process. And as a 
practical matter, campaign committees spending in excess of $500,000 on a single race can well 
afford to hire the professional fund-raising staff equal to the task. 
Conclusion 
In the end it is not decisive whether the maxim "those who give will get" is fact or 
fiction. Appearances matter. Widespread cynicism destroys the basic faith in public institutions 
and officials that is vital to our electoral system. Much of the general public believes--often 
with good cause--that the system is biased in favor of wealthy special interests. The appearance 
of impropriety itself has a pernicious effect on the level of confidence in the integrity of the 
electoral and decision-making processes of government. 
The State of New York is at a crossroads. For many years, some officeholders have 
pressed for reform of the campaign fund-raising process. For many years, despite their efforts, 
the status quo has been maintained, while the excesses of candidates and contributors have 
become ever more extreme and public cynicism more pronounced. One problem is that until 
now no one could credibly cry for reform without pointing accusing fingers at colleagues, rivals, 
valued contributors and supporters. The consensus necessary to achieve reform depended too 
much on concessions of wrongdoing, or at least wrong motives. Another problem was that the 
current system worked too well for incumbents. Yet another problem was that proposed 
reforms threatened to be used to the political advantage of one party or another. 
By now, everyone should appreciate that the present system harms us all, and that 
reforms are possible which will enhance everyone's ability to compete effectively in the 
campaign arena. There can be no further debate about the need to limit campaign 
contributions, provide for effective disclosure, and remove public employees from the fund-
raising process (at least in so far as contributions are sought from those doing business with the 
offices in which they are employed). Effective disclosure only hurts those with something to 
hide. Sane contribution limits only restrict special interests with private agendas. 
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Our leaders must not hesitate to clean up campaign finance in New York State. It is 
not this Commission's function to act as prosecutor, jury or judge of the conduct of any 
individual. Instead, an examination of the entire system has shown it to be gravely wanting, and 
the Commission strongly urges its reform. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June, 1989 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
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Part 2 
Individual Officeholders' 
Fund-Raising Practices 
Note 
Commissioner Vance did not participate in the investigation and deliberations concerning 
Part 2 of this report which deals with the campaign finance practices of individual officeholders. 
Commissioner Magavern did not participate in the investigation and deliberations 
concerning the portion of Part 2 of this report which deals with the campaign finance practices 
of Comptroller Edward V. Regan. 
I. 
Fund-Raising Practices of 
Governor Mario M. Cuomo 
Introduction 
The Governor's fund-raising effort is distinguishable from that of the other state-wide 
candidates in that money more readily gravitates to him. Indeed, since he first received the 
nomination for Governor, contributions have come so easily and in such large amounts that in 
1986 and 1987 he decided that it was unnecessary to hold a fund-raising event. The Governor's 
fund-raising organization is similar to those of other officeholders: his campaign committee, 
Friends of Mario Cuomo ("FOMC"), is run on a day-to-day basis by few full-time employees, 
and the fund-raising itself is centered around large, well-attended dinners organized by volunteer 
members of a Dinner Committee. 
The Governor, like the Comptroller and Attorney General, has frequently expressed his 
support for campaign finance reform. He has repeatedly proposed such legislation, and has 
communicated his commitment to reform in his appearances before this Commission. Most 
recently, in his testimony on March 10, 1989, he pledged to sign any campaign finance reform 
bill that was placed before him for signature, even one containing provisions with which he 
might disagree.58 In addition, in connection with his 1988 fund-raising event, he chose to abide 
by the restrictions contained in the Assembly's proposed campaign finance bill, although he said 
that unless a comprehensive campaign finance reform law is passed he may not abide by these 
voluntary restrictions in the future.59 
58 One such provision might, for example, be a ban on contributions from lobbyists or those having 
business dealings with government. Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 65. 
59 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 51-53. 
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I. The Governor as Fund-Raiser: 
The Effect of Attaining High Office 
Both the Governor and those who have worked with FOMC have stated that the task of 
raising money has become vastly easier since the Governor assumed office. Before his primary 
victory in 1982, raising money was, as he put it, "a seven-day, nearly twenty-four hour a day 
effort" and "a great deal of trouble."60 A FOMC fund-raising event in 1981 raised the 
comparatively small sum of approximately $250,000. By contrast, since the Governor's primary 
victory in 1982, his fund-raising has been primarily accomplished through hugely successful 
dinners which have raised an average of approximately 2.0 million dollars per event. 
According to both the Governor and his campaign finance chairman for the 1982 race, 
William Stern, the change was immediate and dramatic after his primary victory. In the 
Governor's words, Stern "didn't have room enough in his office to accommodate all the people 
who came rushing in to make contributions to us."61 Stern described how, while he had been 
able to raise only about $1.2 million for then Lieutenant Governor Cuomo in the entire year 
and a half preceding his victory in the 1982 gubernatorial primary, during the short four weeks 
between the primary and the general election he raised some $3.5 million, largely from "people 
trying to ingratiate themselves with somebody who was to be Governor."62 
The gala events staged in 1983, 1984 and 1985 were each marked by greater receipts: 
approximately $1.2 million in 1983; $2.4 million in 1984; and $3.5 million in 1985. Only in 1988 
(when, at the Governor's direction, FOMC imposed voluntary contribution limits at the levels 
prescribed in the Campaign Finance Reform bill passed that year by the New York State 
Assembly63) did the total dip--to $1.15 million. Stern also testified that the rush of contributors 
to Mario Cuomo's campaign after the primary in 1982 was led by those selling things to the 
government and those regulated by government.64 This has continued to be true. During an 
interview with Commission staff, John Marino, the current Executive Director of the State 
Democratic Committee and the organizer of the 1988 event, estimated that for the 1988 event, 
60 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8. 
61 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8. 
62 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 132. 
63 A virtually identical bill, 189A, has again this year been passed by the Assembly. It imposes, among 
other things, a limit of $4,000 on individual contributions for the primary and general election and an aggregate 
limit of $5,000 on contributions from corporations and their subsidiaries. 
64 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 132-33. 
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between thirty and fifty percent of contributors to FOMC were people or businesses having 
dealings with the state. 
The magnitude of such contributions is striking, and surely is one cause of the public's 
troubling lack of confidence in the manner in which candidates for public office raise funds. 
This Commission has been assessing whether this flow of funds from those doing business with 
the State to those in the highest state offices occurs of its own accord, or if it is encouraged by 
the candidates and those who raise money on their behalf. In the case of Governor Cuomo, it 
is a mixture of both. 
II. The Organization of Cuomo's Fund-Raising Effort 
Governor Cuomo's political fund-raising is accomplished through his campaign 
committee, to which he delegates responsibility for raising money for his campaigns. While the 
Governor may not play as active a role as the other statewide elected officals, documents 
obtained from FOMC and referred to during the Governor's testimony reflect the Governor's 
approval of and input into fund-raising strategies, including the creation of a Board of Advisors, 
the selection of Dinner Committee members, establishing fund-raising goals for their members, 
and the drafting of solicitation form Ietters.65 
FOMC has been sparsely staffed between election campaigns and fundraisers. During 
campaigns the FOMC staff swells with state employees on leave from their official positions. 
During the periods immediately preceding fund-raising events, volunteers and short-term 
employees are added to the staff to meet the temporary need for personnel. 
Following Governor Cuomo's election to office, FOMC's fund-raising efforts were 
organized initially on a volunteer basis by Lucille Falcone, who was Counsel to FOMC from 
1983 until 1988. Falcone assembled dinner committees for each fund-raising event, the 
members of which were each asked to commit to selling ten tickets to the event. Tickets were 
priced at $1,000.66 In addition, invitations were sent to individuals on the committee's 
solicitation lists. Falcone would keep track of and encourage the efforts of the dinner 
65 See Appendix Three, Exhibits 4 and 5. 
66 In some years, a small number of "ringside" tickets sold for $2,500 each. 
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committee members. Volunteers and temporary staff employees would make follow-up inquiries 
to others. 
In 1985, Richard Gordon was hired as a full-time Executive Director of FOMC. In that 
position he assumed the organizational responsibilities Falcone had borne in 1983 and 1984. He 
also took responsibility for the filing of the requisite financial disclosure statements with the 
Board of Elections. Between 1985 and 1988, FOMC had only one other full-time, salaried 
employee, who handled computer-related tasks. In 1988, Gordon resigned his full-time position 
with FOMC and the fund-raising dinner staged in November of 1988 was organized by the 
Executive Director of the State Democratic Committee, John Marino. Volunteers and part-time 
employees assisted in the effort. A Dinner Committee was again assembled and its members 
were each asked to attempt to sell ten tickets. 
By his own account, the Governor has limited his personal involvement in the fund-
raising activities of FOMC because he dislikes both the appearance created by contributors 
showering incumbent or potential public officials with money and the cynicism that such 
contributions create. He testified that he has done everything he could to discourage the reality 
and even the impression of conflict, and has avoided as much as possible even knowing who 
contributes to his campaign.67 His campaign committee, however, has approached its fund-
raising in a manner that, in certain respects, capitalized on the inclination of specific groups and 
industries to contribute to the Governor, and played upon the illusion, which FOMC helped to 
create, that the Governor was in fact aware of the contributions and efforts made and 
undertaken on his behalf. 
Despite the fact that contributors are most willing to shower a popular incumbent 
Governor with large sums, FOMC operates in typical political fund-raising fashion. It aggres-
sively pursues those most willing and able to contribute in large amounts, and targets groups of 
people of means, as well as individuals and businesses identifiable by virtue of their dealings 
with the State. The solicitation lists maintained and used by FOMC, the configuration of 
Dinner Committees it has organized, and the affiliations of contributors to FOMC all reflect this 
approach. 
A. The Solicitation Lists 
In his testimony before the Commission, Stern identified the enormous givers to political 
campaigns as "the usual suspects" - Wall Street, real estate developers and public employees' 
67 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 8·9. 
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umons. Stem noted that these were groups which, in one way or the other, depended upon 
"state capitalism" and therefore had an incentive to ingratiate themselves with government 
officials. 68 
FOMC developed and maintains solicitation lists, some of which target such industries. 
Included in FOMC's records is an index of computerized solicitation lists identified by FOMC as 
follows: Banking, Engineers, Insurance, Labor Leaders, Finance, Architects, Attorneys and 
Brokerage Houses, among others.69 
The contribution pattern with respect to individuals and companies on one of these lists, 
labeled "Engineers," is revealing. A Commission comparison of that list with the list of 
contributors to FOMC during the period between 1982 and 1987 revealed that 64 of the 68 
engineering firms or individuals on the list made contributions to FOMC during that period. 
Additionally, all but 11 of the 64 contributing engineering firms or individuals had, between 
1984 and 1987, secured consulting contracts with either the New York State Thruway Authority 
or the New York State Department of Transportation ("DOT").70 
There is no evidence to suggest that FOMC fundraisers ever stated or implied that these 
firms' business fortunes in New York State would be affected by their contributions. There is, 
however, significant evidence suggesting that the firms were motivated to contribute by business 
considerations. Commission staff interviewed over half of the contributing firms; these 
interviews reflect that while no solicitors ever suggested a link between state business and 
contributions, virtually all of the engineers thought it unwise "to take a chance and not con-
tribute."71 The impact of this perception is reflected in the fact that over 90% of the 
engineering firms doing business with the Thruway Authority and the DOT during the years 
1984-87 contributed to either FOMC or the State Democratic Committee between 1982 and 
1987.72 
One more illustration of the Committee's fund-raising approach is provided by another 
list obtained and used for solicitation purposes by FOMC, the official (publicly available) list of 
68 Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 133. 
69 Hrg. Exh. 74, Mar. 10, 1989. 
70 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 6. Under New York State Law, such contracts are neither publicly 
advertised nor competitively bid. 
71 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 24. 
72 Commission analysis; Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 22. 
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lobbyists registered with the New York State Temporary Commission on Lobbying.73 It was 
evidently secured by FOMC for the specific purpose of targeting firms and individuals whose 
business it is to attempt to influence the processes of government to the benefit of their clients. 
The actual copy of the list used by FOMC is replete with notations indicating FOMC's 
methodical telephone solicitation of those registered lobbyists. While the Governor himself, 
when he was Secretary of State in 1975, proposed legislation that would have prohibited 
lobbyists from providing state office holders with gifts and dinner invitations,74 his campaign 
committee has systematically solicited contributions from lobbyists.75 When questioned on this 
point, the Governor responded that he saw no problem with FOMC practices as long as he was 
unaware of contributions from the lobbyists.76 However, as with other issues raised during the 
public hearing, the Governor stated that he would support a prohibition on contributions from 
lobbyists if legislation to that effect were presented to him.77 
It may very well be that lobbyists' contributions made on behalf of a particular client or 
industry give them no influence over the operations of government, especially if the public 
official is ignorant of their contributions. However, the perception persists among lobbyists that 
73 This list was among the documents and materials made available to the Commission by FOMC upon the 
Commission's request for all records relating to fund-raising activities. 
74 The following is an excerpt from Robert S. McElvaine, Mario Cuomo: A Biography (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, McMillan Publishing Co., 1988) at 214: 
The new secretary of state quickly moved on to a crusade against abuses by 
lobbyists trying to influence state legislators. He said that the laws regulating 
the conduct of lobbyists were inadeqate, but that he intended to start 
enforcing those laws while he sought the enactment of stronger provisions. 
The lobbying law then on the books, Cuomo noted, had been applied only 
once in the sixty-nine years since its enactment. Cuomo proposed legislation 
that would strictly prohibit lobbyists from giving any sort of gifts to legislators. 
He would not permit lobbyists to buy lunch or drinks for legislators, or even to 
give out such items as calendars and memo pads as Christmas presents. 
"Why should any gift or payment be permissible?" Cuomo asked a stunned 
Assembly Committee of Ethics. "Is it essential to our system that a lobbyist 
have a cocktail party for legislators or others whom they seek to influence? 
Will their opportunity to make an intelligent presentation be minimized if they 
cannot take a legislator or agency head out to dinner? Are these things done 
for any purpose other than to seek by the subtle workings of 'good will' or a 
friendly predisposition to help produce a statute or rule or decision that will 
affect large numbers of people, some of them no doubt adversely?" 
75 Lucille Falcone estimated that Howard Rubinstein, a registered lobbyist, raised from his clients, associates 
and contacts approximately $200,000 per dinner for the FOMC. Rubinstein also made contributions to FOMC in 
his own name. 
76 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 67. 
77 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 67. 
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by contributing, they may curry favor and good will--or at the very least will avoid the perceived 
risk associated with not giving. This perception is fostered when, as is often the case, the same 
public employees have a role in both fund-raising and government decision making.78 
Particularly in that case, a public official who is ignorant of the lobbyists' contributions may be 
unable to assess completely what factors may have influenced the staffs recommendations--
including, perhaps, the campaign contributions of lobbyists and interest groups. 
In his remarks to the Commission in September of 1987, Governor Cuomo himself 
touched upon this phenomenon when he stated that while his campaign committee puts no 
pressure on anyone to contribute, there is a feeling in the business community that says "You're 
supposed to give money to the incumbent, it's expected of you."79 Hence, while there is no 
evidence that his committee puts pressure on business people to contribute out of fear of 
adverse business effects or in anticipation of business benefits, current fund-raising practices give 
rise to such expectations even in the absence of explicit pressure. 
B. The Composition of the Dinner Committee/ 
Industry Breakdowns of Contributors 
The FOMC practice of targeting and actively pursuing contributions from the business 
community is further reflected in the composition of the FOMC Dinner Committees during the 
years 1983-1988. The Committees, assembled for the purposes of purchasing and/or selling 
tables, consist of approximately one hundred members and include numerous representatives 
from the industries Stem termed the "usual suspects." For example, the Dinner Committee in 
1988 included leaders from the following firms and businesses: 
Bear Steams 
Brown and Wood 
Citibank 
Communication Workers of America 
Debevoise and Plimpton 
Dillon Reed and Company 
Drexel Burnham Lambert 
First Boston Corporation 
Fleishman Management Company 
Goldman Sachs and Company 
Hawkins, Delafield & Wood 
78 See discussion in Section II (C) below. 
79 Sept. 9, 1987 public hearing of the Commission. 
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Lazard Freres and Company 
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae 
Manuel Elken Co. 
Merrill Lynch and Company 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
Morgan Stanley and Company 
Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander and Ferdon 
Paine Webber 
Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton and Garrison 
Peat Marwick Mitchell and Company 
Smith Barney Harris Upham and Co., Inc. 
The International Longshoreman's Association 
The Mack Company 
The Mendik Company 
The Savings Banks Association of New York State 
The percentage of money raised through contributions from industries represented on 
the Committee reflects the kind of financial support that such representatives have been able to 
garner from their colleagues and business associates80: 
Financial Community: 
Legal Community: 
Real Estate Business: 
Employee Organizations: 
10% 
7% 
8% 
8% 
(approximately $937,000) 
(approximately $656,000) 
(approximately $750,000) 
(approximately $750,000) 
As the comments of the representatives of the engineering firms confirmed in 
Commission staff interviews, such businesses and individuals often perceive a risk in not con-
tributing which they are unwilling to take. The Governor himself acknowledged that they might, 
in fact, prefer not to contribute when he told the Commission in 1987 that "a lot of the 
business community would feel relieved and saved by a campaign finance law that made it 
impossible for them to contribute."81 Nevertheless, FOMC capitalizes on the current inclination 
of such business people.82 By seeking their memberships on dinner committees and then 
fueling their competitive instincts by fostering the impression that their efforts are known by the 
Governor, FOMC has been able to raise enormous amounts of money. 
80 Figures reflect percentages of the $9.37 million raised by FOMC between 1982 and 1989. 
81 Governor's remarks to the Commission on September 9, 1987. 
82 This is consistent with the Governor's position that, until fundamental reforms applicable to all candidates 
are enacted, he should not handicap his own fund-raising efforts. Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 52-53. 
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During questioning by the Commission staff, Lucille Falcone acknowledged that it was a 
desire to please the Governor which caused Dinner Committee members to be aggressive in 
raising money for FOMC. She added that while the Governor was, in reality, unaware of both 
the efforts of such people on his behalf and of the amounts contributed by individuals or 
businesses, neither Dinner Committee members nor contributors were advised that the Governor 
deliberately chooses to remain ignorant of the fund-raising process and its specifics. In fact, 
Falcone stated that it would be "counter-productive" to let fundraisers and contributors know 
that the Governor would never be informed of their efforts. If FOMC so informed them, 
Falcone reasoned, "you'll never get any money." 
Among contributors solicited by them, Dinner Committee members in turn also fostered 
the illusion that the Governor would be aware of their contributions to FOMC. Lobbyist 
Howard Rubenstein suggested as much in solicitation letters wherein he told his clients that 
"the Governor will be pleased by your support." 
Thus, even though unsolicited contributions poured into the Cuomo campaign after the 
1982 primary victory, FOMC still stimulated contributors by cultivating the belief that the 
Governor is himself personally gratified by the fund-raising efforts of "bundlers" and 
contributors alike. This necessarily has the effect of undermining the Governor's personal 
attempts to purge his own fund-raising process of misplaced notions that influence might be 
gained through contributions.83 
C. Staff Participation in the Fund-raising Effort 
The relationship between the Governor's official staff and his campaign and fund-raising 
staff may also contribute to the belief that contributions and state business are in some way 
linked. 
Governor Cuomo has established a policy which prohibits his executive staff from either 
soliciting contributions on his behalf or making contributions themselves to his campaign 
committee. In addition, he has had memoranda circulated to all commissioners and agency 
heads in state government each year explaining that a clear separation must be maintained by 
state employees between political activities and the discharge of their official duties. The 
83 Perhaps adding to these misimpressions is the fact that members of the business community attend 
"businessmen's barbecues" hosted by the Governor at the Governor's Mansion. Although these barbecues are 
official rather than political events, the names of the attendees are added to the FOMC solicitation list and the 
attendees are thereafter solicited for contributions to the Governor's political campaign. 
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memos also explain, however, that state employees are not otherwise discouraged from 
participating in the political process. 
Consistent with this policy, executive office personnel in the Cuomo administration do 
not play a role in fund-raising while on state time. However, the Governor does not restrict 
movement between his executive staff and his campaign staff by people who wish to work on his 
campaign full-time. Some seven members of the executive staff took leaves of absence from 
their state positions to work on the 1986 campaign. Following the election, all returned to state 
government. 
The movement of executive office personnel between the Governor's executive and 
campaign staffs erodes the wall of separation between political and official matters which the 
Governor has endorsed. His personal distance from the affairs of his campaign committee may 
not be perceptible to potential contributors to the Governor's campaign when they are asked 
for money by once and future executive staff members. John Marino, the Executive Director of 
the State Democratic Committee, expressed the view to the Commission staff that the "better 
practice" is to keep separate the executive and campaign staffs. The Governor disagreed with 
Marino's assessment.84 
The fact that the Cuomo campaign asked state workers to volunteer their time to work 
on campaign matters has further blurred this division. While the Governor testified that he 
prohibited his staff from contributing to his campaign because he feared that employees might 
feel pressure to duplicate the contributions of their colleagues, he perceives no basis for 
prohibiting state workers from volunteering their time for campaign work.85 Yet, a Commission 
inquiry into such volunteering revealed precisely the same problems about which the Governor 
expressed wariness in the area of contributions: some state employees stated that they felt 
pressure to volunteer in the effort. Certainly the solicitation of employees to work on the 
campaign by high level executive staff members on leave from their state positions does not 
help to alleviate that feeling. 
84 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 71-72. 
85 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 74-76. 
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D. The Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority 
The pressure which these state employees felt, however, is minimal when compared to 
the pressure felt by employees of the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority ("NFTA") 
when they were solicited for contributions to FOMC in 1985. The Temporary State 
Commission of Investigation ("SIC") hearings held in 1987 disclosed that NFTA employees were 
solicited by colleagues who, in their solicitations, referred to the fact that Raymond Gallagher, 
the Chairman of the NFTA, was seeking their support for the Governor's campaign.B6 One 
such employee testified recently at a hearing of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection BoardB7 that 
he had every reason to believe that his job was at stake when he was asked by the NFT A 
purchasing manager to buy a $1,000 ticket to a 1985 fund-raising event for Governor Cuomo.BB 
The perceived link between contributions and jobs may well have resulted in part from 
actions of the Governor's Executive Office staff. In 1984, the Governor's Appointments Office 
helped form what came to be known in Erie County as the "patronage committee." That 
committee screened and helped select candidates for positions at the NFT A and elsewhere in 
state government. Its members were chosen both by the Governor's Appointments Office and 
the chairman of the committee, a Jong-time political supporter of the Governor. Virtually all 
of the members of the committee were political supporters of the Governor and eight of the 
twelve also served on a committee organized in Buffalo to aid in the staging of a Cuomo 
fundraiser there in 1985.B9 Gallagher was a member of both committees, and it was in his role 
as a member of the organizing committee that he encouraged the use of his name in the 
solicitation of contributions from NFTA employees. 
It is not surprising that where those with apparent authority to recommend who shall be 
employed or promoted by an agency are also dispatched to raise money for the incumbent, 
those solicited may feel compelled to contribute in order to obtain, protect or advance in their 
jobs. The imperfections in the wall of separation between government and politics are nowhere 
more evident than in this situation. 
86 S.l.C. Hearing, Buffalo, N.Y. , July 1987, Tr. at 177. 
87 The Federal Hatch Act prohibits such solicitations and NFTA employees fall under its purview because of 
the partial federal funding which the NFTA receives. Under current New York state law, only solicitations on 
public property are prohibited. 
88 Testimony before Administrative Law Judge Edward J. Reidy, United States of America Merit Systems 
Protection Board, March 2, 1989 in an action brought by the Special Counsel against Raymond F. Gallagher, Q! 
~· and the NFTA. 
89 Among the "patronage committee" members, only Gallagher has been described as a later supporter of 
the Governor. He supported Mayor Koch in the 1982 gubernatorial primary. He is, coincidentally, the Chairman 
of NFTA to which the •patronage committee" made the lion's share of its recommendations. 
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While the Governor testified before the Commission that he does not approve of, 
encourage or allow9° such practices, it is clear that his personal efforts to prevent them have 
not always been enough. Further, while distancing himself personally from the process may 
absolve him of any direct culpability, it does not remove the appearance of all impropriety in 
the fund-raising done by others on his behalf. 
90 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 82. 
41 
II. 
Fund-Raising Practices Of 
Attorney General Robert Abrams 
Introduction 
Robert Abrams' political fund-raising stresses direct contact with prospective contributors. 
His fund-raising reflects the careful grooming of personal relationships with wealthy prospective 
givers, an intimate involvement with the details of his own fund-raising operation and a constant 
preoccupation with the need to raise money, even in non-election years. 
The Attorney General's fund-raising effort for the 1986 election had three principal 
components: the "one-on-one" program, the "give or get" program, and a large fund-raising 
dinner. Each component raises appearances of conflicts of interest, many of which are similar 
to those we have noted in our analysis of the other statewide elected officials. They are 
inherent in a campaign fund-raising system that pushes candidates to rely on large contributions 
from those who have an interest in the decisions of the office. 
Like the Comptroller and the Governor, the Attorney General is an advocate of 
campaign finance reform; he also has adopted several voluntary limits on his own fund-raising. 
Notwithstanding his sensitivity to the issues discussed in this report, voluntary limits are not an 
adequate solution to the vexing problems of New York's campaign finance system. A 
meaningful solution can only be found in new laws that apply equally to all candidates. 
I. The Attorney General's Personal Approach 
to Fund-Raising 
The "one-on-one" and "give or get" programs were the source of most of the Attorney 
General's funds for his 1986 campaign. Both programs involved the Attorney General's direct 
personal solicitation of financial support from wealthy potential contributors. 
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This type of fund-raising guarantees that the officeholder is intimately aware of who is 
contributing to his campaign; it also ensures that the contributor knows without doubt that the 
public official is aware of his or her support. Coercion--however unintentional--is an inherent 
danger in such an approach, especially when the potential giver has an economic interest in the 
official decisions of the Attorney General's office. 
A. The One-on-One Program 
Beginning in late 1984, the Attorney General scheduled a series of breakfast and 
luncheon meetings with each of approximately 100 prospective contributors.91 The object of 
the meetings, which were attended by the Attorney General, the prospective contributor, and 
either Lawrence Buttenwieser (chairman of Abrams' campaign finance committee) or Leonard 
Boxer (another member of the finance committee), was to secure a pledge of $15,000 if the 
Attorney General chose to run for re-election, and $50,000 if he decided to run for Governor. 92 
The finance committee kept close track of incoming pledges.93 The Attorney General, 
his long-time political advisor Ethan Geto, Buttenwieser, Boxer and John Burke, the Attorney 
General's executive assistant, met periodically throughout 1985 and 1986 to review spreadsheets 
prepared by Geto's political consulting firm which tallied incoming pledges and contributions and 
noted any outstanding "balance due."94 The finance committee--including the Attorney 
General--reviewed name by name the lists of those who had not redeemed their pledges, and 
debated how best to follow up. 
91 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 33. 
92 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 42-44. At the Commission's hearing on March 15, 1988, the Attorney General's 
finance committee chairman Lawrence Buttenwieser testified that the $15,000 figure was selected because "we felt 
it was the right place to draw the line between the problem of the appearance of large influence and the problem 
of raising enough money to pay for his campaign." Tr. Mar. 15, 1988, at 257-58; see also Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 
45-46. 
Documents produced to the Commission by the campaign committee, however, reveal that, in connection 
with the 1986 election, the campaign committee received in excess of $15,000 from a number of supporters, 
including McAndrews & Forbes' chairman and chief executive officer, Ronald Perelman; John Kluge, chairman 
and president of Metromedia; and Donald Trump. Hrg Exh. 14, Mar. 10, 1989. 
93 Tr. Mar. 1 O, 1989, at 46. 
94 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 47-50; Hrg. Exh. 13 and 14, Mar. 10, 1989. In 1986, this core group was joined by 
Laura Ross, a fund-raising consultant hired by the campaign committee to oversee and coordinate the "give or 
get" program and the fund-raising dinner. 
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Election Day found the Attorney General re-elected, his campaign in debt and more 
than $140,000 in pledges outstanding. Geto, Buttenwieser, Boxer and the Attorney General 
split up among themselves the responsibility for collecting these pledges. The Attorney General 
was assigned, in several instances, to make one last effort to collect pledges which the campaign 
committee had otherwise all but written off.95 The finance committee also considered going 
back to loyal supporters, like Donald Trump,96 to solicit additional funds.97 
B. The "Give or Get" Program 
The "give or get" program also involved direct solicitation by the Attorney General. 
Over 80 individuals were approached and asked either to contribute between $5,000 and $10,000 
or to raise that amount from their friends, acquaintances or business colleagues.98 
Individuals in the "give or get" program were encouraged to host whatever type of 
fundraiser they felt they could handle. In most instances, the initial contact with the prospective 
host was made by the Attorney General himself. Functions ranged from a small buffet 
luncheon at the host's home to cocktails and dinner at Tavern on the Green. Individual events 
raised anywhere from $1,200 to over $25,000, for a total of approximately $400,000. 
95 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 54; Hrg. Exh. 17, Mar. 10, 1989. At the Commission's hearing on March 10, 1989, 
the Attorney General testified that he did not in fact make these assigned follow-up calls (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 56-
57) . 
In any event, the committee's post-election solicitation efforts met with mixed success. George Klein, who 
had pledged $15,000, made good in full on that pledge six months after the election. 
Lewis Rudin, on the other hand, who pledged $5,000 at a one-on-one breakfast in September 1986, was 
pursued with less success. Four months after the election, Buttenwieser wrote to Rudin to advise him that he 
was free to contribute to the Attorney General since his "plan for 65 Central Park West has been accepted for 
filing ." See Appendix Three, Exhibit 7 (letter from Lawrence Buttenwieser to Lewis Rudin, March 4, 1987). 
As of September 1, 1987, Rudin's $5,000 pledge had been all but written off as uncollectible, although 
the initials "RA" still appeared next to his name in the column captioned "person responsible for collection" on 
the attachment to the Citizens for Abrams' September 1, 1987 balance sheet. See, Appendix Three, Exhibit 8; 
see also Appendix Three, Exhibit 9 (letter from Ethan Geto to Lawrence B. Buttenwieser, dated June 4, 1987, 
advising Buttenwieser that Abrams "was going to follow-up personally" with Rudin) . 
96 By December 1986, Trump had already contributed $20,000 to the Attorney General's 1986 campaign, 
$5,000 more than the basic one-on-one pledge of $15,000 (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 59; Hrg. Exh. 14, Mar. 10, 1989) . 
97 Tr. Mar. 1 O, 1989, at 59. 
98 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 93-95. 
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II. Solicitation of Contributions 
from Those with an Economic Interest 
in the Decisions of the Attorney General's Office 
A. Solicitation and Acceptance of Campaign Contributions 
from Sponsors of Condominimum and Cooperative 
Apartment Conversion Plans 
Decisions made by the Attorney General's office have a broad impact on various 
members of the business community, particularly real estate developers and their lawyers. The 
office oversees public offerings of real estate securities, including condominium and cooperative 
apartments. It reviews each offering plan for compliance with detailed disclosure requirements, 
and is vested with substantial investigative and prosecutorial powers. 
In connection with the 1986 election, Citizens for Abrams voluntarily adopted a policy 
banning certain contributions from the sponsors of co-op and condominium plans. A pre-
printed slip was sent out with each thank-you note,99 advising the contributor that: 
The Citizens for Abrams committee has adopted a policy that it will 
not accept any contributions from individuals who are sponsors of 
co-op or condominium plans pending in the New York State 
Department of Law ... If [this} polic[yj may affect your 
contribution, please contact the committee at (212) 692-9440. 
The Commission's investigation reveals that this voluntary policy is flawed in crucial 
respects. First, the definition of when a plan is "pending" is too narrow. As the Attorney 
General explained at the March 1989 hearing, a plan is considered "pending" for purposes of 
his ban only during the period of review of the proposed offering statement known as the "red 
herring."100 
There are no restrictions on the solicitation or acceptance of contributions after the red 
herring has been accepted for filing, even though the Law Department continues to play a 
99 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 65-66, Hrg. Exh. 18, Mar. 10, 1989. 
100 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 65-67. 
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pivotal role in the conversion process once the red herring has been accepted for filing and the 
offering statement or "black book" is distributed to tenants and prospective buyers.101 
Thus, for instance, when Donald Trump contributed $7500 to the Attorney General on 
April 10, 1986, five plans worth over $60 million in which Trump had an interest were still in 
the black book stage and had not yet become eff ective.102 When Buttenwieser advised 
developer Lewis Rudin on March 4, 1987 that he was "not hindered by the constraints of the 
Campaign from making a contribution to the Campaign" since his plan for 65 Central Park 
West had been accepted for filing, 103 that plan was still in the black book phase and would not 
become effective until July 1987. 
Second, to pol ice its ban, the campaign committee relies on the contributor--the very 
person who may be seeking to ingratiate himself with the officeholder--to come forward and 
demand the return of his contribution.104 
101 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 67-76. The Commission can see no principled distinction between the red herring 
and the black book phase of the Law Department's responsibilities. For instance, a closing cannot take place on 
any units the sponsor sells until the Law Department reviews and accepts the effectiveness amendment, which 
must be filed within 15 months of the issuance of the black book and which must state that the sponsor has sold 
the requisite number of units to bona fide purchasers who intend to reside in the building. N.Y. General Bus. Law 
section 352-eeee(2)(a) , 2(c)(i) and 2 (d)(i) . The Law Department is empowered to reject a plan at the black book 
stage if, upon investigation, the Law Department determines that the sponsor has failed to comply with the 
various statutory requirements involving the sale of units to bona fide purchasers. (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 7 4-75) . 
A plan may also be rejected at the black book stage if the Law Department finds that the black book 
contains material misrepresentations, i.e., if the condition of the building has been falsely portrayed, or if the 
maintenance figure has been underestimated. Tr. Mar. 10, 1989 at 75. Complaints by tenants of harassment by 
the sponsor may be grounds for seeking a stay of the sale of units which, in turn, may cause the sponsor to 
miss the statutory 15-month time frame for filing the effectiveness amendment. N.Y. General Bus. Law section 
352-eeee(4) . 
102 Hrg. Exh. 20, Mar. 10, 1989. 
103 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 7 (letter from Lawrence Buttenwieser to Lewis Rudin dated March 4, 1987) 
and footnote 95 above. 
104 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 88. The Attorney General testifed that: 
"the whole point of this process is to separate the fundraising and the 
campaign from the Department of Law . . .. I don't want somebody in my 
fundraising operation in the campaign headquarters to put in a call to 
somebody in the real estate finance bureau about a contribution. That would 
require contact, liaison, information. That is totally antithetical to the way we 
have conducted ourselves and set up this program." (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 86-
87) . 
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The inadequacy of this enforcement mechanism was illustrated at the Commission's 
hearing in March 1989. On March 13, 1985, Donald Trump fulfilled the first installment of a 
$15,000 pledge to the Attorney General: Shorehaven Apartments 1, 2 and 3--entities owned by 
Donald Trump 105 __ each contributed $2,500 to Abrams.106 On that same day, red herrings for 
two co-op conversions plans in which Trump had an interest were pending in the Department 
of Law. According to Abrams' rules, the contributor should have alerted the campaign 
committee and requested a refund. Trump did not ask for his money back; the contributions 
were not returned.107 
Third, the Attorney General's voluntary ban does not address the problem of 
contributions received shortly before an offering plan is filed with the Attorney General's 
office.108 From the standpoint of the sponsor, a plan may be in gestation for months and even 
years before it is actually filed with the Law Department; the engineering report, which the 
sponsor must file with the red herring, may alone take three or four months to prepare, to say 
nothing of any repairs or renovations the sponsor may wish to make before offering units for 
sale. Yet the Attorney General makes no provision for the return of a contribution when it is 
followed in short order by the filing of a plan. 
Finally, and most important, the Attorney General's voluntary rule does not prohibit the 
candidate from meeting with and personally soliciting contributions from sponsors of plans with 
pending red herrings. The campaign committee does not screen out from its one-on-one 
program potential contributors with pending plans. 
When, according to his calendar, the Attorney General was scheduled for breakfast with 
Donald Trump on January 25, 1985, Trump had at least three plans in the red herring stage 
pending in the Law Department. When Trump pledged $15,000 to the Attorney General on 
February 22, 1985, he had four plans pending in the red herring stage.109 Developer Arthur 
105 Tr. Mar. 14, 1988, at 255-56. 
106 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 84-85; Hrg. Exh. 20, Mar. 10, 1989. 
107 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 85, 88. 
108 Thus, for instance, records of the Law Department reveal that Bernard Mendik, who contributed $15,000 
to the Attorney General on January 16, 1985, had an interest in plans worth hundreds of millions of dollars that 
were filed with the Law Department from April 1985 through August 1985. That contribution fell outside the 
strictures of the Attorney General's voluntary policy; it was therefore not refunded. 
109 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 79-82; Hrg. Exh. 20, Mar. 10, 1989. 
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Cohen had an interest in plans worth, collectively, over $150 million when the Attorney General 
met with him on October 9, 1986 at the Harmonie Club and asked for his $15,000 pledge.110 
Inherent in a policy which permits solicitation of campaign contributions--but not the 
acceptance of campaign contributions--while a plan is pending is the danger that the inference 
will be created, however unintentionally, that payment will be expected for favorable action by 
the officeholder. Soliciting campaign contributions while a plan is pending invites cynicism and, 
in the Commission's view, is implicitly coercive. 
B. Solicitation and Acceptance of Campaign Contributions 
from Attorneys with Matters Pending in the Law 
Department 
1. Contributions From Sponsors' Attorneys 
In the 1986 campaign, the Attorney General's voluntary ban did not apply to the 
acceptance of campaign contributions from law firms whos.e attorneys represented sponsors of 
condo and co-op plans pending in the Law Department, despite the fact that the sponsor's 
attorney has more direct dealings with the Law Department than the sponsor itself. 
For instance, Morton Certilman, one of the state's foremost sponsors' attorneys, was 
invited to a one-on-one breakfast on January 23, 1986.111 His $15,000 pledge was fulfilled by 
his law firm, Wofsey, Certilman, Haft, Lebow & Balin, in March 1986. In the two months 
between Certilman's pledge and his firm's contribution, his firm represented sponsors in over 
twenty plans submitted to the Law Department. Since January 1984, Certilman's firm has 
110 The Attorney General testified that Arthur Cohen was: 
"a success of our blue slip co-op policy. I solicited Arthur Cohen together with 
Larry Buttenwieser for a $15,000 contribution. He made a commitment of 
$15,000. We have never collected that $15,000 because he has had plans in 
the office." (Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 135.) 
Nonetheless, Arthur Cohen's $15,000 pledge was carried forward on the September 1, 1987 balance sheet 
of Citizens for Abrams as a viable pledge that had not yet been written off and which Ethan Geto was assigned 
to collect. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 8. 
111 Hrg. Exh. 14 & 32, Mar. 10, 1989. 
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represented sponsors of over 500 condo and co-op plans submitted to the Law Department for 
review. 
Altogether, of approximately $150,000 contributed to the Attorney General's 1986 
campaign by law firms in the name of the firm, approximately $90,000 was contributed by firms 
that represented sponsors in at least one plan submitted to the Law Department since January 
1984. Firms with ten or more plans accounted for a quarter of the law firms ' contributions. 
2. Contributions from Attorneys with Active Matters 
Pending in the Law Department 
During the 1986 election, the Attorney General had no restriction on contributions from 
those who had an interest in matters other than real estate development pending before his 
office. The following example illustrates the ethical dilemma which the Commission believes is 
inherent in the solicitation of contributions from attorneys with matters actively pending in the 
Law Department. 
In May 1986, the Attorney General spoke with Ira Millstein, a prominent New York 
City attorney, to ask him to help out in the campaign's fund-raising effort. Throughout the 
summer of 1986, campaign staff tried unsuccessfully to contact him to follow-up on that initial 
conversation.112 
On September 15, 1986, Abrams presided over a meeting at the Law Department at 
which Millstein and another partner from his firm sought relief from the Attorney General's 
office on behalf of one of their clients.113 Shortly after that meeting, Abrams telephoned 
Millstein, to ask him to raise $10,000 from his law firm for the campaign.114 
112 Tr. Mar. 1 O, 1989, at 95; Hrg. Exh. 16, Mar. 1 O, 1989. Campaign committee records indicate that 
campaign staff tried to contact the prospective contributor four times from June 5 to September 10, 1986. (Hrg. 
Exh. 16, Mar. 10, 1989). 
113 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 96, 100-102. 
114 The Attorney General had no specific recollection of that conversation {Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 96-97) ; 
Millstein remembered getting a call in his office from the Attorney General sometime in the fall of 1986 but was 
not sure when. 
However, Millstein's partner, who was present in the office when the Attorney General called, remembers 
that the call was made after the September 15 meeting at the Law Department. He remembers being surprised 
that Abrams made the call personally, especially since he and Millstein had met with the Attorney General in his 
office a few weeks earlier. 
(continued ... ) 
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Millstein did not raise the $10,000 the Attorney General was looking for, but he, his 
firm and his partner together contributed $2,000 in late October 1986. Geto called Millstein yet 
again, on November 14, 1986, after the election was over. This time, according to Geto's notes 
of the conversation, the lawyer requested that the campaign committee "stop pressuring him;" 
he still had a matter in the Law Department and "shouldn't have sent (the] contribution in [the] 
first place."115 
At the Commission's hearing, the Attorney General took issue with the suggestion that 
the contributor was in any way pressured by his campaign staff and testified that he had stood 
by the decision of his Law Department staff which was adverse to the contributor's client.116 
In an effort to address the ethical issues raised by contributions from attorneys, Abrams 
announced at the close of the Commission's hearings in March 1989 that he would refer every 
contribution over $2,500 from anyone with a "representational interest" in a matter involving his 
office to the New York State Commission on Ethics and would refund any contribution which 
"might create the appearance of a conflict."117 
The Commission considers such a measure, commendable as it is, inadequate. 
Contributions from those attorneys for condo and co-op plan sponsors, whose practice revolves 
in a substantial way around the Department of Law and whose appeal to prospective clients 
depends, in some measure, on their success in shepherding plans through the Law Department, 
should be prohibited altogether. So too should contributions from attorneys with other matters 
actively pending before the Law Department. 
114( ... continued) 
Campaign committee records indicate that other campaign staff members sought to contact Millstein six 
times from September 17, 1986 to October 27, 1986. (Hrg. Exh. 16, Mar. 10, 1989.) 
115 Hrg. Exh. 16, Mar. 10, 1989. 
116 Tr. Mar. 1 O, 1989, at 98-102. Millstein, who was interviewed by Commission staff, noted that the 
Attorney General made no reference to his client's pending matter in the fund-raising call and stated that he 
himself did not connect the two events in his own mind. 
At the same time, he told the Commission that the continuing requests for money -- especially after he 
had already raised $2000 and in light of the fact that the election was over -- made him "uncomfortable" and he 
felt that the perception would not be right. 
117 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 141 . 
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III. The Major Mailing List 
Before the 1986 election, the Attorney General advised all his employees in writing that 
"under no circumstances may any Department [of Law] employee engage in any political activity 
during working hours or on state premises, or make use of state equipment or resources for 
such activity."1 18 (emphasis added). 
This is a rule the Commission supports wholeheartedly. State resources are for public 
business, not campaigning. Using such resources for political purposes gives a significant and 
unfair advantage to incumbents. The Commission's investigation reveals, however, a significant 
breach of the Attorney General's policy which can be viewed as amounting to a public subsidy 
to his campaign. 
At some point in the Attorney General's first term of office, he began to compile at 
state expense a mailing list which came to be known as the Major Mailing List or "MML" for 
short.119 Separate and distinct from other mailing lists maintained by the Department of 
Law, 120 the MML included over 600 names by May 1986 and grew to over 1000 names in 
1988. 
Names were added to or deleted from the MML by Department of Law staff at the 
direction of the Attorney GeneraJ. 121 For each name on the MML, the Department of Law 
computer in which the MML was stored included a separate field for the name of the 
individual 's spouse, business address, home address, office telephone number, home telephone 
number, and an indication of any nickname by which he and his spouse were to be 
addressed. 122 As the need arose, these separate fields were also corrected, updated and 
proofread by Department of Law employees.123 
118 Hrg. Exh. 26, Mar. 10, 1989. 
119 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 107·108, 111·112; see Hrg. Exh. 11, Mar. 10, 1989. 
120 Apart from the MML, the Department of Law maintained mailings lists for various constituencies of the 
office, including press contacts, civil rights groups, religious groups, environmental groups, consumer rights 
activists, and labor unions. Names on the MML were assigned a specific computer code which allowed them to 
be retrieved without retrieving the names on the other mailing lists. 
121 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 108·109. 
122 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 110. 
123 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 108. 
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From time to time, those whose names appeared on the MML received a letter from 
the Attorney General, typed on Department of Law letterhead, together with a package of 
press clippings.124 The letter did not, as one might expect, tout the recent legal victories scored 
by his office.125 Rather, the emphasis in the MML letters sent out by the Department of Law 
from December 1984 through June 1987 was on the stance which the Attorney General himself 
believed should be taken to fight crime and municipal corruption.126 
Certainly, the issues raised in the MML letters are issues of concern to all New 
Yorkers.127 Yet, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the mailings served, at least in part, to 
pique the interest of a select group of wealthy prospective supporters.128 The tone of the 
letters was confiding and personal. The reader was addressed by his first name or nickname and 
the letters, signed "Bob", were cordially concluded with "warmest personal regards." Time and 
again, the reader was invited--"as a person of prominence who has a leadership role in the 
cornrnunity"129--to respond with their comments. 
That the MML could be viewed as serving a campaign function is bolstered by a 
comparison of the MML with the lists of Abrams' contributors filed with the state Board of 
124 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 107. 
125 For a brief period of time, the Law Department's Office of Public Information published and disseminated 
a newsletter, Agenda which did precisely that: inform the reader of recent victories of the office in the area of 
environmental protection, civil rights, consumer protection and the like. The Department of Law informed the 
Commission that that newsletter has not been published since early 1985. 
126 Documents provided to the Commission by the Law Department included eight MML letters dated, 
respectively, December 12, 1984, May 10, 1985, September 13, 1985, December 27, 1985, April 18, 1986, May 16, 
1986, February 6, 1987 and June 22, 1987. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10. The Commission was advised that 
no MML letters were sent out in 1988. 
127 The call for law enforcement reform was sounded in the December 1984 MML letter, mailed by the Law 
Department just as Abrams was scheduling the first of his one-on-one breakfast meetings, and was taken up 
again in the MML letters of May 1985, April 1986 and February 1987. The need for ethics reform legislation is set 
forth in MML letters of May 1986, February 1987 and June 1987. 
Other themes, such as the need to preserve the deductibility of state and local taxes, the recruitment 
policies of the Law Department and the need for legislation to deal with toxic chemical spills are sounded in MML 
letters of September 1985, December 1985, and February 1987 respectively. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10. 
128 After the election, the tone is more in the nature of a "thank you." Before going on to reiterate the 
Attorney General's stance on legislation needed in the areas of law enforcement, ethics reform and toxic 
chemicals, the February 1987 MML letter -- the first to follow the November 1986 election -- reminds the reader 
that the Attorney General 's " margin of victory was the biggest in the history of the office, 65.12°A." and that he 
"carried 60 of 62 counties in New York State, losing the two by a combined total of only 191 votes." The 
Attorney General also enclosed a sample of newspaper editorials supporting his candidacy, culled from daily 
newspapers throughout the state. See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10. 
129 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 10 (December 12, 1984 MML letter) . 
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Elections. Seventy-three percent of those on the MML as of December 1988 were 
contributors.130 Of the $2,288,000 Abrams raised from January 1984 through January 1989, 
over $1,900,000--83%--came from MML contributors.131 
Over 400 names were added to the MML between May 1986 and December 1988; of 
these, 94% were the names of contributors or those who were associated with firms or unions 
which contributed to Abrams' 1986 campaign.132 As the Attorney General testified in 
explaining why no mailings had been made since 1987, "the list became imbalanced .... it was 
growing disproportionate in terms of financial contributors."133 
If looked at from a campaign-related perspective, the MML allowed the Attorney 
General to communicate at state expense with wealthy individuals who had supported his 
campaign in the past or who might be encouraged to support his campaign in the future. 
Beyond that, it also provided a valuable address and telephone directory for the campaign staff. 
A copy of the Major Mailing List was brought from the Law Department to the campaign 
headquarters in 1986 by a campaign staff member on leave of absence from the Law 
Department and was openly available for consultation there not only by campaign staff but by 
the Attorney General himself. 134 The 1986, 1987 and 1988 versions of the MML were also 
sent by that Law Department staff member to the office of Abrams' campaign consultants, Geto 
& DeMilly. 
Interviews conducted by Commission staff reveal that the MML was useful to the 
campaign in a variety of ways. It was used to place telephone calls for the Attorney General 
from the campaign headquarters; to compile lists of people to invite to the major fund-raising 
dinner in October 1986; to address invitations to other smaller fund-raising events; and to send 
personal thank you notes to contributors where the incoming contribution check lacked an 
address. 
130 Hrg. Exh. 4, Mar. 10, 1989. A comparison of the MML with the list maintained by the campaign 
committee of the approximately 100 people in the one-on-one program reveals that over 800,.{, of the names on 
the one-on-one list appear on the May 1986 version of the MML. Compare Hrg. Exh. 11 and 14, Mar. 10, 1989. 
Everyone on the one-on-one list who is not on the May 1986 version of the MML appears on a subsequent 
version of the MML. Compare Hrg. Exh. 14 & 28, Mar. 10, 1989. 
131 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 29; Hrg. Exh. 4, Mar. 10, 1989. MML contributors include all individuals named on 
the MML who either contributed to Citizens for Abrams as individuals, or whose firm(s) or union contributed to 
Citizens for Abrams. 
132 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 29-30. 
133 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 117-118. 
134 Tr. Mar. 10, 1989, at 113-114. 
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III. 
Fund-Raising Practices of 
Comptroller Edward V. Regan 
Introduction 
In many ways the political fund-raising of Comptroller Edward V. Regan has followed a 
format typical of other candidates in New York State. He has one campaign committee, the 
Ned Regan Support Committee ("Support Committee"); that committee forms a Dinner 
Committee and, in some years, a Finance Committee, to spearhead a fund-raising drive centered 
around an annual fund-raising dinner. The Support Committee has only one full-time paid 
employee, but employs ancillary bookkeeping help and, during periods before the major fund-
raising events, a number of short-term paid campaign workers and volunteers. 
However, unlike the other state-wide officeholders, Regan assigned a senior advisor on 
his Comptroller's Office staff to serve as liaison to the Support Committee and to do work 
related to fund-raising. That advisor, while a State employee, wrote a series of memoranda to 
the Comptroller on Comptroller's Office letterhead, setting forth in detail a campaign fund-
raising agenda that appears to link campaign contributions with the award of lucrative 
investment management contracts and other business by the Comptroller's Office. 
This chapter will examine the operation of the Ned Regan Support Committee, including 
both its fund-raising approach and the personnel (both paid employees and volunteers) it used 
to solicit contributions during 1982 through 1988. It will review the many memoranda which 
were written in connection with the Committee's fund-raising efforts, by Joseph Palumbo, the 
Comptroller's Assistant, whose official duties included serving as liaison with the Support 
Committee. It will also review the contribution patterns of those who contributed to the 
Support Committee, including the identities of the contributors, the nature of their business 
dealings with the Comptroller's Office, and the timing and amounts of their contributions. 
The Commission is aware that some of these facts are presently being reviewed by the 
District Attorney for New York County. It must be emphasized that this Commission is neither 
a grand jury nor a prosecutor. It has no law enforcement functions. It does not seek to 
establish whether in fact campaign contributions were solicited with the promise of state 
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business; nor, if so, whether such conduct violated any criminal statute; nor, if it did, to 
determine who should bear criminal responsibility, by virtue of having participated in, or 
authorized, the deeds. In short, it is not this Commission's function to pinpoint liability, but to 
review the facts, and to evaluate their implications for this State's current system of campaign 
finance. 
I. The Ned Regan Support Committee 
The Ned Regan Support Committee handles the receipt and disclosure of all 
contributions to Ned Regan, as well as all campaign expenditures. It also organizes Regan's 
fund-raising efforts. The Support Committee is chaired on a volunteer basis by Lawrence 
Huntington, a long-time friend of Regan's whose interest in politics dates back to his 
participation in John Lindsay's mayoral campaign. The Treasurer of the Support Committee 
(again, a volunteer) was, from 1978-1987, Wilfred S. Meckel, II, of Seligman Securities. In 
1987, Meckel resigned, and was replaced by Carl Pforzheimer, III, of Petroleum Trading Corp. 
Support Committee members, whose names are listed on the Committee's letterhead, consist of 
individuals who demonstrate their support of Regan either by providing substantial services 
(such as organizing the details of the fund-raising events) or by making substantial contributions, 
or both. On rare occasion, a prominent individual may, in effect, lend his name to the Regan 
campaign effort, by becoming a Support Committee member without either making a substantial 
contribution or devoting effort to the cause. 
The Support Committee raises funds in the efficient manner characteristic of the most 
effective philanthropic fund-raising. William Hicks, the single full-time employee of the 
Committee, was for a number of years before joining the Committee a successful professional 
fund-raiser for charitable and cultural institutions. Under Huntington's leadership (assisted by 
Hicks), volunteer Dinner Committee Chairs or Co-Chairs for the annual fund-raising dinner 
(held by tradition in the Spring) are selected on the basis of their stature in the community and, 
more specifically, their "outreach" or ability to buttonhole large numbers of friends, clients and 
other contacts and to solicit pledges or purchases of tickets/tables. Dinner Committee members 
are recruited from among the ranks of Support Committee members, or their contacts, and 
asked to be responsible for buying, or selling, one or more tables at the annual gala event. 
Follow-up calls are assiduously made by Support Committee staff and volunteers. In the 1986 
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campaign year a second dinner was held, which entailed all the organizing effort of the Spring 
dinner, though the fund-raising goal was lower.135 
As Huntington explained in interviews with Commission staff, campaigns for State 
Comptroller are expensive, even in years when the opposition is not strong. No candidate, even 
an incumbent, can be confident that the opponent is not strong enough to prevail. The 
consequence of underestimating the opponent's strength would be so great that even the strong 
incumbent must mount, and finance, a full-force campaign. In order to raise the needed funds , 
a goal is set for each dinner (in Regan's case usually at least $1 million), and over the four 
years an incumbent holds office he tries to amass enough money to fund his race for re-
election. While efforts are made to keep actual costs of the campaign within the budgeted 
amount, last minute expenses may cause overruns, and bank loans may be taken, guaranteed by 
individual contributors with repayment promised after the election.136 Regan spent over $1.4 
million on his 1982 campaign, and over $3.1 million in 1986. By contrast, his opponent in 1986, 
Herman Badillo, spent less than $400,000. 
Huntington stated that the greatest handicap Comptroller Regan faces in his fund-
raising is that "nobody knows who the Comptroller is and what his job is."137 As he described 
it, individuals and businesses in the financial community, who also do business with the 
Comptroller's Office, figure prominently in his fund-raisin~ in part precisely because they know 
the Comptroller and the work of his office, as well as because they are historically the most 
generous contributors not only to political but also to philanthropic fund-raising events. 
In fact, it is to prominent figures in the financial and sometimes real estate communities 
that the Support Committee turns when selecting those key individuals with the quality of 
"outreach" to serve as Dinner Committee Chairs and anchors of the annual fund-raising effort, 
as well as to serve as Dinner Committee members.138 But the significance of this selection can 
only be appreciated in the context of an understanding of the scope of the Comptroller's 
135 The fundraising dinners were held on May 2, 1983; May 7, 1984; May 6, 1985; January 27, 1986; 
October 6, 1986; June 8, 1987; and May 2, 1988. 
136 Huntington described just such a scenario in Regan's 1986 campaign. In the waning days of the 
campaign, the opponent's intensive radio campaign in Regan's home city caused the candidate "almost to 
panic," and to decide to respond with his own costly media appeal. During the last two weeks of October 1986, 
the Support Committee took out a $290,000 loan, guaranteed by thirteen of Regan's most reliable supporters. 
The loans were repaid by September 1987. 
137 Huntington Dep. Tr. Sept. 19, 1988, at 35-36; Hrg. Exh. 1, Sept. 24, 1988. 
138 Memorandum from William Hicks to Lawrence Huntington, dated November 23, 1987. See Appendix 
Three, Exhibit 11 . 
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discretionary decision-making, especially as it affects those groups. This discretion is at its 
greatest over investment decisions for assets of the Common Retirement Fund. 
II. The Comptroller's Role in the Award 
of Pension Fund Business 
New York State's Common Retirement Fund, with assets of over $35.8 billion, 139 has 
by law a sole trustee, the Comptroller of the State. While there are some statutory restraints 
on the allowable investment of these assets, the Comptroller retains enormous discretion to 
manage the funds: to invest directly in equities or liquid assets, with his office selecting brokers 
and banks; to place the funds with active managers selected as he chooses; to diversify into high 
risk ventures, including leveraged buyout deals and Certificates of Participation; to invest in real 
estate or mortgage-backed securities. In all these transactions he can be guided, but is not 
controlled, by committees composed of representatives of the financial and investment 
communities, who sit on the Investment Advisory Committee and Mortgage Advisory 
Committee.140 Each of these investment decisions can, and does, generate enormous fees for 
the brokers, fund managers, and banks who manage the investments, loan funds for recipients of 
mortgages, and legal fees for attorneys who represent the individuals and firms involved in these 
transactions. Between January, 1984 and August, 1988, direct commissions and fees paid by the 
Comptroller to firms in the financial community totalled $271 million; to firms in the real estate 
business, $7.9 million; and to lawyers and law firms, $871,000.1 41 
Until recently, the existence of this enormous discretion to award financial benefits was 
virtually unknown to anyone outside the financial and investment world. Even the Annual 
Reports of the Common Retirement Fund, while they indicate that the Comptroller is the sole 
Trustee, provide only general information about the Fund holdings and do not illuminate the 
extent of his decision-making in this area. 
139 These were the assets as of March 31, 1988, the most recent annual report before the Commission 
hearing at which Regan testified. 
140 See discussion, pages 60-61 below. 
141 Other financial benefits were awarded indirectly, such as where the Comptroller's office engaged in a 
real estate transaction where brokers' fees were paid by a third party. 
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This exclusive (and obscure) discretion to award enormous benefits, unique among 
statewide officeholders, has provided, and still provides today, the ingredients for potential abuse 
of many kinds, but particularly in the area of campaign finance. The risk of abuse is all the 
greater where there are links, whether formal or informal, between the fund-raising functions 
and the official functions of the officeholder. In the Comptroller's case, there were a number 
of such links. 
III. Employees and Advisors as Links Between Two Offices 
A. Joseph Palumbo: State Employee 
and Political Fund-raiser 
From 1986 to 1988, Joseph Palumbo was employed in the Office of the State 
Comptroller as Assistant to the Comptroller.142 Witnesses variously described him as a liaison 
to the financial community, an issues spotter, "the Comptroller's 'eyes and ears' in the financial 
community," an assistant charged with developing position papers on somewhat peripheral 
programs under consideration by the Comptroller's Office, someone who could call anyone in 
the office to seek information or communicate the Comptroller's desires, and "not a substance 
person."143 The professional staff in the Division of Cash Management, while minimizing 
Palumbo's decision-making role in the business of their Division (to which he had once been 
assigned), conceded that they would not feel free to withhold from him any substantive 
information he might seek (as he did from time to time). They also described situations when 
Palumbo attended substantive meetings, such as presentations in response to an RFP for an 
investment manager. He also attended the meetings of the Investment Advisory Committee, 
and prepared the minutes. 
The descriptions of Palumbo's duties appeared always to include fund-raising in some 
way, and to emphasize his role as liaison with the Support Committee. Huntington emphasized, 
and William Hicks confirmed, that Palumbo was someone on the Comptroller's staff whom 
142 Palumbo has held a number of positions in the Comptroller's Office, including one in the Division of 
Cash Management, the Division charged with investing the assets of the Common Retirement Fund. He has now 
resigned following the institution of grand jury proceedings. 
143 Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 69, 73, 162; Tr. Hull Dep. Sept. 16, 1988, at 63. 
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either Huntington or Hicks could contact with information or questions concerning fund-raising. 
And at the Commission's hearing, Regan testified that one part of Palumbo's official job 
was to lay the foundation for fund-raising: to identify potential contributors to Regan and to 
recommend opportunities to meet with them, for the express purpose of obtaining political 
contributions. As Regan described it: 144 
"[Tjhis is part of his job and, again, it is part of the environment to 
get me to raise--to participate more actively in fund-raising, and that 
I should go out and meet with people that contribute, are known 
contributors to other candidates, that are wealthy, that are 
involved .... 
... having to find out who the prominent people are in this City, be 
they wealthy people who cont1ibute or civic leaders that I should 
meet, or the academic community, prominent people, and providing 
me with names under any mbric .... [I]f he came to me and said why 
don't you try to meet, and named all those names, I would have to 
say that undoubtedly over the course of a couple of years that could 
easily have happened." 
In addition, Palumbo routinely took leave from his government position to work full-time 
as a salaried employee of the Support Committee during the weeks prior to a major fund-raising 
event, or prior to an election. At those times he would assume responsibility for follow-up calls 
to potential contributors who had made pledges but not yet given their checks, or to those who 
had not yet made a commitment to give. Witnesses said that Palumbo was assigned a large 
stack of the index cards naming contributors, some (though not all) of whom were assigned to 
him because it was felt that (for reasons never specified by witnesses) he might be the most 
effective solicitor. 
144 Tr. Sept. 24, 1988, at 115, 116. 
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B. Lawrence Huntington: Support Committee Chair 
and Member of Common Retirement Fund 
Investment Advisory Committee 
The Chairman of the Support Committee, Lawrence Huntington, is also the Chairman of 
Fiduciary Trust International, an investment banking conglomerate. For a number of years 
Huntington has served as a member of the Investment Advisory Committee which, pursuant to 
statute, oversees investments of the Common Retirement Fund assets. In that capacity he 
receives all the literature concerning investments which is distributed to IAC members on a 
regular basis, attends the quarterly meetings of the IAC, and actively participates in shaping the 
Comptroller's investment policy for the Common Retirement Fund. For example, Huntington 
was a major proponent of a shift in investment strategy for the bond portfolio, away from 
passive management and toward an active management approach. His firm, Fiduciary Trust, did 
a series of consulting studies to assess the new strategy, for which it received some $25,000 in 
investment-related fees in fiscal year 1986, $230,000 in fiscal year 1987 and $252,000 in fiscal 
year 1988.145 Fiduciary Trust also received income as a result of its equity trading for the 
benefit of the Common Retirement Fund. 
C. Support and Dinner Committee Members as Members 
of Common Retirement Fund Advisory Committees 
Some nine members of the Support Committee, and an additional two members of the 
Dinner Committee have been, at various times over the past five years, members of the 
Investment Advisory Committee and Mortgage Advisory Committee ("MAC").146 The members 
of the Mortgage Advisory Committee have veto power over any proposed investment in 
mortgages or real estate; the members of the Investment Advisory Committee, although they 
appoint the members of the MAC, have advisory oversight responsibility but no formal power 
over the Comptroller's investment decisions. The Investment Advisory Committee meets 
quarterly to review the investment decisions of the Comptroller and to receive detailed 
accounting of the Fund's performance; the Mortgage Advisory Committee meets approximately 
145 Tr. Huntington Dep. Sept. 12, 1988, at 12-16. Huntington testified that his firm did these studies as a 
" loss-leader in the hope of receiving a share of the bond management business"; they were not selected. !fL 
146 The members of the Support Committee who were also members of the Mortgage Advisory Committee 
are Richard Bernstein, Benjamin Lambert, George Vadyak, and Louise Sunshine; those who were members of the 
Investment Advisory Committee are Lawrence Huntington, Robert Irwin, Peter Sharp, Madelon Talley, and Leon 
Levy. The members of the Dinner Committe who were also members of the Mortgage Advisory Committee are 
Monroe Seifer and Alvin Dworman. 
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every month. The Comptroller appoints their members, who serve at will, and the Comptroller 
also decides which of the members of the MAC to summon to its monthly meetings. 
In connection with their service on these Committees, members become privy to all the 
major plans and policies of the Comptroller with respect to his investment of the Funds. 
Indeed, they are clearly in a position to shape those policies, since they are selected by the 
Comptroller himself, on the basis of their investment expertise, precisely so that he can consult 
with them. The Comptroller has no formal policy against employing the services of these 
advisors or their firms as investment managers, brokers, and the like, nor against investing the 
Fund's assets in their ventures. (There is, however, a provision that no member of the Mortgage 
Advisory Committee participate in the vote by which an investment which may benefit him or 
his firm is authorized.) 
In their capacity as Support or Dinner Committee members, several of these advisors 
also serve as active fund-raisers for Regan. There is a clear appearance of conflict in their dual 
roles; this appearance is not lessened by the fact that many of these firms have profited by the 
investment decisions of the Comptroller, or by the fact that those from whom they solicit 
contributions receive (or can receive) substantial business from the Retirement Fund investment 
decisions. 147 
IV. Palumbo's Central Fund-raising Role 
Joseph Palumbo's activities as liaison between the Comptroller's Office and the Support 
Committee were detailed in a number of memoranda which he authored. The first, which is 
unsigned and on its face does not identify to whom it was sent, delineates in no uncertain terms 
a proposed fund-raising strategy.148 This memorandum was followed by a series of memoranda 
from Palumbo to Regan, on official letterhead of the Office of the State Comptroller, which set 
forth details of fund-raising plans over more than three years, and reflect both the level of 
147 Commission staff identified approximately 108 individuals as having served on the Support Committee 
during part or all of the period 1982 · 1988. Of these, four were known to be relatives of the Comptroller or staff 
of the Committee. Of the remaining 104, the individuals were affiliated with some 70 different firms. 41 , or 59%, 
of these firms, received direct business from the Comptroller's Office. 18 of the remaining firms are in either the 
financial, real estate, or legal communities. Thus, 59 of the 70 firms represented on the Support Committee are in 
businesses which receive substantial income from the Comptroller's investment decisions. 
148 During his testimony on September 23, 1988, Regan acknowledged that this memorandum had been 
authored by Palumbo, although he denied having seen it at the time or endorsing its philosophy. (Tr. Sept. 23, 
1988, at 106.) 
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Palumbo's involvement in the Comptroller's fund-raising operation, and the approach that 
Palumbo, at least, espoused in soliciting contributions.149 
A. The "Give to Get" Memorandum 
On August 20, 1985, Palumbo traveled to Washington, D.C., to meet with Government 
Finance Officers Association officials. During that visit he met with Rod Smith of the National 
Republican Senatorial Committee; 150 three days later he wrote a three-page memorandum 
summarizing a fund-raising strategy for Regan's campaign committee which he had discussed in 
detail with Smith.151 Palumbo said Smith "made it clear" that Regan's "power and fund raising 
base" should mean that the Support Committee "should not have a problem, rather, we should 
have more money that we know what to do with." The fact that Regan was sole trustee of a 
pension fund that amounted to $26 billion, and that grows by $2.5 billion annually, and that he 
"was the final say on which firms receive commission business, etc." meant, Smith observed, that 
Regan: 
" ... had more leverage than most elected officials since he provided 
finns with actual dollars, while a senator or governor can only 
provide a vague promise to assist with legislation or make a few 
introductions and phone calls ... " 
Palumbo then repeated Smith's observation that any difficulties Regan might experience 
in raising funds were the result of his being "too much of a nice guy," and that Regan must 
now "make it clear that those who give will get." Palumbo set forth Smith's recommendation 
that the Support Committee and the Comptroller set up an advisory board of investment firms 
to help him make investment decisions, and obtain fixed, high amounts in contributions from the 
members of those boards. In turn, the participants would receive most of the investment 
business. While Palumbo said this "may be a bit too radical" he added that he thought it could 
be modified: 
149 Regan also testified that he could not recall having ever seen these memoranda, because of the volume 
of memoranda he must read daily in the course of performing his official duties. (Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 104.) 
150 The National Republican Senatorial Committee is composed of Republicans who pay a membership fee 
of $10,000 to be used to support Republican candidates for the United States Senate. 
151 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 12. 
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" ... a bit to relate to the Regan Support Committee .... The Committee 
could be restructured to include only top CEOs such as William 
Shryer of Menill Lynch. Each member could be made responsible 
for a sizeable amount of money and in return, they or their fmn 
would make a sizeable amount of money. While still not the most 
subtle approach, it would send a clear message to the street .... " 
Regan testified that he never saw this memorandum and never discussed with Palumbo 
either his meeting with Rod Smith nor Smith's recommendations for a new approach to his 
fund-raising. He said that he did not agree with this philosophy of fund-raising. 152 But a 
number of additional memoranda, addressed to Regan himself and typed on official letterhead, 
contain statements which appear designed to implement this strategy. 
B. Palumbo's Memoranda to Regan. 
1. Memoranda about Fund-Raising in General. A significant number of 
memoranda from Palumbo to Regan discuss only fund-raising issues, and reflect that Palumbo 
did, indeed, play a pivotal role in Regan's fund-raising planning, and in the implementation of 
the fund-raising plans. 
On August 23, 1985, the date of Palumbo's "give to get" memorandum, Palumbo sent 
the Comptroller a memorandum bearing the reference "Subject: William Shryer."153 The 
memorandum suggested naming William Schreyer, chairman of Merrill Lynch, to chair a fund-
raising event.154 Although Regan does not recall reading the memorandum, Schreyer did in 
fact serve as the Dinner Committee Chair for the next fund-raising gala.155 
On November 25, 1985, Palumbo sent Regan a list of some twenty-two individuals who, 
Palumbo suggested, could together contribute over $250,000, an average of more than $10,000 
each. Although the memorandum did not spell this out, all twenty-two had some business 
152 Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 104. 
153 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 13. 
154 In the "give to get" memorandum Palumbo had commented that Schryer's selection to chair a major 
fundraising event would be of immeasurable assistance in fund-raising. 
155 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 14. 
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dealings with the Comptroller's Office in connection with investments of the Common 
Retirement Fund. 156 
Throughout 1986 Palumbo communicated a wide range of campaign finance information 
in a series of memoranda to the Comptroller that suggest that he spent a large portion of his 
official time that year engaged in fund-raising activities. The memos document his frequent 
meetings with Hicks to plan fund-raising strategies and opportunities for Regan. For instance, a 
joint memorandum 157 dated March 11, 1986 from Palumbo and Hicks to Regan and 
Huntington, describes in detail the individuals they targeted for contributions as well as the 
strategies involved in soliciting them, including plans for Regan himself to contact a number of 
proposed contributors and ask for money. 
Another memorandum from Palumbo to Regan, dated May 19, 1986,158 is referenced: 
"Subject: Fund-raising (various)." This memorandum lays out a series of fund-raising initiatives 
to pursue in different regions, including Long Island, Westchester, Albany and Rochester. It 
contains information about specific planning details, urges Regan to move quickly, and requests 
prompt indications from him concerning the steps he wishes to take. It also contains Palumbo's 
report to Regan on the progress of Palumbo's contacts with Drexel Burnham representatives: 
"Drexel Burnham: I am meeting with Joel Mesznick tomon-ow 
(5120) to discuss the October event in general and the corporate 
angle in paHicular. Kathy Lacey has been given the list of holdings 
and we'll begin there. Also, I am setting up a meeting with you, me, 
Kathy Lacey and Bob Shiffer to get things moving. This meeting 
will be after the Convention. Kathy, others from Drexel and I are 
meeting with Bob Linton on Friday (5123)." 
From this language, it seems evident that Palumbo had the authority to arrange meetings 
with the chairman of a major investment bank, 159 as well as to initiate direct contact with 
prospective contributors to solicit campaign funds. 
156 Hrg. Exh. 6, Sept. 24, 1988. 
157 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 15. 
158 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 16. 
159 Robert Linton was CEO of Drexel Burnham Lambert. 
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On October 9, 1986, Palumbo routed another fund-raising directive to the 
Comptroller, 160 with a level of detail that reflects Palumbo's substantial role in fund-raising: 
"Lany Huntington et al have immediately begun to move on the 
next fund-raising initiative with calls already placed to Peter Sharp, 
Ronald Perelman and Ivan Boesky ... 
What you must do is call Henry Kravis, Carl Icahn, and Lawrence 
Tisch. When you reach them you should explain that you had a 
fund-raiser on Monday and while it was successful, the campaign 
needs additional funds ... (with Henry Kravis it 's important that you 
don't say you want him to contribute more personally. As you 
know, we would like him to arrange a Forstmann-type luncheon)." 
It is clear that a very large part of Palumbo's "official" role, on paid government time, 
was to plan fund-raising. But the memoranda from Palumbo to Regan also reflect an effort on 
Palumbo's part to seek information concerning official business to enhance the fund-raising 
effort, and an intention to reward contributors with business. 
2. Memoranda Linking Contributions to Business. The Jong May 19, 1986 planning 
memorandum discussed above indicates a plan to go through files in the Comptroller's Office, in 
order to develop information concerning prospective contributors: 
"Martha and I also discussed the real estate developer/real estate 
attorney [fund-raising] event ... Lenny Rizzolo is getting a list 
together of all developers we deal with." (emphasis added) 
Leonard Rizzolo heads the Mortgage Organization unit of the Comptroller's Division of 
Investments and Cash Management. Although it is not clear that Rizzolo ever produced such a 
list for Palumbo's or the Committee's use in fund-raising, it is clear that the Support Committee 
solicited and received a number of contributions from real estate developers who had business 
with the Common Retirement Fund. 
A December 11, 1986 memorandum from Palumbo to Regan entitled "Spring 
Borrowing-Related Contributions" separates those financial institutions that participated in the 
160 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 17. 
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under-writing of the 1986 Spring Borrowing 161 into two groups: those that made political 
contributions to Comptroller Regan and those that did not.162 This memorandum was written 
on a Thursday; four days later, according to Regan's scheduling diary, Regan met with four of 
his assistants to discuss the planning for the 1987 spring borrowing.163 Selection of participants 
in the Spring Borrowing, and planning for the Spring fund-raising event (held June 8, 1987) 
went forward simultaneously. 
Another memorandum from Palumbo to Regan highlights the premise that those who do 
not contribute should not be rewarded. Dated November 24, 1987, 164 it discusses the 
leadership of the First Boston Corporation's public finance area and then the history of the 
firm's contributions to Regan. 165 The memo (using "we" to refer, interchangeably, to the 
Comptroller's Office and the Campaign Committee) states: 
"But while he [Mike Hernandez) does great things for First Boston, 
he has done almost nothing for us. 
During the last fund-raise1; the only thing First Boston did was buy 
one table and we just received the final payment two days ago. He, 
along with Shoemaker, was exJremely uncooperative and seemed to 
feel the finn was doing us a favor by lending its name to the event. 
We do an enonnous amount of business with the finn ($231,000 in 
commissions for this fLScal year to date) yet they more or less refused 
to return the favor. "166 
161 Spring Borrowing is New York State's annual issuance of short term debt against anticipated tax 
revenues. 
162 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 18. 
163 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 19. Regan explained that the memorandum highlighting who among the 
participants in the underwriting had contributed to him was prepared in order to respond to press inquiries on the 
subject. Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 156. 
164 See Appendix Three, Exhibit 20. 
165 This was not the first time Palumbo computed the dollar amount of business that the Comptroller 
conducted with First Boston. On February 24, 1987, Palumbo sent a memorandum to Regan indicating that First 
Boston received $597,419 in fees for the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1986. Palumbo also noted that figure put 
First Boston "in the number three slot out of the 67 firms with whom we do business." See Appendix Three, 
Exhibit 21. 
166 Another incident also suggests the possibility of retaliation for a refusal to contribute. One respected 
attorney with a major New York City law firm told Commission staff how, at a time when his firm had submitted a 
(continued ... ) 
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These memoranda provide a backdrop for the public testimony the Commission received 
from one witness from the financial community. Michael Smith, formerly a Vice-President at 
E.F. Hutton, testified that in October, 1986 the firm was under consideration to be retained to 
act as financial advisor in a Certificate of Participation financing. The award of the contract was 
to be made October 7, 1986. In connection with processing the request for proposals for that 
contract, Palumbo served as the contact person at the Comptroller's Office from whom the firm 
could pick up certain necessary documents. During the same week, the Support Committee was 
holding a major fund-raising dinner; Palumbo made persistent requests to a member of the firm 
to purchase a table. Although Smith testified that he never heard of a specific link between the 
two transactions, he said that his fellow workers clearly understood that a message was being 
communicated: it would be helpful to their cause in bidding for Comptroller's Office business if 
they contributed to the Support Committee at that time.167 
V. Contribution Patterns Reviewed 
Analysis of the contribution patterns of firms doing business with the Comptroller's 
Office, particularly those handling Pension Fund assets, suggests at the very least an extremely 
effective fund-raising drive focused on firms that have business dealings with the Comptroller's 
Office in connection with Common Retirement Fund investments. The fund-raising statistics 
show that the overwhelming majority of contributions to the Comptroller's campaign committee 
come from the financial, legal and real estate communities that do extensive business with his 
office, that contributions rose dramatically in the period following Palumbo's "give-to-get" 
memorandum, that particular firms who gave money to the Committee did, in fact, receive 
166( ... continued) 
proposal in an effort to be named as the Comptroller's Office permanent counsel for Certificate of Participation 
financing, the firm also received a solicitation letter to contribute to the fundraising dinner scheduled in a few 
days. The firm responded with a letter saying that they considered a contribution at that time inappropriate; they 
did not receive the contract. 
The firm's letter apparently did not reach the Support Committee quickly enough; before it arrived, the 
attorney received one of the Support Committee's "follow-up calls" from an individual whose name he does not 
recall ; the caller said that he was "astounded" at the reason the attorney gave for his firm's not purchasing a 
table at the upcoming dinner. In a subsequent year, at the repeated request of a client which was a major 
underwriting firm, the firm did buy a table, and the attorney became a member of the Dinner Committee. 
167 Tr. Smith Dep. Sept. 20, 1988, at 48 et seq. 
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substantial business from the Comptroller's Office, and that those involved in the fund-raising 
effort also received substantial business from the Comptroller. 
A. Contributions Come Heavily from Those Receiving 
Business from the Comptroller's Office. 
During the period from January 1, 1983 through July 15, 1988, 63% of Regan's 
contributions came from identifiable individuals and firms in the financial community; 16% came 
from those in the real estate community; and 12% came from lawyers and law firms. This total 
of 91 % from identified interest groups which receive substantial direct benefits as a result of 
investment decisions of the officeholder stands in contrast to comparable figures for the other 
statewide officeholders.168 Comparison of total pre-1985 contributions with contributions 
received after 1985 shows a dramatic improvement in the receipts of the Support Committee. 
In the two full years following the 1982 election, the Support Committee had raised 
approximately $614,000. In the two years following the 1986 election, the Committee raised 
more than $1.7 million, nearly treble the post-1982 amount. And the election year comparisons 
are almost as stark: in 1982, $1.2 million was raised; in 1986, $2 million. These overall figures 
are explained in part by a closer look at individual contributions. 
Analysis shows that very few firms doing business with the Comptroller's Office do not 
contribute to his campaign committee. They frequently begin making such contributions within 
the first year of being awarded the business; and in a number of cases, they make contributions 
to no other candidate for New York office. 
* The California-based RREEF USA, an equity real estate 
investment manager, received no financial benefit from the 
Comptroller's office prior to 1986; nor did it make any political 
contributions to the Comptroller (or any other statewide elected 
official in New York). The Retirement Fund first invested in 
RREEF equities in 1986; since then RREEF (and individuals 
affiliated with the firm) have contributed nearly $50,000 to the 
Support Committee (but still nothing to any other statewide 
candidate); RREEF has received approximately $425,000 in 
investment-related fees. 
168 42°/o of the contributions to Governor Cuomo and 40% of those to Attorney General Abrams, during the 
same time periods, came from readily identifiable interest groups. See, Appendix Three, Exhibit 1. 
68 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Forstmann Little and Company gave only $1,000 in political 
contributions to the Support Committee prior to 1986 and its 
earned fees were approximately $140,000. Since 1986, however, 
Forstmann Little and individuals affiliated with the firm have 
contributed nearly $64,000 to the Support Committee and the firm 
has received approximately $3.4 million dollars in fees from the 
Comptroller's office. The firm and its members do not contribute 
to any other New York statewide elected official. 
Lord Abbett and Company, an equity management firm, 
contributed about $5,000 to Regan prior to 1986; the fees 
received were about $500,000. From 1986 to the present, 
however, Lord, Abbott and Company and affiliated individuals 
have contributed over $75,000 to the Support Committee; during 
the same period the firm's investment-related fees received from 
the Comptroller's office exceeded one and a half million dollars. 
The firm does not contribute to other statewide officeholders in 
New York. 
Corporate Property Investors, an equity real estate investment 
manager, reflects the pattern on a more modest level. The firm 
had contributed $5,000 to Regan's Support Committee for the first 
time in 1985 and had as yet received no business; since then, CPI 
has contributed $20,000 and earned nearly $300,000 in investment-
related fees. The firm contributes exclusively to Regan in New 
York.169 
Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, Inc. has been a steady supporter of 
Regan's campaigns, contributing over $80,000 from 1984-1988. 
During the same period, the firm has received over $2 million in 
investment related fees.170 
169 Commissioner Meyer did not participate in discussions or deliberations concerning Corporate Property 
Investors, Inc. 
170 Chairman Feerick did not participate in discussions or deliberations concening Kolberg, Kravis, Roberts, 
Inc. 
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Other firms which contribute exclusively to Regan in New York, and all of whom receive 
substantial business from the Comptroller's Office, include: 
Alliance Capital Management Corporation 
Capital Guardian Trust 
Delaware Investment Advisors 
Fiduciary Investment Corporation 
Miller, Andersen & Sherred 
Montgomery Securities 
Seligman Securities 
On occasion, strong contributors received business from the Comptroller's Office despite 
statements in the Advisory Committee minutes suggesting a lack of qualifications, or poor 
performance. The following are examples: 
Equitable Investment Management. Equitable Investment Management, a Common 
Retirement Fund portfolio manager, made only one $5,000 contribution to Regan, and received 
no fees from the Comptroller's Office, prior to fiscal 1986. Since then, however, Equitable has 
received approximately $2.l million in investment-related fees, and has contributed nearly 
$30,000 to the Support Committee. During the February 28, 1986 Investment Advisory 
Committee 171 meeting, Equitable was criticized as a "poor performer" and its possible dismissal 
was debated. Nine months later, during a November 21, 1986 IAC meeting, the Comptroller's 
staff disclosed that $100 million in additional funds were to be allocated for management by 
Equitable. There had been no discussion of improved performance, but Equitable had 
contributed $15,000 to the Support Committee on January 24, 1986 as well as $5,000 on 
February 7, 1986 and $1,000 on March 14, 1986. The firm made contributions of $10,000 in 
June, 1987, and another $9,000 in April, 1988. Although Equitable was again characterized as a 
"poor performer" during a February 18, 1988 IAC meeting, the firm received $859,354 in 
investment-related fees in fiscal 1988. 
Alliance Capital Management Corp. Alliance Capital has been a steady and generous 
contributor, giving $5,000 per year in 1982, 1983, and 1985; $20,000 in 1986, $12,000 in 1987, 
and $10,000 in 1988. During that time the firm received millions in investment management 
fees earned from managing pension fund assets. The fees rose steadily from just over $1 million 
in fiscal year 1984 to almost $1.9 million in fiscal year 1987. Despite a negative performance 
171 Minutes, Investment Advisory Committee, February 28, 1986 at 2. 
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evaluation in early 1987, 172 the firm continued to give sizable sums ($12,000 and $10,000) and 
to receive substantial business (over $600,000 in fiscal 1988). 
B. Fund-raisers Also Received Generous Business 
Analysis of the contribution patterns of Support Committee members, as well as of the 
business their firms received from the Comptroller's Office, reveals that nearly sixty percent of 
Support Committee members or the firms with which they are affiliated receive discretionary 
business totalling millions of dollars from the Office of the Comptroller.173 The following are 
the most prominent examples: 
* 
* 
The former Treasurer of the Support Committee was Wilfred N. 
Meckel, Chairman of Seligman Securities, who served as treasurer 
until November, 1987. From 1982 to mid-1988 Seligman 
contributed approximately $64,000 ($40,000 after the 1985 
Palumbo memo) to the Regan campaign effort. 
During fiscal years 1984 through 1988, the firm received more 
than $4 million in investment-related fees from the Comptroller's 
office. The minutes of the first Investment Advisory Committee 
meeting (February 18, 1988) after Meckel's resignation as Support 
Committee treasurer described Seligman's prior investment 
management as poor. 
Stephen Robert, a Support Committee member, is a principal of 
the Oppenheimer Holding Company. Oppenheimer more than 
doubled the investment-related fees it received from the 
Comptroller's Office over a five-year period: from something over 
$600,000 in fiscal '83-84 to nearly $1.6 million in fiscal '87-88; over 
those years the total fees were approximately $6 million. 
Oppenheimer's contributions over the same time period were in 
excess of $46,000. 
172 Minutes, Investment Advisory Committee, February 13, 1987. 
173 See fn . 147 above. 
71 
* 
* 
Frank Smeal, Robert N. Downey and Arthur B. Spector, all 
members of the Support Committee, are also principals of 
Goldman, Sachs and Company. Smeal has contributed $28,500 to 
Regan since 1983; of that $23,000 was given after the Palumbo 
memo. Spector has contributed $6,500 after and none before; and 
Downey, $500 before, $6,000 after. Since 1982, Goldman has 
received over $1 million in investment-related fees alone.174 
On December 13, 1985, the Mortgage Advisory Committee 
approved a $45 million mortgage to a limited partnership in a deal 
brokered by Eastdil. Similarly, during a February 26, 1987 
Mortgage Advisory Committee meeting, Deputy Comptroller John 
Hull announced that Eastdil had been retained to "handle 
problem loans" pursuant to a contract worth about $100,000 per 
month. Benjamin V. Lambert, through his Eastdil-affiliated 
companies, is a steady supporter of the Comptroller; since 1984 he 
has contributed over $75,000 to the Committee, and the 
memoranda of Palumbo and Hicks reflect his active involvement in 
efforts to solicit funds from other members of the real estate 
community. 
VI. The Comptroller's Policies 
Concerning Fund-raising and the Award of Business 
The Comptroller has repeatedly stated that no relationship exists between governmental 
decisions and political contributions. Testifying before this Commission 175, he responded to a 
question regarding his fund-raising credo: 
174 Goldman, Sachs also receives substantial fees as a broker-dealer for the Common Retirement Fund. 
175 Tr. Sept. 23, 1988, at 100. 
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"It is, as I stated, to have the funds raised by an independent 
outside committee and to conduct our office, in the decisions, on the 
merits, and to keep these two activities separate." 
Regan was unable to articulate any specific policies which he had adopted, or 
communicated to his Comptroller's Office or fund-raising staffs to implement this philosophy. 
He referred only to verbal instructions to his professional investment staff, to the effect that 
they must make all investment decisions strictly "on the merits." 
In addition, Regan emphasized his own aversion to fund-raising in all its forms , especially 
as it necessitated his own involvement. He pointed to the many memoranda he received as 
expressing his staffs frustration with his detachment from the process, and his own unwillingness 
to solicit funds with the energy they wished. In effect, he said, the fund-raising was done by 
others, and he was not involved in directing their efforts. 
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Appendix One 
Public Hearings, Commission Reports, and 
Computerized Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements 
Concerning Campaign Finance 
Commission Reports, Public Hearings and 
Computerized Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements 
Concerning Campaign Finance 
The following is a listing of reports, public hearings and computer printouts 
which comprise the publicly available work of the Commission, thus far, in the area of 
Campaign Finance. Copies of the reports, transcripts and computer printouts are available from 
the Commission. 
Commission Reports 
1. Campaign Financing: Preliminary Report, issued December 21, 1987. 
2. Campaign Finance Reform: The Public Perspective, issued July 1988. (Results of a 
poll conducted for the Commission by Dresner, Sykes, Jordan & Townsend, Inc.) 
3. The Albany Money Machine: Campaign Financing for New York Legislative Races, issued 
August 1988. 
4. Unfinished Business: Campaign Finance Reform in New York City , issued September 28, 
1988. 
Public Hearings 
1. October 21-23, 1987 in New York City and Buffalo. Forums on campaign financing with 
expert witnesses, including Dr. Herbert Alexander. 
2. January 26, 1988 in Albany. Hearing on the Poughkeepsie Town Board election of 
1985. 
3. March 14-15, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: Focusing on fund-raising 
practices of statewide and New York Citywide officeholders; received testimony from 
their fund-raisers and from large contributors. 
4. June 20, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing, New York City: including 
testimony of Mayor Edward I. Koch, City Council President Andrew J. Stein, and 
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin. 
5. September 23, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: New York State 
Comptroller Edward V. Regan's fund-raising practices. 
6. October 25, 1988, in New York City. Campaign Financing: Continuation of January 26, 
1988 hearing into the 1985 Poughkeepsie Town Board Election -- emphasis on New 
York State Board of Elections investigation. 
7. March 10, 1989, in Albany. Campaign Financing: New York Statewide Elected 
Officials' fund -raising practices; including testimony of Governor Mario M. Cuomo and 
Attorney General Robert Abrams. 
8. March 17, 1989, in Albany. Campaign Financing: Fundraising Practices of New York 
State Legislators and Legislative Party Committees; including testimony of Senate 
Majority Leader Ralph Marino and Assembly Speaker Mel Miller. 
Computerized Campaign Finance Disclosure Statements 
1. Statewide Officeholders New York State: 1/83-1/88. Sorted alphabetically by contributor 
or alphabetically by contributor address. 
2. Citywide Officeholders New York City: 1/83-1/88. Sorted alphabetically by contributor or 
alphabetically by contributor address. 
3. State Party Committees (Democratic) New York State: 1/1/81-1/1/88. Sorted 
alphabetically by contributor. 
4. State Party Committees (Republican) New York State: 12/7/81-1/1 /88. Sorted 
alphabetically by contributor. 
5. Legislative Party Committees (Senate Democratic) New York State: 11/29/82-2/11/88. 
Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
6. Legislative Party Committees (Senate Republican) New York State: 11/29/82-1/1/88. Sorted 
alphabetically by contributor. 
7. Legislative Party Committees (Assembly Democratic) New York State: 11/29/82-3/4/88. 
Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
8. Legislative Party Committees (Assembly Republican) New York State: 11/30/82-3/11/88. 
Sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
9. Citywide Officelwlders - New York City, Update: 1/88-7/88. Sorted alphabetically by 
contributor. 
10. Borough Presidents - New York City: 1/83-7/88. Sorted by Borough President, 
alphabetically by contributor. 
11. Legislators - New York State Senators and Assemblymen: 1/85-7/88. Individual reports 
on each, sorted alphabetically by contributor. 
Appendix Two 
Commission's Recommended 
Contribution Limits 
Commission's 
Recommended Contribution Limits 
Category of Contributor 
[Proposed Aggregate Limit]* 
1. Corporations, unions 
and anyone doing 
business with 
government. 
2. Individual 
[$25,000 per year] 
Recipient of 
Contribution Proposed Limit 
TOTALLY PROHIBITED 
Candidate for $2,500 - $4,000 per 
Statewide Office election 
Candidate for $1,500 - $2,000 per 
Senate/Assembly election 
Candidate for Citywide Office, New 
Local Office York City: $2,500 -
4,000 per election 
All other city/ 
county: $1,000 -
$2,000 per election 
TownNillage/other: 
$500 - $1,000 per 
election 
PAC $1,500 - $2,000 
per year 
Party Committee $2,500 - $4,000 
per year 
* Aggregate limit is the maximum any contributor can give per year for political purposes to all candidates, party 
committees and PACs. 
Catergory of Contributor 
[Proposed Aggregate Limit] 
3. PAC 
[$10,000 - $15,000 
per year] 
4. Party Committee 
[No aggregate limit] 
5. Individual Candidates' 
Committees 
[No aggregate limit] 
Recipient of 
Contribution 
Candidate for 
Statewide Office 
Candidate for 
Senate/Assembly 
Candidate for 
Local Office 
Party Committee 
Any Candidate 
Another Party 
Committee 
Other Candidates 
Party Committees 
Proposed Limit 
$2,500 - $4,000 
per election 
$1,500 - $2,000 
per election 
Citywide Office, New 
York City: $2,500 -
$4,000 per election 
All other city/ 
county: $1,000 -
$2,000 per election 
TownNillage/other: 
$500 - $1,000 per 
election 
$5,000 per year 
5 times limit on 
contribution from 
an individual 
Same as contribution 
from an individual to 
party committee 
Same as contribution 
from an individual to 
that candidate 
Same as contribution 
from an individual to 
party committees 
Appendix Three 
Exhibits 
Mario M. Cuomo, Gove-rnor 
1/15/83 ~ 1/15/89 
Total Monetary Contributions 
and Transfers In:· 
OTHER (:&) 
REAL EST A TE (8%) 
ERNG, CONSTRUCTON & CONTRACTNG (9%) 
$ 9,377,000 
UNONS (8%) 
LEGAL (7%) 
ransfers or Contributions from Party Committees or Candidate Committees Not Included 
FNANC~L ( 10%) 
Robert Abrams, Attorne General 
1/12/83 ~ 1/11 89 
Total Monetary Contributions 
and Transfers In:· 
OTHER (60%) 
$ 2,527,000 
LEGAL (11 %) 
FINANCIAL (5%) 
UNIONS (10%) 
REAL EST ATE (14%) 
* Transfers or Contributions from Party Committees or Candidate Committees Not Included 
Edward V. Regan, Comptroller 
1/10/83 ~ 1/15/89 
Total Monetary Contributions 
and Transfers In:· 
FINANCIAL ( 63%) 
LEGAL (12%) 
$ 3,801,000 
OTHER (9%) · 
ransfers or Contributions from Party Committees or Candidate Committees Not Included 
REAL ESTATE (163) 
Pyramid - Related Contributions and Expenditures for 
the 1905 Town Board Elections and the Poughkeepsie Galleria 
$226 ,000. 
~ 
N.Y. Republic an $126,000. 
State Cammi ttee 
N.Y. Republica n $100,000. 
111 
Federal Camp aign 
Committee 
Total $226,000. 
l 
Campaign Contributions 
from 18 Pyramid-Related 
Individuals 
$301,000. 
Town of 
Poughkeepsie 
'-$31 ,500 _. Republican 
Committee 
$31,500 
I 
Total Contributions 
and Expenditures 
$776,967. 
$75,000 
+ 
Building a 
Better 
New York 
Committee 
$75,000. 
/ 
Expenditures by 
Pyramid-Related.._ __ _ 
Companies 
$475,967. 
$166,045. $31 ,500. $69,700. $386,892 . $49,000. $4 0, 075 . 
Campaign Strategies, Inc. and Various Vendors 
Engaged in Consulting, Polling, Research, Mailing, 
Printing and Other Election Related Work 
$267,245. 
Total Expenditures Related to 
the Town Board Elections:$ 26 7,245. 
Campaign 
Strategies, Inc. 
I 
$386,892. 
Attorneys' 
Fees 
$49,000. 
Polling and 
Research Fees 
$40,075. 
Additional Expenditures Related to 
Either the Town Board Elections or 
the Poughkeepsie ·Galleria: $ 4 75, 967. 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
(1986 and 1988 Election Campaigns) 
RALPH MARINO 
DATES* AMOUNT 
1986 Election Campaign Cycle 
Contributions received $ 63,900 
1/15/86 - 1/11/87 
1988 Election Campaign Cycle 
Contributions received $209,200 
1/12/88 - 1/11/89 
CATEGORIES OF 
CONTRIBUTORS 1986 CYCLE 
PACs $22,527 35% 
Corporations & 
Associations 
(other than P ACs) $15,900 24% 
Employee 
Organizations 
(other than P ACs) $ 400 0% 
Other $25,073 41% 
TOTAL $63,900 100% 
PERCENTAGE 
VOTE 
IN ELECTION 
62% 
65% 
1988 CYCLE 
$106,454 50% 
$ 20,740 9% 
$ 640 0% 
$ 81,366 41 % 
$209,200 100% 
* In June 1988, Majority Leader Warren Anderson announced his intention to retire at the end of the legislative 
session. 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
(1984 and 1986 Election Campaigns) 
MELVIN MILLER 
DA TES* AMOUNT 
1984 Election Campaign Cycle 
Contributions received $ 40,700 
1/14/84 - 7 /12/85 
1986 Election Campaign Cycle 
Contributions received $ 82,700 
1/14/86 - 7/15/87 
CATEGORIES OF 
CONTRIBUTORS 1984 CYCLE 
PACs $13,900 34% 
Corporations & 
Associations 
(other than PACs) $ 7,050 17% 
Employee 
Organizations 
(other than PACs) $ 4,100 10% 
Other $15,650 39% 
TOTAL $40,700 100% 
PERCENTAGE 
VOTE 
IN ELECTION 
76% 
83% 
1986 CYCLE 
$32,805 39% 
$13,650 16% 
$ 3,050 3% 
$33,195 42% 
$82,700 100% 
* In May 1986, Speaker of the Assembly Stanley Fink announced his intention to retire from the Assembly at the 
end of the legislative session. 
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• . . :M E M 0 R A N D U M 
To Governor Cuomo 
From: Lucille Falcone . 
Re November 20, 1984 Second Ariniversary Celebr.ation 
In preparation for the next Celebration, I would like 
to proceed to form a Board of Advisors and a Dinner Committee. 
In addition, I suggest a General Mailing as soon as the computer 
printout is completed. 
---Board of Advisors of The Friends of -Mario Cuomo 
Attached ·is a list of prospective members and a copy 
of the proposed letter for your review. - The "Board of Advisors" 
is actually a Finance Committee. I think that the type of 
people we are trying to attract will be more eager to serve if 
they feel that they are serving in an advisory, as well as a 
fundraising capacity. The Board will be a permanent group con-
sisting of approximately 30-50 members meeting periodically. I 
have attempted to organize the Board on both a regional and . 
industry basis. They will be encouraged to organize their 
industry or region as the case may be into sub-committees. 
Board members will be asked to raise a minimum of $30,000.00 
(three tables) for the November dinner. 
Dinner Committee 
Attached is a list of prospective members and . a copy . 
of the proposed letter. The Dinner Committee will consist of 
approximately 100 .members organized solely for purposes of 
purchasing and/or selling tables for the November dinner. 
They will each be .asked to commit to raising $1,000.00 (one 
table) for the dinner. ' · :.-~"~ - · ·. ···. . .. ·;. ~ -
. I 
. \ 
. .;. . 
Memo to: 
From 
Re : 
Governor Cuomo · 
Lucille Falcone 
-2-
November 20, 1984 Second Anniversary Celebration 
. . 
General Mailing 
Attached- ls a copy of the proposed solicitation letter 
to be sent to all persons on our mailing list, except for those 
invited to join either the Board of A'dvisors or Finance Committee. 
All letters will be on "The Friends of Mario Cuomo 
Committee" letterhead under your signature, unless you suggest 
otherwise. I cleared this with Fabian. I would follow up after 
the mailing to provide details and explain the commitment requested 
of Board and Dinner members. I did not think it appropriate to 
provide these details in your letter. 
' -
advise if I should proceed. 
cc: Andrew Cuomo 
Michael DelGiudice 
August 7, 1984 
. 
.. 
Lucille Falcone 
" 
Board of Advisors Letter 
FOMC Letterhead 
Dear (name) : . ~ ~ ~ ~ (/""'t': 
In the 1982 New York guber~torial campaign4~e 
cc;I!.c!fdate .spent $13. 9 million• : ·· · ~ 
I .;-··iea JOU Cv Jblii Elk bddld 6..1.. ~ctCl561S. S 
you -f e0 1 .. '- - t 11tJ -Oil t.:..med ptiblic serv±Ci::: IS ±.£ Li.... L--l 
i;?:h~:U!t:'"!.rr~h~t yop.;ill .j:;r;.,;;.r;..;eam. >·~~}"'respond regarding ~ur a~abil{~y to h-'-e-c..AoN""..,..,.. 
serve to Lucille Falcone at (212) 686-1000. Thank you for ~IJ,,J,AA-
your continued support. '1'~ _ J 
- l~LJV/ 
Sincerely, \\ ~ ~ 
I ..µ,,'~ 
Mario M. Cuomo ~ ~ 
7!~~.fo 
k~fo~-/,~~4~,.,..~~w,­~ ~' ~a.~7-fv~fl,.,~&j ~ ~~. lo A ·n~ 
... 
Dinner Committee Letter 
FOMC Letterhead 
Dear {name} : 
In the 1982 New York gubernatorial campaign, the 
Republican candidate .spent $13.9 million, while my· campaign 
spent $4.8 million which means that we were outspent by more 
than three to one. We believe that the Republicans intend 
to spend even more money in the 1986 gubernatorial race, with 
some estimates ranging as high as $25 million. 
In order to enable me to continue to serve the 
people of the State of New York, we ·must be prepared to meet 
this challenge. Of course, we can only accomplish this with 
the assistance of friends and supporters and we must begin 
to prepare now. 
The Friends of Mario Cuomo Committee has scheduled 
our Second Anniversary Celebration for November 20, 1984. 
I invite you to join the Dinner Committee for this Celebra-
tion. If you feel that my continued public service is in 
the best interests of the State, I hope that you will join 
our team. 
Kindly contact Lucille Falcone at (212} 686-1000 
to advise of your availability to serve. 
Thank you for your continued support. 
Sincerely, 
Mario M. Cuomo 
• 
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DESCRIPTION 
Bill Stefn's list of $5000+ givers 
Robert Abrams list of $500+ 
Architects 
1st Anniversary 
2nd Anniversary 
Art 
Assembly - $500+ contribution to Assembly Campaign Cornn 
Attorneys 
Carol Bellamy - $500~ 
Business Bar-be-que 1984 
Business Bar-be-que 1985 
Banking 
Board of Advisors 
Brokerage Houses 
Buffalo Area Contributors 
Basil Patterson - $500+ 
Hugh Carey - $500+ 
CBC Board (Bankers & RE) 
County Chairs 
Celebrities 
Contractors ~ * + w 
€ity Pl.:Hning 0 2H1111.:usionCd,,J.Sc,.~r' /o C .c) 
Cuomo Contributors (General) 
Mrs. Cuomo's Luncheons 
Democratic National Committee (Members & Committees) 
Doctors 
Dinner Committee So!icitation 1985 
Education 
Engineers 
Entertainment 
Finance 
Fortune 500 Companies 
General Givers - $500+ contribution to 1982 General 
General Business 
Harrison Goldin $500+ 
Hennessey - List provided/ ~I Bill 
Inauguration - fc.-f 0..1 v."1'-( .:f)dv 
Insurance 
Italians 
Koch 85 - $500+ to Mayor's race 
1983 Koch Dinner $500+ 
pre-1985 Koch $500+ givers 
Labor Leaders 
Hennessey 
Lew Lehrman - $500+ givers to 1982 campaign 
Lucille Falcone - list 
M E M O R A N D U M 
To . . 
From : 
Governor Cuomo 
Lucille Falcone 
Re . . Board of Advisors and Dinner Committee 
of the Friends of Mario Cuomo . 
After discussion with Michael DelGiudice and Phyliss 
Wagner, I suggest the following changes in the Board of Advisors 
and Dinner Co~~tte~ .lists previously submitted to you, copies 
of which are enclosed: 
Transfer to Board of Advisors from Dinner Committee 
(t1D recommended) 
/Albert Shanker 
/John Gu tfreund 
/'Penny Kaniclides 
/Alfred Taubman 
/A. Robert Towbin 
/Edmund Pratt 
,_A,ewis Rudin 
Letters to the foregoing are enclosed for your 
signature, if you think that they are appropriate. 
Add to Board of Advisors 
VMarvin Traub 
-/'~r. Fink7lstein 
al'Mrs. Irwin Kramer 
~hornton Bradshaw 
al"..,z!hillip Robinson 
V Arthur Hauspurg 
Remove from Board of Advisors 
hoseph Murphy 
~win Kramer 
(Bloomingdale's - PCW recommended) 
(Macy's · - PCW recommended) 
(Daughter of Charles Allen, substitute 
in place of Ir:win Krcimer - PCW 
recommended) . 
(LF) 
(LF) 
(LF) . 
(MD) 
(PCW) 
Memo to: 
From 
Re 
Governor Cuomo 
Lucille Falcone 
Board of Advisors and Dinner Committee 
of the Friends of Mario Cuomo 
Transfer to Dinner Committee from Board of Advisors 
(MD recommended and PCW concurred) 
.JG enneth C. Nichols 
homas M. Macioce 
al Ge~b?~i 
ames Murphy 
ohn Sweeny 
Stella Saltonstall 
Remove from Dinner Committee 
Francis Barry (MD recommended - he's being dropped 
James Ruth 
Jorge Battista 
Ronald Lauder 
from a commission) 
(MD recommended) 
(MD recommended) 
(PCW recommended) 
Please note that Leon Hess, · William Shea and George 
Klein are on the proposed Board of Advisors list and advise 
whether they are appropriate. 
I also suggest that we invite everyone who attended 
the Business Barbecue to be on the Dinner Committee. A copy of 
the list is enclosed. 
I would suggest that the Board of Advisors mailing and 
the General mailing be done immediately. Once the Board has been 
formed, I would do the Dinner Committee mailing. I would also 
suggest that the first meeting of the Board be a dinner meeting 
scheduled after Labor Day. · 
Also enclosed are copies of the revised letters for the 
Dinner Committee solicitation and the General mailing. I would 
recommend that you not sign the General mailing letter inasmuch as 
it will~ be sent to approximately 15,000 people. A decision must 
be made as to who should sign the letter. 
Please advise whether the above is acceptable. 
~~ 
cc·: Andrew Cuomo 
Michael DelGiudice 
August 21, 1984 
Lucille Falcone 
-2-
-. 
Dinner Committee Letter 
FOMC letterhead 
In the 1982 New York gubernatorial campaign .we were 
outspent by more than three to one: the Republican candidate 
spent $13.9 million. We are told that-the Republicans intend 
to spend even more money in the 1986 gubernatorial race, with 
some estimates -ranging as high as $25 million. 
We believe we have already made a strong record of 
accomplishment for the State. There are more than 200,000 
people at work in our State than in 1982 and crime is down by 
9\_ Those figures are striking evidence that our program of 
"Jbbs and Justice" is working well. 
In order to be able to continue to serve and to 
build on this record, we must somehow find a way to meet the 
challenge of our opponents' wealth. To do that we need the 
assistance of friends and supporters who believe in our cause. 
The Friends of Mario Cuomo Committee has scheduled 
our Second Anniversary Celebration for November , 1984. 
I invite you to join the Dinner Committee for this Celebra-
tion. If you feel that my continued public service is in 
the best interests of the ·State, I hope that you will join 
our team. 
Kindly contact Lucille Falcone at (212) . 686-1000 
to advise of your avail~bility to serve . 
• 
Thank you for your continued support. 
- Sincerely / · 
Mario M. Cuomo 
.'! 
General Mailing 
Dear Friend: 
In the 1982 New York gubernatorial campaign we were 
outspent by more than three to one: the Republican candidate 
spent $13.9 million. We are told that the Republicans intend 
to spend even more money in the 1986 gubernatorial race, with 
s~me estimates ranging as high as $25 million. 
We believe we have already made a strong record of 
accomplishment for the State. There ·are more than 200,000 
people at work in our State than in 1982 and crime is down by 
9%. Those figures are striking evidence that our program of 
"Jobs and Justice" is working well. · 
In order to be able to continue to serve and to 
build on this record, we must somehow find a way to meet the 
challenge of our opponents' wealth. To do that we need the 
assistance of friends and supporters who believe in our cause. 
The Friends of Mario Cuomo Committee has scheduled 
our Second Anniversary Celebration for November 20, 1984. I 
hope that you will be able to join us . . You will receive a 
formal invitation shortly, however, if you would like to make 
a reservation, you may do so now. 
Thank you ·for your continued support. 
Sincerely, 
Enclosure: RSVP card 
·-' 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
is:. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44: 
45. 
Sol Chaikin 
Morton Bahr 
Edward Cleary 
Abraham Schraeder 
Maurice Greenberg 
Kenneth Nichols 
Edgar Bronfrnan 
H.I. Merinoff 
Robert Milano 
Peggy Kurnble 
William Beinecke 
John C. Bierwirth 
William Ferguson 
William Shea 
Robert Wagner 
Richard Albosta 
Harry Helrnsley 
Irving Schneider 
Milton Petrie 
Irwin Winkler 
James Nederlander 
Gerald Schoenfeld 
.George Weissman 
Alan Greenberg 
John Heimann 
John Creedon 
1'1artin Segal 
John Kluge 
Robin Farkas 
Robert Karnarro 
Jack Rudin 
Robert Tisch 
Leon Hess 
Arthur Krim 
Nate Landow 
Sal Gerbasi 
Bernie Picotte 
Robert Gioia 
Torn Wilmot 
Herbert Allen 
Arthur Emil 
George Klein 
John Sweeny 
Thomas Murphy 
Donald Trump 
BOARD OF ADVISORS 
Union 
..Pnion 
Union 
Garment {has raised money for 'Koch) 
Insurance 
Insurance -
Liquor 
Liquor 
Racing 
Racing 
Environmentalist & Business (Sperry) 
Defense Contractors 
Communications 
Attorney 
Attorney 
Engineer (Ebasco) 
Real Estate 
Real Estate 
Retailers 
Entertainment 
Theatre 
Theatre 
Business 
Brokerage 
Brokerage 
Insurance 
Cultural 
Business 
Retailer (Alexander's} 
Retailer (A & ·s) 
Real Estate 
Business 
Business 
Nassau 
Albany 
Buffalo 
Rochester 
Business 
Real Estate 
. Real Estate 
Union 
Communications 
Real Estate 
Board of Advisors 
Page Two 
46. Leonard Lauder 
47. D~vid Mahoney 
48. John Brademas 
49. Cyrus Vance . 
SO. James Murphy - -
Sl. Peter Kiernan 
S2. - John McGillicuddy 
S3. John Reed 
54. Sanford Weill .. .. 
SS. Walter Shipley 
56. Donald Kendall 
S7. Hicks Waldron 
S8. Thomas M. Macioce 
s~: . Irwin Kramer 
60. John Tishman 
61. Stella Saltonstall 
62. David A. Werbliri 
63. William Kanaga 
64. Joseph Murphy 
., 
Cosmetics 
· Business , 
Univ'ersi ties 
Attorney 
Bank 
Bank (Albany) 
· B~k 
Bank 
Broker 
Bank 
Beverage (Pepsico) 
Cosmetics (Avon) 
Retailers 
Real Estate 
. 
Accountant (Arthur Y~u~g & Co.) 
Universities 
Vincent Albanese 
· Robert Arnow 
Henry Benach 
Arnold Biegen 
Otto Bonadonna 
Peter M • . Brant 
Victor Condello 
Angelo :Costanza 
Lawrence Costiglio 
Robert N. Downey . 
Frank Drozak 
Robert Ferdon 
Bertram Firestone. 
Robert Fernan 
Joseph Giglio 
Sheldon S. Goldstein 
Victor Gotbaum 
Donald J. Greene 
John Gutfreund 
Charles Harris 
Gedale Horowitz 
Michael Johnston 
Penny Kaniclides 
Mary Wells .Lawrence 
William A. Levin 
Arthur Levitt, Jr. 
Matthew Lifflander 
David S. Mack 
Earl I. Mack 
William L. Mack 
Richard Manney 
John F.X. Mannion 
Barry Marcus 
William Mattison 
William McGowan 
William s. Mcspedon 
John Michaelson 
Paul Milstein 
Seymour Milstein 
William Modell 
Barney Monte 
Joseph Monti 
William Mulro 
Matthew Nirnetz 
William O'Shaughnessy 
Robert Parker 
Leone Peters 
Tony Peters 
Lester Petracca 
DINNER COMMITTEE 
-Dinner Corrunittee 
Page Two 
Joseph Pinto 
Vito J. Pitta 
Lee Rizutto 
Donald J. Robinson 
J. Rousseau 
Howard Rubenstein 
Robert E. Rubin 
Lewis Rudin . 
Bernard J. Ruggi~r~­
James N. Ruth, Jr. 
Jack Scheinkrnan 
Melvin L. Schweitzer 
Albert Shanker 
James Sinclair __ _ 
Richard Sirota . 
Larry Silverstein 
Jam es F. Srni th 
Mjchael P. Smith 
Robert Spitzer 
Gordon Stewart 
Chester Straub 
Joseph Talarico 
Alf red Taubman 
A. Robert Towbin 
Harry VanArsdale 
Dr. Howard Wagner 
David Walentas 
Alan Weiler 
Jack Weiler 
Jerry A. Weiss 
Dale Scutti 
Paul Westerkarnp 
John Zuccotti 
Morton Kornreich 
Daniel Rose 
Ross Pepe 
Stanley Steingut 
Donald Blinken 
-- Charles Montanti 
Dick Fisher 
., 
Dinner Conunittee 
Page Three 
Leo Fallon 
Harry Jacobs 
Sam Le Frak 
David Peirez 
Marty Steadman 
Ronald Stanton 
Robert Brennan - - -
Maurice Sonenberg 
Torn _Young · 
Lewis Glucksman 
Angelo Giordani __ 
Joseph Loveci 
Al Roth 
Michael Marx 
Stephen Swid 
Andrew Rosen 
Ea: Downes 
Lou ·Rena Hammond 
Joseph Flom . · 
Michael Lazar 
Edmund Pratt 
Donald Platten 
Abe Margolies 
Evan Debell 
Frank Wilde 
David Rubenstein 
Miles Ruben . 
John.Pomerantz 
Gene Eidenberg 
Malcolm Forbes 
Louis Wolf son 
Robert A. Farmer 
William Ellinghaus 
Sheldon Solow 
Denny Phipps and Bancroft (NYRA) 
• 
Dinner Committee 
Page Four 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
. * -
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
·"* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
*-
* 
Mrs. Walter Shorenstein 
Nina Rosenwald 
Averill and Pamela Harriman ~ 
Martin Barell 
Percy Sutton 
:Richard LeFrak 
Jim Stanton 
John Rosenwald 
Ed Arrigoni--
Francis Barry 
Wellington Mara 
George Steinbrenner 
William -Paley · 
Carter Burden 
Edward Bennett Williams 
Richard Gidrin 
Alan Felinger 
Joel Gersky 
Hannan Komanof f 
Sam Fredman . 
Neil Norry 
Sam Edelman 
Dick Wilson 
Stanley Cohn 
Laura Bonvigiani 
Lou Swyer 
John Trif aletti 
Bernie Conners 
Robert Milonzi 
Leonard Stern 
John Barry 
Christina Tusi 
Dr. Hugo Morales 
Jorge Battista 
Earl Graves 
John Procoppe 
Bruce Llwellyn 
J'ohn Torres 
Carlos Correa 
* Ron Brown 
* Bill Woodward 
* Tony Vallella 
* 
Recommended by Tony Burgos and Ellen Conovitz 
., 
.. . 
Dinner Committee 
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** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
Neil Austrian 
Richard Bliss 
Coy Eklund 
·"** 
Joseph Delario 
Andrew Gurley 
Daniel }j~rman . 
Michael Hernandez 
Richard Kezer 
Andrew Lanyi .. 
Natalie Lipman 
Morgan Murray 
Robert Rose 
.. 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
** 
Eryk Spektor 
Ed Steinberg 
C. G. Tharp 
James Wolf ensohn 
Marion Ascoli 
Mr. and Mrs. Donald Everett Axinn . 
Stuart Beck 
Louis Bernard 
John Forma 
Marif e Hernandez 
Judith Hernstadt 
Stephen Hopkins 
Peter Kalikow 
Jeffrey Koopersmith 
Isabelle Leeds 
Leland . Maphail 
George McNamee 
Morton Olshan 
Ben Palumpo 
Louis Resnick 
Edwin Roer 
Stanley Smith 
Robert Sterling 
Joseph Watts 
Lawrence Wien 
Joan Axinn 
** DNC 
" 
1 Hr. William C. Ferguson 
NY Bell 
P. 0. Box 2945 
New York, New York 10185 
2 Hr. Delbert C. Staley 
NYNEX 
1095 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036 
3 Hr. Robin Farkas 
Alexanders 
4 World Trade Center 
New York, New York 10048 
5 Hr. Earl I. Mack & Guest 
370 West Passaic Street 
Rochelle Park, NJ 07662 
6 Mr. William L. Mack & Guest . 
370 West Passaic Street 
Rochelle Park, NJ 07662 
7 Hr. and Hrs. Raymond Schuler 
152 Washington Avenue 
Albany, New York 12210 
. -.;.. 
8 Hr. William A. Shea &. Guest 
Shea and Gould 
330 Hadison Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
10 Hr. Gordon Stewart & Guest 
American Stock Exchange 
86 Trinity Plaza 
New York, New York 10006 
· ~11 Mr. Mrs. ~·ncent Tese 
130 ast 74t Avenue 
New Yo , New rk 1 21 
12 Mr. Al Roth 
Al Roth Bonds 
50 West 34tb Street 
New York, New York 10001 
13 Ms. Ruth S. Elliott 
One Park Avenue, Rm. 837 
New York, New York 10016 
GUEST: her son 
14 tts. Margaret C. ttcGarry 
360 Lexington. Avenue ·· · 
New York, New York 10017 
. ·. 
. . . 
15 Hs. Lillian Giden 
Suite 1515 
230 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10169 
GUEST: Dr. Penelope Russianoff 
16 Hr. Manuel Bustelo 
Publisher 
El Diario-La Prensa 
Gannett Company, Inc. 
143 Varick Street 
New York, New York 10013 
17 Hr. and Hrs. George B; Cox 
Sr. Vice President 
General Electric 
One River Road 
Schenectady, New York 12345 
18 Mr. James Gifford 
200 Madison Avenue, 3rd Floor 
New York, New York 10016 
19 Mr. Edmund Pratt 
Pfizer, Inc. · 
235 East 42nd Street . 
New York, New York 10017 
. ..... 
., 
20 Hr. Gerald Shoenfeld 
225 West 44th Street , 
New York, New York 10036 
21~ Mr. Arthur Hauspurg 
Con Edison 
4 Irving Place 
· New York, New York .:· 10003 .-· · ·· 
22 Hr. Eugene "Luntey 
195 Montogue Street 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
GUESTS: Mr. & Mrs. Robert Cattell 
23 Mr. David A. \.lerblin 
Madison Square Garden 
2 Pennsylvania Plaza 
New York, New York 10121 
24 Mr. Thornton Bradshaw 
RCA 
Rockefeller Plaza 
New York~ New York 10020 
25 Mr. Phillip Robinson 
Procter & Gamble 
5 Corporate Park Drive 
·· White Plains, New York 10604 
: 
26 Hr. George HcNamee, Jr. 
President . 
First Albany Corporation 
90 State Street 
Albany, New York 12207 
... 
27 Mr. Joseph Allen & Guest 
P. 0. Box 3443 
Greenwich, CT 06830 
28 Mr. and Mrs. Donald Bachmann 
Bachmann, Scwartz & Abrams-on 
2 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 
GUEST: Harriet 
.. 
. . 
29 Mr. Jack Carroll 
Grumman Corp. 
1111 Stewart Avenue 
Betbpage, New York 11714 
GUEST: Maura Carroll 
30 Mr. Robert N. Downey 
Goldman Sachs 
85 Broad Street, 26th Floor 
New York, New York 10004 
GUEST: John Melvin 
31 Mr. & Mrs. Sheldon S. Goldstein 
17 Bon Aire Circle 
Suffern, New York 10901 
.... 
33 Mr. William Mu!rou 
Donaldson, Lufkin 
& Jenrette, Inc • . 
140 Broadway 
New York, New York 10005 . 
GUEST: · Teddy Strane 
34: Mr. George Weissman & Guest 
Philip Morris 
120 Park Avenue 
New York, ~ew York 10017 
36 Mr. & Mrs. A. Costenza 
275 Hibiscus Drive 
Rochester, New York 14618 
38 Mr. & Mrs. Barney Monte 
245-20 Grand Central Parkway 
Bellerose, New York 11426 
39 Mr. & Mrs. Lester Petracca 
18 Borglum Road 
Manhassett, New York 11030 
40 Mr. Joseph Pinto & Guest 
Manuel, Elken Company 
419 Park Avenue, South 
New York, New York 10016 
- -~--
CUUMU~ tile ~ All~NU~U nn~ 
43 Hr~ & Hrs. ·Melvin Schw~itzer ' 
Rogers and Wells 
200 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 
44 Hr. & Mrs. Richard Sirota 
Xwik International Color Ltd. 
11 8th Avenue 
New York, New York 10011 
45 Mr. Robert Spitzer -&--Guest . 
1700 Broadway . 
New York, New York 10019 
46 Hr. Lou Rena Hammond 
39 East Slst Street 
New York, New York 10022 
47 Ms. Peg Sweazy 
JFK International Airport 
Jamaica, New York 11432 
48 Hr. Angelo Giordani 
210 East 86th Street 
New York, New York 10028 
• 
. . 
49 Hr. Victor Condello 
and Guest 
27 Woodland Drive 
Huntington Bay, NY '11713 
50 Ms. Alice Byrne 
Ambassador Investigations 
554 Argyle -Road 
Brooklyn, New York 11230 . 
51 Ms. Phyllis Linn 
Fine Art Advisory Services 
165 East 66th Street 
New York, New York 10021 
52 , Ms. Jill Feldman 
Jill Feldman, CPA 
Apt. 1403 
270 Madison Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 
Inc. 
53 Ms. Lillian Firestone 
Firestone Associates 
1365 York Avenue 
New York, New York 10021 · 
GUEST: Frances Smedberg 
54 Ms. Lisa Kolb Liebert 
Attorney-at-Law 
277 Broadway, Suite 1506 
New York, New York 10007 
GUEST: Solomon Levine 
'I 
55 Hs. Cecile C. Weich 
Atto::-ney-at-Law 
One Riverdale Avenue 
Bronx, New York 10463 
56 Ms. Doris Gilman 
Fingerprints Design 
77 West 15th Street 
New York, New York 10011 
GUEST: Belina Caulfield 
57 Ms. Carol Bensky 
Women Business Owners 
of New York 
322 Eighth Avenue, 12th Flr. 
New York, New York 10001 
GUEST: Terri Bensley 
.. 
. . 
58 Ms. Tamara K. Homer 
485 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
59 Ms. Phyllis F. Schwebel 
First Vice President · 
Time Magazine 
Room 11-30 
Time & Life Building 
New York, New York 10020 
60 Ms. Anne P. Collins 
41 East 42nd Street, Rm. 400 
New York, New York 10017 
..... 
61 Hs. Joan Lipton 
485 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
GUEST: Norton Wolf 
62a Hr. Robert Wagner, Sr. 
Finley, Kwnble, Wagner, 
Heine and Underberg 
425 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
63 Hr. Robert Gioia 
36 Ramsey Road 
Buffalo, New York 14029 
65 President David Campbell 
Computer Task Group, Inc. 
800 Delaware Avenue 
Buffalo, New York 14209 
GUEST: Gay Campbell 
66 Ms. Susan Deutsch & Guest 
Paine Webber 
140 Broadway 
New York, New York 10005 
. ' 
67 Ms. Sandra Kurtin 
369 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
· 68 Hs. Marybeth Lareau 
875 Third Avenue · 
New York, New York 10022 
70 Hr. & Mrs; Malcolm Forbes 
Forbes Magazine 
60 Fifth Avenue 
New York, New York 10011 
72 Mr. &. Mrs. Bernard _Pjcotte 
Picotte Realty 
120 Washington Avenue 
Albany, New York 12210 
73 Mr. Michael Picotte 
& Guest 
Picotte Realty 
120 Washington Avenue 
Albany, New York 12210 
74 Mr. John Picotte 
Picotte Realty 
120 Washington Avenue 
Albany, New York 12210 
76 Mr. & Mrs. Edmond Safra 
Republic National Bank 
452 5th Ave., 9th Floor 
New York, New York 10018 
. ..:. 
-- -·· - ... - --- - ... ... .. - ·· --- - - "\, 
77 Hr. & Mrs. Paul Lai · 
Jack's Chinese Restaurant 
1881 Central Avenue 
Albany, New York 12205 
82 -:: Hr. Robert Greenba~ 
& Guest 
Breed Abbott & Morgan : . . . 
153 East 53rd Street ·· 
New York, New York · 10022 
83 Hr. Robert Cammara & Guest 
420 Fulton Street 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
84 Dr. Robert Matrisiano 
133-55 .Lefferts Blvd. 
S. Ozone Park, NY 11420 
85 Hr. Peter M. Brant 
· White Birch Farm 
Taconic Road 
Greenwich, Connecticut 06030 
86 Hr. and Mrs. James Conway 
American Express Company 
American Express Plaza 
New York, New York 10004 
BJ Hr~ Dale Horowitz 
Salomon Brothers, Inc. 
One New York Plaza 
New York, New York 10004 
89 Ms. Jewel Jackson McCabe 
10 East 87th Street 
New York, New York 10028 
90 Mr. Peter M. Brant & Guest 
White Birch Farm 
Taconic Road 
Greenwich, CT 06830 
91 Mr. Edward K. Flynn & Guest 
E. F. Hutton Group, Inc. 
One Battery Park Plaza 
New York, New York 10015 
92 Hr. Patrick Foley 
American International Group 
70 Pine Street 
New York, New York 10004 
93 Hr. Gedale Horowitz & Guest 
Salomon Brothers, Inc. 
One New York Plaza 
New York, New York 10009 
·~ 
• 
94 · Hr. Bernand Jacobs · 
225 West 44th Street 
New York, New York 10036 
95~ Ms. Jewel Jackson McCabe 
President · 
National Coalition of 
100 Black Women 
10 East 87th Street 
New York, New York 10028 
96 Mr. Jolm Michaelson & Guest 
First Boston Corp. 
Park Avenue Plaza 
New York, New York 10007 
.· 
97 Mr. William O'Sbaughnessy & Guest 
c/o WVOX - Return Radio 
One Broadcast Forum 
New Rochelle, New York 10801 
98 Mr . & Mrs. James Conway 
American Express Company 
American Express Plaza 
New York, New York 10004 
99 Mr. Harvey Sabinson 
226 West 47th Street 
New York, New York 10036 
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LAWRENCE B. BuTTENWIESER 
575 MADISON AVENUE 
NEW YORK 10022 
Mr. Lewis Rudin 
345 Park Avenue 
March 4, 1987 
New York, New York 10054 
Dear Lew: 
As a supplement to our recent telephone conversation: 
1. I enclose with this Jetter a copy of the financial 
Disclosure Statement of Citizens for Abrams for the period 
ended January 14, 1987, which shows a cash balance at the 
end of that period of $22,500 and loans outstanding at the 
end of that period of $113,000. The present "deficit" has 
been reduced by $5,000 and is now about $85,000. 
2. The policy of the Campaign about contributions 
from individuals with an interest In a Plan within the office 
of the Attorney General is not to accept a contribution from 
any individual with an interest in a Plan which has not been 
accepted for filing. I am informed that the Plan for 65 
Central Park West has been accepted for filing and 
accordingly you are not hindered by the constraints of the 
Campaign from making a contribution to the Campaign. 
I hope that this enclosure and this information may be a 
useful supplement to our conversation. 
Best regards, 
LBB:btb 
Encls. 
bee: Hon. Robert Abrams 
Leonard Boxer, Esq. 
Mr. Ethan Geto 
Ms. Laura Ross 
f ordia: 
Lawrenc~~Buttenwleser 
finance Chairman 
Citizens for Abrams 
September 
From the desk of: 
1 87 . 
,19--
LA WREN CE B. BUTTENWIESER 
To: 
RA 
LB 
EG 
LR 
Here is my version 
of the "Balance Sheet" 
of Citizens for Abrams 
as at September 1, 
1 987. 
= 
CITIZENS FOR ABRAMS 
September 1, 1987 
I. Liabilities 
Sterling National Bank 
II. 
Guarantors: 
Assets: 
(a) Cash on 
( b) Labor 
( c) Pledges 
1 • 
2. 
hand 
(net) 
( d) Contemplations 
Howard Schulder 
Jacob Schulder 
$58,000 
44,000 
14,000 
58,000 
1, 000 
10,000 
52,500 
5,000 
68,500 
. -~ 
Pledgor 
Henry Benach 
Arthur G. Cohen 
Samuel M. Eisenstat 
Jerry Finklestein 
Peter Fischbein 
Abraham Hirschfeld 
Jones, Day 
(Arthur D. Emil) 
Norman Levy 
Alexander Parker 
Lester Pollack 
Lewis Rudin 
Melvin L. Schweitzer 
Gross 
Net 
Contemplator prospect 
William Zeckendorf 
Amount 
Pledged 
8,000 
1 5, 00 0 
7,500 
5,000 
6,000 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
10,000 
10,000 
5,000 
1 , 000 
82,500 
82,500 
-30,000 
52,500 
Person responsible 
Haircut for collection 
RA 
EG 
5,000 EG 
EG 
EG 
5,000 RA 
EG 
2,500 EG 
5,000 EG 
7,500 RA 
5,000 RA 
EG 
30,000 
Person responsible 
Amount anticipated for collection 
5,000 LB 
5,000 
I 1 
. Geto&deMilly Inc .. 
Public Relations 
Governmental Affairs 
Political Consulting 
I :· 
Mr. Lawrence B. Buttenwieser 
Rosenman Colin Freund 
Lewis & Cohen 
575 Madison Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
Dear Larry: 
June 4, 1987 
In your memo of May 28, 1987 you designated me as the person 
responsible for following up with Lew Rudin. This is not the 
case--Bob was going to follow-up personally. 
With warmest regards. 
dl 
bee: Hon. Robert Abrams 
Laura Ross 
2.19/buttenwieser 
130 East 40th Street 
··-.~--
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL.. 
Mr. Frank Wilkinson 
Managing Director 
ST.ATE OF NEW YORK 
DEPARTME~T OF L-\.W 
Two WORLD TRADE CE:NTER 
NEW YORK . N . Y. 100--'7 
December 12, 1984 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette 
140 Broadway 36th floor 
New York, NY 10005 
Dear Frank: 
Rather than discuss with you a wide range of topics and 
send clippings relating to those subjects, I thought I would 
focus on a single important subject: crime. As you know, I have 
made a major commitment over the past two years to working with 
my colleagues in the law enforcement community to develop respon-
sible reforms in our flawed criminal justice system. We have 
been successful beyond our most optimistic expectations in 
gaining support for and implementation .of many of these critical 
changes. I want to take this opportunity to share the story of 
this success with you and to get your comments and advice --
especially regarding the important adjustments which still need 
to be made. 
Two years ago, I exercised leadership in forming a 
unique organization, the New York State Law Enforcement Council. 
The LEC is made up of the Attorney General's Office, the New York 
State District Attorneys Association, the New York State Assoc-
iation of Chiefs of Police, the New York State Sheriffs Associa-
tion, The City of New York's Criminal Justice Coordinator and the 
Citizens Crime Commission of New York City. We agreed on major 
initiatives to strengthen the criminal justice system and to help 
reduce crime in New York State. Because they represented a 
consensus of the state's entire law enforcement community, our 
initiatives offered a cogent and broadly acceptable plan of 
action in an area where programmatic, jurisdictional and ideolo-
gical differences had frequently stymied efforts to achieve badly 
needed reforms. As a result, during 1983 and 1984, the Legisla-
ture and the Governor adopted major components of the LEC 
program. These included: 
* A tough asset forfeiture law, under which the state 
can seize property used to commit felony crimes, the proceeds of 
such crimes, and other assets exchanged for the ill-gotten fruits 
of such crimes. This is a powerful new tool in the fight against 
sophisticated organized crime -- in particular narcotics 
trafficking -- and white collar crime. 
Exhibit 
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* A change in the insanity defense. The revised law 
now places the burden of proving a lack of criminal responsi-
bility on the defendant in a criminal trial. 
* The establishment of determinate sentencing. The 
Legislature created a special State Sentencing Guidelines Commit-
tee to propose a system whereby sentences will be fixed by the 
courts and not by the Parole Board. 
* A reclassification of certain less serious misde-
meanor crimes to permit non-jury trials in such matters. This 
will help clear up the near-disastrous calendar backlogs in our 
criminal courts. 
* Tougher handling of drunk drivers who cause injury or 
death and are found criminally negligent. 
Among other LEC proposals adopted were those which 
raise the penalties for bail jumping; increase the maximum time 
in prison that can be served by a person convicted of more than 
one unrelated felony and sentenced to consecutive terms; permit 
for the first time the indictment and trial together of defen-
dants who participated in the same criminal incident but commit-
ted different crimes; bar frivolous appeals of sentences that 
were based on a guilty plea; and allow a prosecutor to seek a 
court order to force submission to a chemical blood alcohol test 
in certain cases of driving while intoxicated. 
In addition, I am especially gratified that long-
standing concerns of mine to enhance the rights of crime victims 
were put forward by the LEC and adopted. One such measure pro-
vides that courts consider restitution to victims as an alterna-
tive punishment in appropriate circumstances. Another liberal-
izes the amounts victims can ask a court to award for property 
losses or medical expenses. 
Taken together, these changes constitute a serious 
effort to deal comprehensively with many of the problems of the 
criminal justice system. 
But these breakthroughs, however salutary, are still 
only a beginning. The proposals which the Law Enforcement Coun-
cil has made which remain to be acted upon include: an Organized 
Crime Control Act that would give state and local prosecutors 
critical weapons in the fight against organized crime; a major 
expansion and revamping of probation services that will give new 
life to this essential but long-neglected element of the system; 
a switch to the federal system of selection of jurors by judges, 
eliminating the dilatory and hugely expensive voir dire system 
now used in the state courts, under which the lawyers-5°elect the 
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jurors; increased capacity for local jails which are literally 
bursting at the seams; and further assistance to crime victims. 
I am greatly encouraged by the results that have been 
obtained through the spirit of cooperation and collaboration 
generated by the Law Enforcement Council. Further success in 
creating the best possible criminal justice system in which the 
public can have the highest degree of confidence will depend on 
continuing broad support from the public. As a person of prom-
inence who has a leadership role in the community, I want to keep 
you informed of these crucial developments and hope that I will 
have the benefit of your counsel and your help in building and 
maintaining that all-important support. 
I look forward to hearing your comments and reactions. 
For your added information, I am enclosing a few recent articles 
and commentaries which of fer greater detail about certain aspects 
of this subject. 
With best personal regards. 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNCY GENE:RAI... 
ST.A.TE OF N:e:w YoHK 
DEPARTMENT OF UW 
Two WOHLD TRADE C.e:NTER 
N:e:w YoRK . N. Y. 10047 
May 10, 1985 
Hon. Albert N. Abgott 
Kenmore, New York 14217 
Dear Al: 
( . 
Traditionally, on Law Day, May 1st, the Attorney 
General addresses the Court of Appeals and an audience of 
top public officials and leaders of the bar. This year, I 
devoted my Law Day remarks to the urgent needs of the criminal 
justice system. Pointing to the importance of a long-overdue 
comprehensive approach to fighting serious•crime, I called 
for a major increase in law enforcement resources for police 
and prosecutors, supported in part by new state fundingi 
encouragement of innovative programs to improve the effectiveness 
of police and prosecutors; and statewide consolidation of 
the court system to promote improved court: management. / 
In combination with the development of a new system 
of tougher, determinate sentences, which I support, this program 
would give us the appropriate resources to respond vigorously 
to the challenge of widespread criminality. With three-quarters 
of a million major crimes reported in New York State last year, 
we must be prepared to make responsible changes and reforms 
and to devote additional funds to making our communities safer. 
I am enclo§ing a copy of my Law Day remarks as 
they appeared in the New York Law Journal. As always, I 
would very much appreciate your comments and reactions. As I 
shape concepts outlined in the address into more detailed 
proposals for the consideration of the law enforcement ' · 
community and the Governor and Legislature, your suggestions 
will be espe .. cially helpful. 
With warmest personal regards. 
Sincerely, 
.. 
ROBERT' ABRJl.!1S 
. ' 
' . 
ARV last-name, first-name, title, companyl, company2, street, 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
Two WoRLD TRADE CENTER 
NEW YoHK. N. Y. 10047 
September 13, 1985 
&mr& &first-name& &last-name& 
&title/a& 
&companyl/o& 
&company2/o& 
&street& &suite-apt& 
&city&, &state& &zip& 
Dear &dear&: 
Recently, I took the initiative to .organize a group of 
state attorneys general to oppose elimination of deductibility 
of state and local taxes as part of any tax reform program. 
Twenty of my colleagues joined me in a statement to the 
President and leaders of Congress expressing our unanimous view 
that the scheme to allow double taxation would undermine the 
essential role of states and localities in our federal system. 
The twenty-one attorneys general involved are of 
different parties and philosophies and represent every region of 
the country, including both larger and smaller states. ·rt is 
especially noteworthy that they come from both relatively high-
and low-tax states. 
Moreover, we are a group with widely differing views 
on tax reform. Personally, I strongly favor genuine tax reform 
along the lines of the Treasury Department's first plan 
("Treasury I") or the Bradley-Gephardt plan, ·sponsored by New 
Jersey Senator Bill Bradley and Missouri Representative Richard 
A. Gephardt. The nation's tax system has become not only 
unfair, but also a burden to economic growth, as political 
favoritism to special interests and not the markets has 
increasingly become a decisive force in allocating capital. 
Hon. Albert N. Abgott 
- 2 - September 13, 1985 
But, despite the long-overdue need for comprehensive 
change, double taxation is no reform. Since the income tax 
began in 1913, the tremendous responsibilities of state and 
local governments for public services such as education, police 
and sanitation have been recognized, and the deductibility 
provision has been taken for granted. As of last year --
excluding defense and interest on the debt -- the federal budget 
was $542 billion, while aggregate spending of state and local 
governments was $470.7 billion. This makes it abundantly clear 
that the major revenue streams available to state and local 
governments for the past 72 years are needed, and that any 
disruption of this system will wreak havoc. It is estimated, 
for example, that if deductibility is disallowed, the nation's 
15,000 school districts will be forced to cut back by twenty 
percent. This would cause a major crisis in public education. 
Elimination of the deductibility of state and local 
taxes would also be a terrible blow to New York City. It would 
send a devastating signal to the business coilllllunity. Major 
coroprations would find that their well-paid executives would 
rather live in Connecticut or some other state. For many, this 
would be an inducement to locate or relocate beyond the borders 
of New York State. Middle income homeowners who pay hefty real 
estate taxes would also seriously suffer under such a plan. 
It's important, therefore, that we continue to mount a vigorous 
fight on this serious issue. · 
I am enclosing for your information a copy of the 
statement to the President from the 21 attorneys general .. ·· As 
always, I am eager to get your reactions and comments on this 
issue of critical importance, especially to New Yorkers. I look 
forward to hearing any advice or input you may have. 
With warmest personal regards. 
Sincerely' · 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
A'n"ORNEY GENERAL. 
ST.a.TE 01" NEW' YORK 
DEP_'\.RT)<!E::fT OF LA w 
Two WoRI.D TR.ADE CE~TER 
NEW YORK.~. Y. 10047 
December 27, 1985 
&mr& &first-name& &last-name& 
&title/o& 
&companyl/o& 
&company2/o& 
&street& &suite-apt& 
&city&, &state& &zip& 
Dear &dear&: 
In seven years as Attorney General, few achievements of 
my office have been more gratifying personally than our success 
in attracting the best and brightest men and women in the legal 
profession. Public service always has had an appeal to 
attorneys, and we have sought to maximize that appeal by working 
hard to give the Office of Attorney General the highest 
professional quality. .' 
The New York Law Journal recently focused on our 
considerable success in recruiting excellent, experienced 
attorneys -- often at a substantial financial sacrifice -- from 
many of the major law firms. This is just one aspect of our 
recruitment of a first-rate staff from the non-profit sector, 
government and the private bar, but it is an especially 
satisfying part of that larger story. A copy of the Law Journal 
article is enclosed for your information. ----
Quality recruitment is the foundation of all our other 
initiatives in the office. We have supplemented this effort with 
training programs and seminars for our lawyers. It is part of 
the program we have established to make the Attorney General's 
office a professionally run, quality law office. As always, I 
would very much appreciate hearing any cotmnents or ideas you may 
have concerning this or any other phase of the office's mission. 
With warmest personal regards. 
Sincerely, 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Mr. Edward R. Downe, Jr. 
l!ew York, NY 10022 
Dear Ed: 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
Two WORLD TRADE CE::-.TER 
NEW YORK,N . Y. 10047 
April 18, 1986 
This is a crucial year for law enforcement in New York State in its 
strug~les with the mob, corrupt public officials and politicians, and 
white cC\llar cr_iminals. Law enforcement has taken on sC\me formidable 
challenges, forcefully, diligently and responsibly. -But these challenges 
have spotlighted major weaknesses in our state l~w enforcement 
capability that must be corrected. 
As allegations of criminal wrongdoing by high public officials and 
powerful party leaders :In New York City have unfolded, the close 
coope=ation among federal, state and local prosecutors has been notable. 
For example, the investigations focusing on collections contracts in the 
city's Parking Violations Bureau were handled primarily by U.S. Attorney 
~dolph Giuliani, while investigations of alleged fraud by Citisocrce, 
Inc. in obtaining a contract for a hand-held summons-issuing computer 
were handled mainly by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau and 
by my office. The dramatic series of indictments of major mob figures 
has been possible because of the same kind of coop~ration at work. One 
federal case -- the indictment of leading mob figures on charges that 
they constituted a 11 CC\Tl'mission" that directed gangster enterprises 
was made possible by investip,ative work done by the New York State 
Organized Crime Task Force, an arm of my office. 
This close cooperation on matters involving highly organized 
criminal conspiracies is not only desirable; it is essential. Federal 
action is not only helpful because :It brings vast investigative 
resources to bear on important cases; it is indispensable to successful 
indictment ant! prosecution of some serious crimes. Federal la\.·~ are 
better designed to de.al with certain modern sophisticated crimes and to 
bring violators to .iustice. The comparahle New York State laws arP 
disturh5.ngly out of tlate . . 
First ana foremost, New York State needs an Organiz~d C~ime Control 
Act, pci.t:erned after the federal Racketeer Influenced iinci Corrupt 
Org:!nizations Act (RICO). l' r:der RICO, federal pro o ecutors ;ire able to 
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attack patterns of criminal activity and to find and seize assets that 
represent the profits of crime. 
Second, we need to extend the reach of state bribery laws. Under 
present state law, payments to party officiAls to influence public 
officials cannot be prosecuted as bribery. Also, a public official 
cannot now be prusecute<l for accepting bribes unless he is actually able 
to bring about personally the result desired by thP. briber. Wt need a 
law which holds party officialR accountable for corrupt influence-
peddling and which define~ brihPrv to include any acceptance of a 
pnyment by a public official to influence an official act. 
Third, we need to revise the present unnecessarily restrictive 
state requirement for corroboration of testimony given by criminal 
accomplices. In most cases of public corruption and organized crime, 
accomplices' agreeing to testify is the only way to prosecute anyone at 
all. Not only the federal government hut also most other states permit 
the use of accomplice testiruony alone to convict defendants. With its 
special burdens of powerful crime syndicates, hir,h-volume narcotics 
trafficking, public corruption and the potential for large-scale 
economic crimes ··of mAny kinds, New York State badly needs this important 
criminal justice reform. 
These three chan~es are critical. They are being pressed 
vigorously by the Law Enforcement Council -- a statewide alliance which 
I was instrumental in organizjn~ and whicl1 .is made up of the Attorney 
General, djstrict attorneys, police chiefs, sheriffs, the Citizens' 
Crime Commission and New York Cit y 's Criminal Justice Coordinator. 
State prosecutors should have every appropriate strong weapon necessary 
to combat the grave threat to society posed by organized crime and the 
special <lan~er to honest, democraric government presented by 
unscrupulous public figures who violate their oaths u11d sell their 
trust. 
These proposals are now pending in the Legislature, and we need the 
help of every citizen in securing approval of these and other long-
overdue reform~ in the state's criminal justice system. Federal 
officials will always have certain advantages in investigating matters 
that involve interstate or international activiticB or are covered by 
some uniquely federal jurisdjction. But we in the Empire State should 
stand <is equal partners with the federal government and play a full part 
in defending the interests of our own state's citizens. 
For additional information about these vitnJ jssuea, I uw enclosing 
a few recent new articl~s and comments. I ~rge you to contact members 
of the Legislature to let them know your views, an<l, cis always, I would 
appreciate heari11g any comments nnd suggestions you may have. 
With warmest personal regurds. 
Enclosures 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNEY Ge:NERA.L 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
DEPARTHENT OF LAW 
Two WORLD TRADE CENTER 
NEw Yon.rr. N. Y. 100.+7 
May 16, 1986 
Mr. an<l Mrs. Paul Milstein 
1271 Avenue of the Americas 42ncl floor 
New York, NY 10020 
Dear Paul and Irma: 
"Honest politician" may appear to be an oxymoron to some 
cynicr,, but not to me. Having spent decades working with 
thousands of hard-Horking, dP.dicated and honest people who hold 
important elective public office, work in the halls of 
governrnerit and lead our great political parties at every level, I 
knew that most public servants are, like me, deeply 2ngered by 
any act of corruption involving the public's interest. The 
recent, shocking spectacle of high public and p2rty officials 
abusing the public trust placed in their hands disturbs us 
profoundly. It makes us determined not only to punish any who 
may be guilty of crimes but also to adopt strict reforms to 
prevent the recurrence of such abuses. 
That is why Governor Cuomo and Mayor Koch appointed a 
special commission headed by Columbia President Michael I. Sovern 
-- a p~mel that has begun to issue reports and make 
recommendations for strong 2ction. That is also why both 
Goverm>r Cuomo and I have independently proposed tough and far-
reaching reforms that are very similar in approach. We both want 
to es tab U sh an independent S tatc F. thics \.cYr:::mis s ion with strong 
enforcement authority; to require cletCJiled financial disclosure 
by public officials and candidates; and to limit political party 
officers from lobbying or doing business with government. He 
hope the Ler,islature will act favorably on these and other long-
overdue ethics-in-government reforms. 0nly sweeping changes like 
these will restore b~dly shaken public confidence in our 
governmental and political institutions. 
Mr. and Mrs. Paul Milstein - 2 - May 16! 1986 
As you may know, I have also urged my own party to act 
decisively, regardless of how speedily the Legislature takes up 
these issues. In a letter to the Democratic State Chair and to 
county leaders and state committee members, I have proposed that 
the Party adopt rules at the upcoming State Convention that would 
bar certain major party leaders from holding elective party 
office and prohibit these same leaders from doing business with 
government. These were, in fact, the two sets of circumstances 
in which many of the serious corrupt acts that have been alleged 
recently were nurtured. In my view, this kind of bold, 
unilateral action by one of the major parties will press the 
other parties to take similar steps and will make comprehensive 
legislative reform inevitable. 
For your information, I am enclosing a copy of my Law Day 
statement on the need for ethics reforms and some recent articles 
about my proposals for the party rules changes. As always, I 
value your views as a leader in the community and would 
appreciate any reactions or comments you may have. 
With warmest personal regards. 
Enclosures 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
STATE 01" NEW YORK 
DEPARTMENT OF LA.w 
120 BROADWAY 
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10271 
Mr. and Mrs. Meshulam Riklis 
Rapid American Corp. 
725 Fifth Avenue 18th floor 
New York, NY 10022 
Dear Rick and Pia: 
February 6, 1987 
With the hectic holiday and inaugural period behind me, I 
wanted to take a moment and share briefly with you my reflections on 
the past few months and the period ahead. My re-election to the 
office of Attorney General was both exciting and gratifying. The 
margin of victory was the biggest in the history of the office, 
65.12%. I carried 60 of the 62 counties in New York State, losing 
the two by a combined total of only 191 votes. 
Also deeply gratifying was the fact that my candidacy was 
supported by every daily newspaper in the state that editorialized 
on the election. A sample of these editorials is enclosed. 
As I begin my new term of office, I will continue to press 
for reforms in the ethics and conflict of interest laws of our 
state. The scandals that have been uncovered in New York City and 
the abuses elsewhere in the state have undermined the credibility of 
our political system. We urgently need to adopt stringent new 
reforms in order to restore public confidence in government. 
My proposals include creating a powerful state ethics 
commission, imposing new restrictions on the outside activities of 
current and former public officials, prohibiting top-level party 
officials from being paid for representing private clients before 
government agencies, preventing an individual from being both a 
party and public official at the same time, requiring financial 
disclosure from all elected, and top-level appointed, officials and 
reforming our campaign finance laws. I used this theme in my 
Inaugural Address in Buffalo. I'm enclosing a copy of a Buffalo 
News editorial on these initiatives. 
Mr. and Mrs. Meshulam Riklis -2- February 6, 1987 
Another issue critical to the State of New York is the 
adoption of legislation dealing with the very serious dangers posed 
by the accidental release of toxic chemicals into the air or water. 
While the tragedy in Bhopal and the spill last year into the Rhine 
River have made the public aware of the enormous risks we run, there 
have been many smaller leaks of toxic chemicals in New York State 
over the years. Preventing a Bhopal tragedy in New York is a must. 
I introduced a bill that would require industrial plants which have 
toxic chemicals on site to take steps to prevent accidental 
releases, to prepare plans to respond to an emergency, to work in 
cooperation with the communities in which they are located and to 
report any toxic releases to government agencies. My office has 
been working closely with the Governor's office, the Legislature and 
business community representatives on the bill, and I believe that 
there is a good chance of passage before the 1987 session ends. 
Finally, since becoming Attorney General, I have spent a 
substantial amount of time advocating reforms to aid in the 
enforcement of our criminal statutes. Much of this work has been 
done through the Law Enforcement Council, which I helped form five 
years ago with the District Attorneys, Sheriffs, Police, the Mayor 
of the City of New York and the Citizens Crime Commission. Last 
year, the Council achieved the passage of a State Organized Crime 
Control Act, a measure which I had first introduced in 1982. I 
continue to belie9e that there is ~ critical need for increased 
funding of the various elements of the criminal justice system, 
including the police, prosecutors, courts, sheriffs, probation and 
parole offices and correctional system. In 1987, I expect to be 
joining with the other members of the Law Enforcement Council in 
proposing additional funding of identifiable programs which have 
proven to be effective in the fight against crime. 
As always, I am eager to get your reactions, which in the 
past have helped to guide my efforts in important ways. I'll keep 
you posted periodically on our major initiatives. 
With warmest personal regards. 
ROBERT ABRAMS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF NEW YoRK 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
120 BROADWAY 
Mr. Jeffrey S. Silverman 
President 
Ply-Gem Industries 
NEW YORK. N. Y. 10 2 71 
919 Third Avenue 6th floor 
New York, NY 10022 
Dear Jeff: 
June 22, 1987 
- Since January of 1986, scandal and corruption have 
dominated the news of state and local government. The daily deluge 
of revelations of self-dealing by government officials and the 
resulting wave of public indignation present us with an historic 
opportunity to recast the way the public's business is done. 
Of particular interest to me in the past few months have 
been the efforts to adopt new rules of ethical conduct for 
governmental and party officials. I have called for action on two 
fronts: the State Legislature and the major political parties in 
the State. I have sent a package of bills to the Legislature 
detailing specific reforms which I regard as essential if public 
confidence in government is to be restored. As part of the effort 
to secure these reforms, I counseled and supported Governor Cuomo's 
veto of the ethics bill initially passed by the Legislature. (My 
memorandum to the Governor as reprinted by the New York Times is 
enclosed.) Agreement on a more comprehensive bill has not, as of 
this moment, been reached, though negotiations are continuing. 
Recognizing the difficulty of achieving bipartisan, 
bicameral agreement on such complex and sensitive issues, I decided 
to open the second front and I called upon the four major parties 
to reform how they conduct their business. I felt that my own party 
should provide leadership in this crucial struggle and could 
immediately do so by revising its own rules rather than waiting 
passively for the actions of the Legislature. As a result of my 
efforts, the 1986 convention of the Democratic State Committee 
created a Special Committee on Ethics to draft comprehensive rules 
covering Democratic party leaders. 
- 2 -
U~fortunately, in my opinion, the report adopted by the 
Committee majority missed the mark. The majority proposals are much 
weaker than what the current crisis of confidence demands. Just as 
Governor Cuomo recognized that the public deserves better than half~ 
hearted and porous efforts on the legislative front, I have called 
for the rejection of the majority recommendation in favor of the 
superior minority report. I have included my detailed statements on 
this matter. 
I would be delighted to get your reaction to these 
efforts. At the very least, I feel it is important to let you know 
that many of us are involved daily in the painstaking work of 
reordering the machinery of government so that it can be honest, 
effective and worthy of the trust of its citizens. 
With warmest personal regards. 
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COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 
Lawrence S. Hunt1ngron 
COMMITTEE TI1EASURER 
Wlllled J. Meckel II 
COMMITTEE SECRETAJN 
PollV weoei 
VICE CHAJRf'fRSONS 
Rlcl'lotd A. Berrutetn 
John C. Blelwirft1 
lw:Jrew M Slum 
Samad R. Bobel' 
Thomas A. Bolon 
Jomes E. Corey 
Jomes E. Cayne 
Jua-.( Cornier 
' 
Peter J. CostiOOl'J ' t 
May S. Cronson 
. 
!homos W. Evans 
Enid K. Feist 
Raf L Furman 
!homos J. Gochbefg 
Ovistlne Gooc::1win 
.Josepn Harcum 
Rita E. Hou-
Mlcl'loe4 Hemondez 
Ridiord 0 . Hooicins 
G.ldo1e B. Horowitz 
Etic M. Jovin 
Howard T. Koneff 
Rooert M. Kaufman 
l<attlleen Locey 
Benjamin V. Lambert 
Janet A Luhrs 
Eo1e 1. Mock 
.Joel R. Mesznik 
William W. IV\oore 
!homos E. o·eonnor 
C Kevin O'Donoghue 
~orcvonte G. Perrotta 
Co~ H Pfooneimer Ill 
Howard W. Phillips 
Jonn R. Price 
!homos L Pulling 
il'ootord J. Race. Jr. 
William J. Regan. Jr. 
Sleonen Roberf 
--William A Schreye< 
Fronk P. Smeal 
Chones F. Smithers. Jr. 
'Miiiam I. Spencer 
Monanne Sorooo1ns 
.; 
Mocelon D. Tolley 
Ectword L Tirrell 
Ph1lloA Toio 
;oM Truo1n 
Chones J. Urstoat 
;omes M. woosworrn 
;onn F. Wolloce Ill 
COMMlnEE IN FORMATION 
To: LSH 
From: Bill Hicks 
Date: November 23, 1987 
Having made a thorough review of our files in search 
of a possible Chairman for next May's Dinner Dance, 
I have narrowed my list of candidates for the job to 
the following: , 
.. . ; 
.. ·~ . 
"A" List (in alphabetical o~der) 
Jam~s E.· Cayne, Co-President, Bear, Stearns & Co ..... · · 
If the W a 11 St . rumor mi 11 proves true , Cayne · w i 1 1 ~-
·soon be named sole President, his Co-President,·-<~> :: .. 
E. John Rosenwald, having been asked t~ step down . 
In the '86 campaign, Cayne, with the help of ·Rita 
Ha u s e r , r a i s ·e d o v e r $ 6 O , O o O w i t h i n t h e . f i rm .,....t _o_w a rd 
EVR's re-election. · · In 1 87, .Cayne,:made ·a solo effort 
and raised nearly $70,000 from wi~hin the firm. · 
Clearly, he wants the job and can do the job within 
his firm. We do not know if he has · any outreach. : 
Will Cayne be so ticked off if .he is not asked ~o -be 
Chairman that we 1-dll lose a minimum of $50,000? <. 
Would Cayne be ticked off if we asked Chairman Ace 
Greenberg in his stead? · . 
Peter A. Cohen, Chairman, Shearson Lehman. Brothers 
Shearson has never taken the lead for one of our 
events~ unlike Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Salomon Bros., 
Drexel and First Boston, because they've never been 
asked. Perhcrps we would be turned down if we asked. 
I hesitate to explore the matter with T. Pulling 
because I suspect that Pulling would try to get off 
the hook if I bring up the suggestion, whereas if .lE..!:! 
explore the idea with him, he might have to take it 
up with Cohen. 
Richard Jenrette, Chairman, Equitable Life 
As you know, the firm is composed of Equitable , 
Investment Corp. (Benjamin D. Holloway, President). 
Donaldson, Lufkin & ·Jenrett2, and Alliance ' Capital 
Management. All three entities ar~ regular contribute · 
to the Support Committee. Personally, I doubt if 
Jenrette would accept. Would Holloway carry sufficien -
.. ,., e i g ht w i th i n t h e i n v e s t :i1 e !l t c : mm l.! ri i"t y ? · 
. ~30lJ1 ::1 
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COMMIITTE CHAIRMAN 
LCW!'ence S. Hunttnoton 
COMMITTCE TREASURER 
Wlltted J. Mecxel II 
COMMITTCE SECRETARY 
Polly Weber 
VICE CHAIRP£RSONS 
Richard A Bernstein 
.Jenn C Bietwirtn 
AnOrew M. Blum 
Bemord R. Bober 
Thomas A Bolon 
Jomes E. Corey . 
Jomes E. Coyne 
Judy Cornier 
Pefe< J. CostiQOI'! 
Mory S. Donson 
Thomas W. Evans 
Enid K f'.eist 
Rov L Furman 
Thomas J. Gochbefg 
ChriSfine Goodwin 
Joseo/'l Harcum 
Rita E. Howe< 
: Mlctioe4 Hemcndez 
Richard 0. Hopkins 
Gedcle B. Horo.vitz 
Enc M. ..Jcvits 
Howard l Koneff 
Rooert M. Kaufman 
KCTtlleen lccey 
BenJCmrn V. Lambert 
Joner A Luhrs 
Eo1e I. Mock 
Joel R. Mesznrk 
'Mlliom w MOO<e 
Thomes E. O'Connor 
C Kevin O'Donoonue 
Fiorovonre G Perrotta 
Cort H P!orznetme< 111 
Hovvord W Phillips 
Jonn R. Price 
Thomes L Pulling 
Broatord J. Race. Jr. 
William J. Reqon. Jr. 
Steonen Rooerr 
William A Scnreyet' 
Ffonk P. Smeal 
C:iorles F. Smrtners. Jr. 
William I. Soencer 
Mononne Sorogo1ns 
Madelon 0. Tolley 
EO'NCrO L nrrell 
Phrllo A Toio 
Jann Trubrn 
Chones J. umacrt 
Jomes M Woaswonn 
.:onn F. Wallace 111 
,. ' 
COMMITTEE IN FOllMATION 
Pa o 
---' 
"A" List (continued) 
·- -.. . 
Gerald Tsai, Chairman, Primerica Corp. 
Now that Primerica is ·realizing its goal of becoming 
a full-fledged financial services corporation throu ~ 
its acquisition of Smith Barney, do you think that 
Tsai might be receptive? Or would he suggest that~ 
approach either John Orb or George Yonder Linden of-
Smith Barney? Smith Barney has given every indicati1 
that it wants to do much more business with the 
Comptroller's office. l 
John Weinberg, Chairman, Goldman Sachs 
I will e~plore the notion with Arthur Spector who is 
a new member of the Support Committee, if you want. 
I don't know Weinberg's politics, although I do know 
that his two newly-named Vice Chairmen, Stephen ·· Frieo 
and Robert Rubin, are major Democratic fundraisers. 
11 8 11 List 
Theodore Forstmann; Chairman, Forstman~ Little 
He raised nearly $60,0GO for '86 re-election hosting. 
luncheon with L. Lehrman at "21". .. · 
David T. Kearns, Chairman, Xerox Corp. 
Neither he nor the corporation has ever contributed 
to EVR, but the corp. purchased Furman, Selz ... this 
past summer. Perhaps, Roy Furman would approach him 
on our behalf. 
Henry Kravis, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. 
He has contrfbuted nearly Sl00,000 over the past five 
years. As you know, he is a new member of the FORBES 
400 and with his wife, Carolyn Roehm, appears to be 
underwriting/chairing half the major charitiable even t 
i n the City , ( an ex a g g er at ion , of course , but you kn ow 
what I mean.) 
Lewis T. Preston, Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 
cc 
LO'\ 
cc 
win 
co 
Poll 
VIC 
Rk:t 
Jon 
HK. 
Bell 
Tho1 
JotT 
Jorr 
Jud' 
· PetE 
Mor 
Thor 
Enid 
Roy 
Thor 
CM: 
Jose 
Rtto 
Miet 
Ricno 
Gdd· 
Enc r 
HQo.M 
ROOE 
Kartl l 
Ben1c 
Jene 
EC1le 
Joel I 
Willia 
Thom 
C K& 
FiO<O\I 
Cert~ 
Howe 
Jonn 
Thom< 
Bro ate 
'Miiiar 
Steen• 
'Mlliar 
Ffonic . 
C1'10r1E 
'Miiien 
.Viener 
Mooel· 
E~erc 
U n d e r T . O e n n i s S u l l i v a n , t h e - b a n k b e c am e · f r i e n d l y Ph•tio ;. 
..;onn Tr 
w i t h E V R . t h e p a s t t \v o y e :i r s • U n f o r t u n a t e l y , _ s. u l l i v a n Chorre~ h a s mo v e d o n t o h e a d P r i n c et o n U . ' s e n d o w m e n t . Am I James 
c o r r e c t i n a s s u m i n g t h a t P r e s t o n c a r r i e s c 1 o t o f 1-1 e i g .:onn F . 
in the financial community? ccMM. 
3-0011 j_ 
SUITE 230 • 45 EASi J5D-i SiRE::T • NEW YCRK. NeN YCRK 10017 • _ !cl:_:'" (212) 697-63:20 
E N.-'ED ·REG AN 
. '. ~ 
SUPPORT COMMITTE 
1 
jh 
1e 
on 
drn 
ts 
w 
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COMMIITTE CHAIRMAN 
LOWl'ence S. Huntington 
COMMIITTE TREASURER 
Wlltr8cl J. Mecl<el II 
COMMIITTE SECRETARY 
Polly Weber 
VICE CHAJl!f'£RSONS 
Richard A Bernstein 
Jonn C. Blefwirtti 
/>ndrew M. Blum 
8emord R. Bober 
Thol'TI03 A Bolon 
Jomes E. Carey 
Jomes E. Covne 
Judy Comief 
. Peter J. Costioo11 
' Mary S. Oonson 
Thol'TI03 W. Evans 
Enid K. Feist 
R"f L Furman 
Thorne$ J. Goct\be<g 
Ovisttne Gooawin 
.Joseol"t Harcum 
Rlto E. Houser 
Mict\oe4 Hernandez 
Ricl"lOTd 0 . Hool<ins 
Gddale 8. HOl"owitz 
Eric M. .Jovits 
Howard T. Kaneff 
Robert M. Kautmon 
Kamteen Lacey 
Ben1amin V. Lambert 
.Jcnet A Luhr3 
EO'\e I. Moo: 
Joel R. Mesznik 
William W Moore 
Thomas E. O'Connor 
C Kevin O'Donoghue 
fiotavanre G . Perrotta 
Con H Pforzne1mer Ill 
Howard W Phillips 
Jol1n R. Pnce 
fhomas L Pulling 
etcC10<d J. Race. Jr. 
W1lllom J. Recan. Jr. 
Sleorien Robert 
'Mlliom A Scnrever 
ffcn~ P Smeal 
C!"lones F. Sm1tt1en. Jr. 
'Miiiam I. Soencer 
Mononne Soraoo1ns 
Mooeton 0 . Talley 
bard L TirreH 
Fl11iiO A To1a 
.:onn Trub1n 
Chcries J. Urstaat 
;omes M. waaswortn 
:onn F. Wollace 111 
COMMITTEE IN F<JRMATION 
P a-ge 
11 8 11 List (continued) 
Leonard Lauder, President, Estee Lauder Inc. 
As you know, the Lauder family is very generous to the 
Republican Party. Estee L. is co-chair of upcoming 
Conservative Party Dinner. Eric Javits could appro~~~ 
L. Lauder. 
Others 
Willard Butcher, Chairman, Chase Manhattan 
Thomas Labrecaue, President, Chase Manhattan 
Chase is the only one of the Senior Managers of 11 Sprin~ 
·· Borrowing 11 that has never chaired one of our eve.a.ts. 
John Reed, Chairman, Citibank 
Walter V. Shipley, Jr., Chairman, Chemical ~ank 
Summary 
, I don 1 t believe that 1988 will be an easy year for 
us with regard to fundraising, given the competition of . 
the Presidential race and the NYS Senatorial election . 
Therefore, · I do not think \'le should 11 settle 11 for a 11 caretaki;; 
chairman - my mind still reels over the 1984 debacle when 
E. Javits, 8. Lambert and the Hon. W. Rogers served as co-
chairs - but must agressively seek someone (or two) who,\'lill 
take the ball and run with it on our behalf. It could mean 
a $50,000 - $100,000 difference for us: 
.,-· ·-
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8/23/85 
MEETING WITH ROD SMITH 
In discussing our fund raising problems, goals and 
operation with Rod Smith of the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee, Rod made it clear that with Ned's power and fund 
raising base, we should not have a problem, rather, we should 
have more money than we know what to do with. 
I explained to Rod that Ned was the sole trustee of 
$26 billion (an amount that grows by a minimum of $2.5 billion 
a year) and was the final say on which firms receive commission 
business, etc. 
Rod commented that Ned had more leverage than most elected 
officials since he provided firms with actual dollars, while a 
senator or governor can only provide a vague promise to assist 
with legislation or make a few introductions and phone calls. 
Rod felt the major problem was with Ned. He assumed 
(rightfully so) that Ned was too much of a nice guy, that the 
firms were aware of this and knew he would not ~ressure them 
into coming up with large political donations. This, he said, 
has to change. He must make it clear that those who give will 
get. 
He felt the best way to get this , ~essage out was to create 
a board for each s~gment of the Common Fund's asset base 
(equity, fixed income, mortgages, venture capital, cash). 
These boards would be make up of top people from each of the 
firms and would assist Ned in making the proper investment 
decisions. In order to get on these boards, members would be 
invited to pay $20,000 a year, and of cburse, Ned would end up 
doing most of the investment business with these people. ~ I ~~~i2H I 
- 2 -
While that idea may be a bit too radical, I feel it could 
be boiled down a bit to relate to the Regan Support Committee. 
As you are well aware, that Committee currently is made up of 
a few people who deliver and many people who want to see their 
name on an invitation. The Committee could be restructured to 
include only top CEOs such as William Shryer of Merrill Lynch. 
Each member could be made responsible for a sizeable amount of 
money and in return, they or their firm would make a sizeable 
amount of money. While still not the most subtle approach, it 
would send a clear message to the street. 
Rod pointed out that a strong, elite committee also would 
provide an attractive forum for the powers that be in 
Washington. He could not think of on~ senator, cabinet member, 
etc., who would not jump at the chance to talk to the people 
Ned deals with. Ned could be the leader and point man rather 
than one of the followers. 
Rod also felt that Ned, in order to make himself better 
known in Washington, should join the Senatorial Trust. While 
the price tag is high ($10,000 a year) it is a very high level, 
well connected group who could be of great assistance to Ned. 
Concerning our fund raising operat±on in general, Rod felt 
that we need more of an organization with the ability to 
follow-up. A staff of one, regardless of how good the person 
was, certainly was not enough. He admitted that this would not 
be a cheap proposition, but felt the return would more than 
justify the creation of this organization. 
- 3 -
During a discussion on PA Cs, Rod felt we had no real 
reason to start a campaign of that nature and should stick with 
our natural constituency (underwriters, investment bankers). I 
explained to him that the Common Fund with an equity portfolio 
of $11 billion, was a major stockholder in every corporation in 
the U.S. and that our vote on a particular proxy issue was 
extremely important. I added that we had never received funds 
from any of the PACs of these corporations. In reply, he said 
we should try to get the CEos of these corporations involved in 
our fundraising efforts, not the PACs. 
At the end of our meeting, Rod said he would be happy to 
come to New York and discuss fund raising with Ned. 
AC IOS..A (R ... l/81) 
OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Regan Date: August 23, ·1985 
From: Joe Palumto Subject: Williar:\ Shryer 
Larry Hunt.in:Jton rret with Jean P.ousseau regard.in::J ask.i.n3' 
william Shryer to chair t.~ ne.tt furrl rais.in::J event. 
Rousseau asked Shryer how he felt al:out it airl Shryer has 
agreed. 
The next step is for ya..i to call Shryer's office arrl set up an 
afP:)intrre.nt for the week of Septeml::;er 3 (tre 2.n:i l:ein; Lal:or Day) arrl 
make the fomal request. 
Larry feels that it is very irnpxtant that re get t:o:Jether 
with ycu prior to ycur IIEetin; to discuss~ approach with ~o 
I will call ~ .ta::orrow to ~ a i c:;o1ss ~ matter with 
. 
yc:u. 
~e, I will ask :1ary Grace to set up tie rreeti.n:;s l:eb.een 
yc:u arrl Shryer arrl ycu airl Larry. 
: 
~ ~ 
200205 
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AN EVENING AT THE 
NEW YORK STATE THEATER 
AT LINCOLN CENTER 
IN HONOR OF NED REGAN 
Monday, January 27, 1986 
LOBBY 
Cocktail Reception 
PROMENADE 
Dinner and Dancing 
MENU 
Fantas ie de Fr<.1its de Mer 
Paupiette of Veal and Chicken 
Sauce aux Morill es 
Melange of Spring Vegetables 
Lemon Mousse 
Strawbe rries au Chocolat 
Cotes du Rhone 
Orvietto Antinori 
Demitasse 
ENTERTAINMENT 
Montgomery, Plant & Stritch 
MUSIC 
Michael Carney 
!!ONIJlll!)r.1 •rc.1c. 
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Januarv 27. 1986 - Lincoln Center Dinner Dance - SEATING BY TABLE 
iable #1 
Turry Newman & Guest 
· John & Joanne Baranello 
'Bonnie Graham 
~ary Gr Mee Mullen. 
Marion , urphv 
-- --'Pat Cunn l ngnam \ 
-.....;::_;___ --Deoorail Grarrato 
Jeanette Mil ione 
#2 
M/M C. Kevin 0' Donoghue 
M/M Joseph J. Larkin 
M/M Kenneth Horner 
~bert W. Bouchard (KEY BANK) 
~nnis S. Buchan (KEY BANK) 
#3 
Walter Kicinski 
Beth de Harne l 
Ruben Madina 
Jerry Selitto 
Paul Ladd 
Kr istin Mannion 
4 Guests 
Maraaret Carey 
~cl: Lop°S'-
~ll~ 
Ste•1e 5e:nria rdt 
'Aii;:e r v cq!:> 
.Jiaraaret Vo9!) 
Cynthia Crispen 
2 Guests 
#5 
& Guest 
Edward L. fi rre 11 & Guest 
M/M Robert Battle 
M/M Bernard Meldrum 
:M/M Morgan Morrav 
Tifton ::i1mi.1ons & Guest 
#6 
· Hans C. Mau:; .-2r 
M/M Warren G. Harner 
M/M J. Mic!:ael Maionev 
•Ffl Ii am I. Soenar -
Victoria Biancni 
#7 
Table #8 
Jay Manas 
Bruce Bent 
Dina Needleman 
Shaun Benet 
M/M Morton Ego l 
· Robert & Joan Pen:; · rigton 
Leslie Maebe & Joe Cashin 
·---··-
··· -Table #Q 
Dennis Sullivan 
Frances Miley 
Karen Eisenstadt 
Clay Meye:s 
Richard Taube: 
Davia S. Scna1man 
Andrew Cooper 
Tom Mooney 
Table #10 
M/M Howard Lim, Jr. 
William Newmark & Guest 
James E. O'Doherty 
Jerry Kassar 
Frances vella 
'. : 2~2:; Gay 
Jim Rutherford 
Robert Ryan 
Jerr·1 Boehm 
V; ,,~,._~ )J"";',i:...S 
Table #11 
,, M/M Harry W. Albright. Jr.~ 
"----. ... - ---~-.,---------M/ M Roger S. PhelD' 
M/M Victor J. Melone 
M/M PAter M. Tocze~ 
Table #12 
M/M Steonen Mittel 
M/M Scott ~~arsh 
M/M Cliff Henry 
M/M Charles Ringle 
Steve Kaufman 
Bi 11 Jonnson 
Table ::15 
M/M Al Der: A. Wa 1 sh 
Blaise G. A. Pas:torv 
Mary Huntington • 
E'...!oene Sout:iern 
~ ·Jwar'J GiJbS 
MJM_5he!don c51egel 
-~/M ~ono=_:nGen:ial 
M/M ~ooer: Mar:1n 
.. C:- Thomas Kunz 
Roger:~. Zaitz2ss 
M/M ?~illip Rcdilosso 
~A/:~ ·~:?0r2e ~anc 
Table #16 
M/M Bernard R. Bober 
M/M Edward Dimon 
M/M Donald Dunn 
M/M Burtt Ehrlich 
Bill Hudson 
Ramona Adams 
Table #17 
Richard F. Kezer 
Steohen A. Hopkins 
John Wetzler 
Valerie Lancaster 
John Young 
M/M James P. Murphy 
Patricia K. Perlman 
Ann F. Walsh 
Richard D. Parsons 
#18 
Thomas Y. Hobart, Jr. 
Dan Sanders 
·SOnara Fi;! dman~ 
·Pa1~~a Stryk0 
Irwin 011snook 
Nuala Drescher 
W11l1am Dougnerty 
Nancy Berger 
#19 
-------
.--M/M John McCarthy 
..__':+f+i'-'f~'=""~~.~rle~n1rderson 
M/M John Walsh 
M/M Paul \.Jhi 1:e 
John Suther 1 and _ 
Rona 1 d Lynch 
#20 
John F. Wallace III 
Herman Charbonneau 
Elaine Brennan 
Denise Finney 
M/M Robert Zirkle 
Jeanette Brummell 
Elizabeth Condon 
Frederick de la Vega 
#21 
------Josenh Sano·& Warren Diet-
Phi 1 Caruso 
-~ 
_Bar!"'! :.::i,n'"-"-b"L . 
· ·James Fe::oe:s:onh;o ugw 
C1fforo Kic:"o 
J~ic:-iael Long 
·page 2 
#22 
Janet A. Luhrs 
Stuart Wershub 
Chris Ring 
Marian Granowitz & Guest 
Patricia Briggs & 
Vincent Brana 
Margaret Soter 
Carol Sunderland 
#23 
Raymond S. Jackson 
M/M Joseoh Forte 
M/M Lawrence Swenson 
M/M Orner Williams 
Diana Browne 
Lauri s Raw 1 
1 Guest 
#24. 
Thomas W. Evans 
Lo i s L . Ev ans 
Arthur & Myra Mahon 
Robert Peduzzi 
Diane Smoak 
Lance & Dee Wilson 
Leon & Mabel Weil 
Rooert Nisely 
Robert El leiib:: r g 
#25 
Eric & Margaretta Javi t s 
Howard ~ooper & Guest 
M/M Richard LeFrak 
M/M Patric J. Foley 
'-..J.:1/M Victor P. Greene=--::: 
Jocelyn Javits 
#26 
M/M Wil l iam J. Regan, Jr. 
M/ M Ric hard 0. Hookins 
M/M Peter C. Regan 
Caroline Lassoe 
Al 1 i son Lassoe 
Ward Lassoe 
William Hopkins 
#27 
Ned Flynn & Gues t 
M/M Ric hard Hel mbrec ht 
M/M Richard Loc ke 
~~o n i ca Mac Ada ms 
Mi chae 1 Sm 1 t h 
Ci ndy Cobb s & Gues: 
#28 
Robert 0' Nei 11 
~ . / Rooert Lamo 
M/M David Kirschenbaum 
M/M Robert St eves 
- Steonen Kovacs '\ 
#29 
Theodore Forstrnann 
Nicholas Forstmann 
William Brian Little 
Judith Little 
John Sprague 
Dorothy Whitmarsh 
Steven Kl i nsky 
Pamela Connolly 
Peter Lusk 
1 Guest 
' #30 
M/M Philip A. Toia 
Jane Sinatra 
Blair Mitchell 
M/M Palmer Turnheim 
.Wolfgang Schoellkopf 
~· 
2 Guests 
#31 
Richard ~ Amelia Bernstein 
C . Au st i n F i t t s 
Muriel Siebert 
Douglas Luke & Jess Belser 
Satoishi ~ 
Susan Fi sher & 
Robert Greenwood 
Marianne Spraggins 
#32 
M/ M John Trubin 
Flora Schnal l & John Nel son 
Jose~~ l IrQne Mattone 
Ri ta & Gustave Hauser 
E! inor Sac h r~c~---
·"Cou1s J. Lefk ow1_:s;; 
#33 
~o n ~a io r a na & ~a ureen 
~.::;n n el ly 
~/ M Ser: hi n ~a ! :2 s2 
'-.i:l!_M Guv Ve e ia 
M/M ~narew ~c urKe 
#34 
Jennifer Regan 
_J. Daniel Mahoney 
'Wi_l l i am D. FUCiazy;; 
Jann Hyland & Frieda Wal 
M/M Lawrence Quinn 
\n 11 i am W. Cobbs & 2 Gue1 
#35 
James M. Wadsworth 
M/M John C. Barber 
M/M Garv Schober 
M/M Francesco Galesi 
Anthony Delorenzo 
David Buicko 
Robert Amdursky 
#36 
M/M Thomas E. O'Connor 
M/M Joseph McManus, Jr. 
M/M Thomas F. Meade 
M/M John Sietes, Jr. 
M/M Gregory Verini 
#37 
M/M Richard Cooper 
M/M Gene Crowley 
M/M Tom Meade 
( M/M Jann 0' Brier~ 
'MLM re , in Pot:nan __., 
#38 
Edward V. Regan 
M/M Wi 11 i am A. S-chreyer ··· 
-Ml[""Antnony J. (Jilav i t3:-
Earle I. Mack & Carol Di d 
Andrew & Fliss Blum 
Patricia Patterson 
Charles F. Smithers, Jr. 
#39 
M/M Daniel P. Tully 
Jean & Georgann Rousseau 
M/ M John G. Heimann 
M/M James E. Murp hy 
M/M John B. Sprung 
:1:a.o 
M/ M Rebert Linton 
M/ M Fred Joseph 
James Balog 
Joel Meszn1k 
~o oer: Sc :: i ff er 
:.::f fr~ y Aofel 
Ka t h 1 e::n i.. acey 
.· ~ James .. es ser 
' ,1 ~ .,... ~I :: .-. "" """ , , 
da Wall1 
2 Guest 
i 
1nor 
, Jr. 
·eyer 
vita:. 
·ol Dicke 
• Jr. 
sseau 
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#41 
M/M Samuel J. Abate. Jr. 
~nnis Radigan & Dee Forrester 
~orge & Rosemarie Bucci 
John & Marilyn LaSpaiui:.u 
#42 
,1te~ DeMatteis i ~~ 
. ~nua L. Mu-ss & Gues~ 
Irving Shatz & William Valet 
~rry & Robert Anderson 
#43 
M/M Robert Foran 
M/M Morris Goodwin 
M/M Raymond Lyles 
M/M Dennis Santo 
Carol Bellamy 
#44 
Gerald Liooes & Guest 
'W! 111 am Hu as on & GL:re-s-t-. 
.- . ---
EJcharn Rq,oqpi0b 
, M/M Richard C. F~t, 
Robert B. ~c:_ye_r._____,, 
#45 
Carl & Betty Pforzheimer 
M/M L. Guthart 
M/M G. Frelinghuysen 
M/M H. Blodget 
#46 
Larry & Caroline Huntington 
Charles & Nancy Beck 
M/M Al an Medaugh 
M/M Henry Thompson 
Christian & Anson Nolan 
#47 
Frank P. Smea 1 
Robert Cenci 
David Cl aop 
' Robert Oownev- , 
Jo~
Mi chael McCar:hv 
Judah Sommer -
Arthur Soec::::ir 
2 Guests 
#48 
Fioravate Perrotta 
Hon. & Mrs. Wm. P. Rogers 
Paul M. Hook ins 
Lewis B. Stone 
Ellen L. Tayl:Jr-
Frank E. Sisson II 
Lee M. Smith & Valerie 
Kilhenney 
#49 
Benjamin Lambert & Guest 
}1JM Joel Goldfran[ - -, 
M/M Jay Joseph 
M/M Ken Zarrilli 
M/M Leonard Rizzolo 
#50 
Thomas Pu 11 i ng 
~~-
Duke Chapman 
'Jack Gault 
Scott Higgins 
Keith Thomas 
Ronald Stack 
Nancy Henze 
Stanley Pardo 
#51 
M/M Homer D. Sch aaf 
~ E. Micnael Sndl?"V 
M/M Joseph Armbrust, Jr. 
4 Guests 
#52 
M/M Daniel Harman III 
Frank & Linda Sullivan 
Ann Hagan 
William McCarthy 
Zenaida Chinloy 
Steve Kantor 
Gail Gordon & Joseph 
Mc Cale 
#53 
Sharon & Steve Portnoy 
Paul & Mary Gojkovich 
JQM W i l I 1 am P ! u o k '"':-- 7 
#5'1 
10 GUESTS 
#55 
Jack Carroll & Desmond Ryan 
Harry Levine & Edw. Connors 
Howard & Cherry ~aneff 
~r_i.[l ur Hug, ~ 
John V. Scaduto 
John & Jean O'Leary 
#56 
Frank Bass 
Patrick J. Callan 
Thomas A. Caputo 
Steve Cordes 
Joe Flanagan 
Frank Gunsberg 
Philip Iglenart 
Peter Steil 
Mi chae 1 Scadron 
Bi·uce Surrey 
#58 
Louise M. Sunshine 
M/M Jim West 
~M/M Gregory L1egey ,,.} 
Harian 8atrus 1'"""Guest 
John Kabacki 
M/M Paul Matlow 
#59 
M/M Charles Urstadt 
M/M Henry Pearce 
M/M Fred B. Morrfson 
Martin Gallagher 
M/M Fred Salomon 
#60 
Lea & Tom Gochberg 
M/M William Hamma 
M/M Alan Levine 
M/M Anthony O'Connor 
#61 
Ian Bruce Eichner 
Howard Hornstein 
Enid K. Feist 
Ronal d Alt:7ian 
Henry S. Miller 
Conrad J. Gunther, Jr. 
David H. Berman 
~·1urray r. \1ascis 
Pete: 2. ShulGioer 
~poer: ::<.. Hunt 
• . I • 
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#62 
John ~Lindsay 
M/M Donald Elliott 
M/M Eugene W. Harper 
Louis R. Tomson 
Betsy Tomson 
John E. Hull 
kny 8. Kuhn 
#63 
Wilfred J. Meckel II 
M/M David Banta 
M/M William Hazen 
Mac & Madelon Talley 
John Lynch 
Polly Weber 
#64 
Michael D. Hernandez 
Jonathan Plutzik 
Ronald Gault 
Thomas Jacoos 
Eva Hassett 
Claire Goodman Pellegrini 
Paolo Pellegrini 
Rona Packer 
Richard Tilghman 
Mrs. Richard Tilghman 
#65 
Leon Levy 
Shelby White 
'J1/M Jon e· rosse-b 
Mary S.ronson & Guest 
.:.111cnae§ F1neston~ 
Alexan er Cortesi 
Mrs. Norman Peck 
#66 
Norman L. Peck 
M/M John Emmanuel 
M/M William Stern 
Linda Wooldridge 
Kurt Dean 
Donal Murphy 
2 Guests 
#67 
William Hicks 
Ky 1 e De Benham 
Judy & Miene! Cornier 
Joseoh P3lumbo 
Chris & Gerry Goodwin 
Irene R. Halliaan 
Jerry & Lelia Raibourn 
Scott Malfitano 
~ .. 
I .. .. . \ 
I: 
· ·.· ... 
:· ·' ! . . -· · .. _ ... - ·.- - · ~·- . ·. .. ~ -."_.: ---·· 
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AC 809-A (Rev. 1/81) 
OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
~- . . . INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM 
. ~ ' •'.- ... 
To: 
Comptroller Regan 
. J.arry Huntington 
From: Bill Hicks 
Joe Palumbo . 
·Date: 
March 11, 1986 
Subject: 
Fundraising 
The following are names and firms that may be contained 
elsewhere in this memo but should be highlighted for various 
reasons. 
Dale Horowitz - Must become more involved, particularly for 
September event. 
Jerome Goldstein/Bear Stearns - Must become more involved 
Alan Greenberg 
Robert Linton - EVR to ask him to Chair September Event but 
must discuss with L.H. before March 19 
dinner. 
Lauder Family - EVR is having lunch with Leonard Lauder and 
Dan Davidson on March 28. P.e must talk to 
L.H. before luncheon. 
Frank Smeal EVR to meet for breakfast. .. :: .... i.... .. _,_,_.:..._7· ..._· .·~-• '. ;.. · _ .. L-=- · 
- Who is partner in charge? 
- Ask for support. 
Eli Jacobs - Arranged Drew Lewis lunch for March 21. 
Dick O'Connor - Offered to help but someone (undecided) has 
to get back to him. 
~1h~~·~! _:. .~ ;_ .. i:~_~{n_L~eJ[. _ ;_()Shoemaker - Offered to get corporate types 
fV ~ !~ , together. EVR. feels Larry 
should talk directly to them. 
Ben Lambert - EVR & J.P. to meet with him and bring a list 
of one or two dozen names of real estate 
types. (Hicks and Palumbo to compile list). 
I 
.... .... '.'··~·-'--·- ~ i~ ' · '· .. J !~_......_/~ . • 
.- ~ - ' .• ; ·:~ .- ' .. , ·~ _ .:. d_ •. _~,::;) .. <(j 
t · I...- ,"J {_.•- · \• .-~"- '-.-v.J • . ; ,.-,
1 
, / ~~~ ,, ' 
.... t c ! • :; ·_ ... :~ • > · .~~· ....... <~---- ~·i·-~· ~ t·~ ..... ~. 1..r.:.=~ ',)· ; :·, ,. - cv . .__ ·t:.-· -~ ~ 
~ 
') ~1 n? 1 ; l 
.·. 
\ 
Forbes 400 (Minimum Net Worth: $150 mi I I ion.) 
Edgar Bronfman (Seagrams) - EVR to v.i sit Ri t~ Hauser. 
C. Douglas Dillon - Andv Blum to contact Pat Patterson who will 
then set up meeting with EVR. 
Semour Durst (Developer) - To be arranged. 
Thomas M. Evans (Crane Co.) - Seymour Knox to introduce EVR to 
him. Knox also is a friend of L.H. 
Larry~ Zachary Fisher - Eric Javits to bring EVR to their 
offices. 
Halcolm Forbes - Pulling to Robinson to Forbes. 
Francesco Galesi - Wadsworth. 
~~urice Greenberg - EVR to ask Louise Sunshine. 
Harry Helmsley - Pul I ing to set up a meeting. 
Peter Kalikow - To be arranged. 
Lauder Family - EVR is having lunch with Leonard Lauder and Dan 
Davidson on March 28. He must talk to L.H. 
·before the luncheon. 
Samuel LeFrak - To be arranged. 
John Loeb - Nothing more to be done. 
~ 
t.iack Fami I y - EVR to c I ean-up prob I em. 
Paul Mi I stein - To be arranged. 
Jack Parker - To be arranged. 
Mi I ton Petrie - EVR to talk to Eric Javits. 
Phipps_Fami ly - Andy Blum to contact Dinny Phipps. 
Jack & Burton Resnick - To be arranged. 
Robert Rich Sr. & Jr. Wadsworth. 
David Rockefeller - Hold off. 
Laurence Rockefeller - Hold off. 
Happy Rockefeller - Hold off. 
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.~c 1!09-A {Rev. 1/81) 
OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER 
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM 
To: Comptro I I er Date: 
From: Joe Pa I umbo Subject: 
May 1 9, . 1 9 8 6 
Fundraising 
(Various) 
ROCHESTER: We should begin to get organized now that the Buffalo 
event is over. Possibly we should get a pre I iminary 
Rochester Support Comnittee together to discuss date, 
time, amount of ticket, etc. 
SYRACUSE: We have an excel lent I ist and now should attempt to 
find a Chairman for the event. I think Dr. Malfitano 
would be a good choice. 
LONG ISLAND: We should try to get moving as soon as possible. 
Please let me know what you want me to do. 
WESTCHESTER: Again, if we are going to try anything, we should 
move quickly. 
ALBANY: The envelopes have been addressed and the invitations 
sho~ld be printed today, but we're running a couple of 
days behind schedule. Also, you said to remind you to 
contact labor leaders regarding this event . 
... 
BEN LAMBERT: I spoke with Martha Wallau late Friday (5/16) and 
she assured me that the people would be contacted. Martha 
and I also discussed the real estate developer/real estate 
attorney event and feel it should take place late sumner. 
Lenny Rizzolo is getting a I ist together of al I developers 
we deal with. The I ist wi I I be ready this week. 
LEONE PETERS: When you have a I ittle more time after the 
ccnvention, Mr. Peters should be contacted and taken up on 
his offer to host a dinner. 
TED FORSTMANN: spoke with his office on Thursday and they 
asked to change the date to June 25. Once firmed up, I wi 11 
contact Eric Javits and Larry Huntington to make certain one 
or both wi 11 attend. .-
~ 
~ 
2U022G 
·' 
-2-
.. 
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER: . 1 met with John Price about 10 days ago. 
He assures me the meeting between you and the executive 
conmittee wi I I take place but wants to make certain Mr. 
McGi I I icudy is in attendance. John also agreed to join our 
Support Corrrnittee. (This could mean a larger contribution 
than the bank's usual $2,000). 
METROPOLITAN LIFE: Bob Bott (you met at the breakfast) 
expressed a "very strong" wi 11 ingness to participate in 
your October Fundraiser. I wi I I continue to keep in contact 
with Metropolitan. ' 
DREXEL BURNHAM: I am meeting with Joel Mesznik tomorrow (5/20) 
to discuss the October event in general and the corporate 
angle in particular, Kathy Lacey has been given the I ist of 
holdings and we' I I begin there. Also, I am setting up a 
meeting with you, · me, Kathy Lacey and Bob Shiffer to get . 
things moving. This meeting wi I I be after the Convention. 
Kathy, others from Drexel and I are meeting with Bob Linton. 
on Friday (S/23) . 
PROPOSED "OTHER NEW YORK EVENT" : I would appreciate it if at the 
Friday Support Corrrnittee meeting you would strongly express 
your desire to hold such an event. I feel we could raise a 
substantial amount of money. Jo~elyn Javits would I ike John 
Cast I e (her boss) . to chair such an event. 
RONALD PERELMAN: Jocelyn said "he' 11 do anything I want". She 
expects to get a large donation from him . 
: 
20022"l 
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TO: Comptroller Regan 
FROM: Joe Pa 1 umb.o 
DATE: October 9, 1986 
SUBJECT: Fund Raising 
Larry Huntington et al have immediately begun to move on the 
next fund raising initiative with calls already placed to Peter Shar~. 
Ronald Perelman and Ivan Boesky. Larry and Eric will now v1s1t 
them and we' 11 see what happens .. 
What you must do is call I;lenry Kravis, Carl Icahn and 
Lawrence Tisch. When you reach them you should explain that you 
had a fundraiser on Monday and while it was successful, the 
campaign needs additional funds. You should then say you would. 
like to have Larry Huntington, Chairman of Fiduciary Trust and 
the head of your committee along with Eric Javits meet with them 
to discuss fundraising ideas. (With Henry Kravis it's important 
that you don't say you want him to contribute more personally. 
As you know, we would like him to arrange a Forstman-type 
luncheon). 
The phone number for l\lessrs. Kravis, Icahn and Tisch are as 
follows: 
Henry Kravis - 212/750-8300 
Carl Icahn - 212/957-6303 
Lawrence Tisch - 212/841-1000 
The calls to these three people are just the beginning. We 
will have additional people in a day or so. 
On a related manner, Bill Hicks and I are designing a letter 
to be sent to about 200 wealthy individuals asking them to make a 
contribution. Bill Shreyer will be asked to sign about 20 
letters and the remainder will be signed by Larry and Eric. We 
will }h~n follow up. 
Also, called Martha Wallau and explained that while we 
appreciated the breakfast, it bore no resemblance to our initial 
a1scussion. I explained that we needed additional ·help and that 
Larry Huntington would like to meet with Ben to discuss 
approaching people such as ~~-~~E~~~Jl• ~£~~-~JJE~~ and ~~£tY 
~~y~~~- She said she would set up the appointment immediately. 
That 
Larry mentioned one other phone call he feels you must make. 
is, to Bob Linton to thank him for his help on the event. 
.· BE] 
To: E.V.R. 
From: J. Palumbo 
Date: 
Subjec~: 
December 11, 1986 
Spring Borrowing-Related 
Contributions 
From the management group of 17 firms, 16 contributed. Bankers 
Trust did not contribute and . Mani Rani did very little. 
Firms contributing from the management group were: Merrill Lynch; 
Salomon Brothers; Citicorp; Chase Manhattan; Chemical Bank; Horgan 
Guaranty; Manufacturers Hanover; First Boston; Ehrlich-Bober; 
Goldman, Sachs: Norstar Bank; Prudential Bache; Bear, Stears; 
Shearson Lehman; Smith Barney; and Drexel Burnham. 
From the lower bracket of 124 firms, only 17 contributed. 
The 17 contributing firms were: Hutton; Kidder; Marine Midland 
Bank; .Morgan Stanley; Paine Webber; L.F. Rothschild; Wertheim; 
Dillon, Read; Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette~ First Albany; Lazard 
Freres; Dean Witter; Chase Lincoln; Key Bank; Oppenheimer & Co.; 
Daniels & Bell; Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. 
~ 
~ 
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MOllDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1986 
-------------------------------------
7:15 AM Depart by car from Katonah for 
Albany. 
9:00 AM Arrive Albany. 
ALBANY OFFICE 
\ 
10:30 AM Meeting w/ Messrs. Dunn, Tomson, ::: / 
Hull, Healy, Hadley and Ms. ·"' : 
G r i d l e y • R e : S ta t e d e b t . ,... d (:.iL-/'_;(-<0· 
t ( I f ~ - • -
Meeting w/ Mr. Bob Doherty of the · . \.-(~ 11:30 AM 
NYS Federation of Police. 
Re: pension supplementation. 
12:00 N" · Interview w/ Mr. Jay Gallagher of : 
Gannett News. (Claudia) 
1 : 0 0 PM Me e t i n g w I Me s s r ·S • D u n n , T o m s o n , · 
Hull and Ms. Gridley. 
Re: Spring borrowing. 
2:45 PM Deoart by car for New York City. 
(Rosie) 
6:00 PM Gala Supper at the Parker 
:·1 e r i d i e n . 118 W . 5 6 t h S t . a t 6 t h 
.C..ve. 212/245-5000. BLACK TIE. 
8:00 PM Gala Reopening of Carnegie Hall. 
57th St. at 7th Ave. 212/247-7800. · 
o/n - New York City 
· Rosi~·- 212/581-8100 
Mark · - 518/449-7345 
.. · / .. 
~ .. ; , 
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To: EVR 
From: J. Palumbo 
Subject: Mike Hernandez 
~Date: November 24, 1987 
·' 
Currently, First Boston, like many other firms, is in the process of 
re-thinking its priorities and it seems likely that public finance will 
not be on the top of the list. 
Several weeks ago, it was announced that First Boston would be 
promoting a subordinate of Mike Hernandez's to help him co-manage the 
public finance area. While many people think this means a demotion for 
Mike, I think he's being groomed to take over other areas of First Boston 
such as corporate finance. He is considered very valuable by the firm 
and has done a great deal for its bottom line. 
But while he does great things for First Boston, he has done almost 
nothing for us. 
During the last fundraiser, the only thing First Boston did was buy 
one table, and we just received the final payment two days ago. He, 
along with Shoemaker, was extremely uncooperative and seemed to feel the 
firm was doing us a favor by lending its name to the event. 
We do an enormous amount of business with the firm ($231,000 in 
commissions for ··this fiscal year to date) yet they more or less refused to 
return the favor. 
Exhibit 
20 
·. 
.. 
···.·. 
..· .. · .. 
.· -·-··-- - ---....=...:...:.... 
.... . •··. ·· . · ... · . 
.. :: .... 
. . · .. : . 
. ... ~ ; ~ . . :· .. ·.' ·-: .... ~. ·. '\ .. ·· . 
. ... •·· ..... . 
: . ·. :··· 
·. 
.. --
.. 
. :· 
· ... 
... · . ... ~ · .. . ;. 
. . ...... --
. : .· . : . \.·. 
~- ......... _._ ·.-; .. : 
·. .. : ·. 
-. 
', ,I. lo•: :·;; ;:: ... ;_ ,· .... : ·:: ·· · ·:.-..·.-:;·_ ;.·~·-:~·\.:~~ ~ ~.···:··· •.• ~ ... : :.· .. .. ~·. ··~:-= ·· .... 
: .. · .. .... ·-:-· . /.,. · · .·· - .-. . . ~:- .. : ·.:::·; 
' . .--. .. .. -·. :_· .· • ·-:-~ .· 
·.·. : ... : ~~·. :·~·=:: . .: .~ · ..... ·. · .. ··. ~-
Feb!:'°'..iary 24, 1987 
'!';:) : :::-JR 
F=m: Joe Palumb:J 
SU.OJ~: First Boston 
':':"1e :::illowing is business con:iuc~"'d wi t.°'1 Fi.!:"st 
Eos---::::i for the fiscal year l::eginni..r:g Ap::-il 1, 1986 
t."-:::"cr.lq:i Janua.ry 31, 1987. 
E-:~~J Carrni.ssicns 
·S.::Or--Te=n <:=e::its 
·Fi.xe::-~ cre::its 
Total 
$ 97,246 
289,913 
210,250 
$597,419 
T.:-..o -:..:: ..... "', puts Fi=st BoS-.....on in t.~ n~ t:-.ree _ 
s2.ot CAit of the 67 fi:=:ns w"ith who:n w= do l::u.siness. 
T:-.= =:...=n also is a.-ri act:..ve playe= .i.'1 Sp=ing 
Ee.=:;-,,,,.; n; se_'\Ti.r:g in t.1-ie ma..112.ge.'Te."'lt c;=cup. 
.. 
~ 
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